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Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections 
15-680 
Ruling Below: Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505 (E.D. Va. 
2015) 
The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of twelve different House of Delegates districts in 
Virginia, on the grounds that they were unlawfully racially gerrymandered, violating the Equal 
Protection Amendment.  
The District Court held that the use of the 55% black voting-age population floor did not satisfy 
the requirement of racial predominance in the drawing of the district and did not trigger strict 
scrutiny as a result. Thus, the holding stated that the plaintiffs failed to show that race was the 
predominant factor in eleven of the twelve districts. The holding also stated that, although race 
was the predominant factor in the twelfth district, it was narrowly tailored, designed to comply 
with federal anti-discrimination law. 
Question Presented: Whether the use of race must result in “actual conflict” with traditional 
districting criteria for race to be considered predominant;  
Whether the use of a black population voting floor should have amounted to racial predominance 
and triggered strict scrutiny; 
Whether the court below erred by disregarding the admitted use of race in drawing districts in 
favor of examining circumstantial evidence; 
Whether racial motivations must outweigh all other criteria considered in order for race to be 
considered predominant; 
Whether the use of race in drawing House District 75 was narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling government interest. 
 
Golden BETHUNE–HILL, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al., Defendants.. 
 
United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia 
Decided on October 22, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
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ROBERT E. PAYNE, Senior District Judge: 
 
This case challenges the constitutionality of 
twelve Virginia House of Delegates districts 
(the “Challenged Districts”) as racial 
gerrymanders in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. The case is ripe for decision following 
a four-day bench trial at which the parties 
presented oral testimony and offered 
numerous exhibits. Our findings of fact are 
based on our assessment of the record and are 
grounded in our determinations respecting 
the credibility of the witnesses. 
 
Our conclusions of law address the several 
legal issues presented by the parties. In 
particular, we have determined that it is the 
burden of the Plaintiffs to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that race was 
the predominate factor motivating the 
decision to place a significant number of 
voters within or without a particular district 
in that, as to each of those districts, Virginia's 
General Assembly subordinated race-neutral 
districting principles to racial considerations 
when forming the district. Based on this legal 
standard and the record, we have concluded 
that, except as to House District 75, the 
Plaintiffs have not carried that burden and 
that race was not shown to have been the 
predominant factor in the creation of eleven 
of the twelve Challenged Districts. 
 
We are satisfied that race was the 
predominant factor in the creation of House 
District 75. However, we have also 
concluded that, in using race, the General 
Assembly was pursuing a compelling state 
interest, namely, actual compliance with 
federal antidiscrimination law, and that, in 
the process, the General Assembly used race 
in a manner narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest. 
 
In the Memorandum Opinion that follows, 
the Court will review the procedural 
background of the case in Section I; provide 
a brief overview of the law relating to racial 
gerrymandering claims in Section II; and set 
out its findings on the factual background of 
the case in Section III. In Section IV, the 
Court will articulate its understanding of the 
relevant legal framework for evaluating 
racial gerrymandering (or “racial sorting”) 
claims, set out additional factual findings of 
general applicability, and conduct a district-
by-district analysis with district-specific 
factual findings and district-specific 
application of the relevant legal framework. 
 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In the wake of the 2010 census, the Virginia 
General Assembly sought to redraw the 
legislative districts for the Virginia House of 
Delegates (“House”) and the Senate of 
Virginia (“Senate”). The task of redistricting 
is one that carries great political and legal 
consequence. In a representative democracy, 
such legislation shapes more than the abstract 
boundaries of electoral districts; it shapes the 
character, conduct, and culture of the 
representatives themselves. On its face, the 
legislation recites a singularly tedious list of 
precincts and counties. But in application, 
few pieces of legislation have a more 
profound impact on the function of 
government and whether it acts as “the 
faithful echo of the voices of the people.” 
 
The political significance of redistricting is 
matched only by its legal complexity. Those 
shepherding redistricting legislation must 
traverse a precarious path between 
constitutional and statutory demands that are 
often in tension with one another and provide 
opaque interpretive standards rather than 
clear rules. 
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As to the 2011 redistricting, Delegate Chris 
Jones led this effort in the House. Delegate 
Jones played an instrumental role in the 2001 
redistricting process and drew upon that 
experience to lead the 2011 redistricting 
efforts. Because Virginia was a covered 
jurisdiction under Section 4 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) at the time the 
redistricting legislation was prepared, and 
was therefore subject to the requirements of 
Section 5 of the VRA, it was necessary to 
ensure that the plan did not result in a 
“retrogression in the position of racial 
minorities with respect to their effective 
exercise of the electoral franchise.” In an 
attempt to comply with this statutory 
command, Delegate Jones crafted a plan 
containing twelve majority-minority House 
Districts (“HDs” or “Districts”). These are 
the Challenged Districts: HDs 63, 69, 70, 71, 
74, 75, 77, 80, 89, 90, 92, and 95. 
 
On December 22, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a 
Complaint against the Virginia State Board 
of Elections, the Virginia Department of 
Elections, and various members thereof in 
their official capacities (“Defendants”), 
alleging that the Challenged Districts were 
racial gerrymanders in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants from 
implementing or conducting further elections 
based on the Challenged Districts. The 
Plaintiffs are twelve citizens of the United 
States and the Commonwealth of Virginia 
who are lawfully registered voters in the 
Commonwealth and each of whom resides in 
one of the twelve Challenged Districts. The 
Plaintiffs requested that the case be heard by 
a three-judge district court pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2284(a) on the grounds that the 
action “challeng[es] the constitutionality of 
the apportionment of ... [a] statewide 
legislative body.” That request was granted 
by the Chief Judge of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.  
 
The Virginia House of Delegates and the 
Virginia House of Delegates Speaker 
William Howell (“Intervenors”) moved to 
intervene in the case. That motion was 
granted.  
 
A four-day bench trial began on July 7, 2015. 
Because the Defendants are “administrative 
agencies that implement elections” but “do 
not draw the districts,” the Defendants 
allowed the Intervenors to carry the burden of 
litigation but joined the Intervenors' 
arguments at the close of the case. For ease of 
reference, the Defendants and Intervenors 
will be referred to as the Intervenors. 
 
II. BASIC OVERVIEW OF RACIAL 
GERRYMANDERING CLAIMS 
 
Before proceeding to the facts of the case and 
the substance of this litigation, a brief 
overview of the constitutional and statutory 
requirements pertinent to racial 
gerrymandering claims is appropriate. As 
noted above, these commands often cut 
counter to each other and require legislators 
to balance competing considerations. Tracing 
their evolution is therefore useful as a 
predicate for the decision that follows. 
 
The Supreme Court has long observed that 
the right to vote is “fundamental” because it 
is “preservative of all rights.” In Reynolds v. 
Sims, the Court recognized that “the right of 
suffrage can be denied by a debasement or 
dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just 
as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the 
free exercise of the franchise” and held that 
the malapportionment of state legislative 
bodies in derogation of the “one person, one 
vote” principle violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. Because legislation affecting the 
right to vote “strike[s] at the heart of 
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representative government,” the 
“Constitution leaves no room for 
classification of people in a way that 
unnecessarily abridges this right,” and grants 
every citizen “an inalienable right to full and 
effective participation in the political 
processes of his State's legislative bodies.” 
 
The decision in Reynolds only required state 
legislatures to comply with the equal 
population standard, but its language would 
come to stand for something more. The next 
year, in Fortson v. Dorsey, the Court 
suggested that a “constituency apportionment 
scheme” may not “comport with the dictates 
of the Equal Protection Clause” if it “would 
operate to minimize or cancel out the voting 
strength of racial or political elements of the 
voting population.” With Fortson, the 
Supreme Court first recognized that 
redistricting legislation may offend Equal 
Protection Clause principles when it 
distinguishes between voters on a racial 
basis. 
 
Over time, the Supreme Court has come to 
recognize two types of racial gerrymandering 
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) 
claims of racial vote dilution, where the 
redistricting legislation is “conceived or 
operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further 
racial discrimination by minimizing, 
canceling out or diluting the voting strength 
of racial elements in the voting population”; 
and (2) claims of racial sorting, where the 
redistricting legislation, “though race neutral 
on its face, rationally cannot be understood as 
anything other than an effort to separate 
voters into different districts on the basis of 
race, and that the separation lacks sufficient 
justification.”  
 
A. Racial Vote Dilution and the 
Fourteenth Amendment 
 
The Supreme Court first struck down a 
districting scheme for unconstitutional racial 
vote dilution in White v. Regester. There, the 
Court stated: 
 
The plaintiffs' burden is to produce 
evidence to support findings that the 
political processes leading to 
nomination and election were not 
equally open to participation by the 
group in question—that its members 
had less opportunity than did other 
residents in the district to participate 
in the political processes and to elect 
legislators of their choice. 
 
At the time, it was unclear whether such a 
claim required a showing of discriminatory 
intent or could be maintained based solely on 
discriminatory effect. 
 
Several years later, in City of Mobile v. 
Bolden, the Court suggested in a plurality 
opinion that both discriminatory intent and 
discriminatory effect were required to 
establish a claim of unconstitutional racial 
vote dilution. That holding was reaffirmed by 
a majority of the Court in Rogers v. Lodge. 
Writing for the majority, Justice White 
confirmed that “a showing of discriminatory 
intent has long been required in all types of 
equal protection cases charging racial 
discrimination.”  
 
Therefore, in a constitutional racial vote 
dilution case, the plaintiff must show that the 
State has placed a burden upon the right to 
vote by intentionally establishing or 
maintaining devices or procedures that cause 
minority citizens to have less opportunity 
than other citizens to participate in the 
political processes and to elect legislators of 
their choice. This dilutes the minority voter's 
ability to exercise the “full and effective” 
right to vote. 
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B. Racial Sorting and the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
 
The other strand of “racial 
gerrymandering”—a racial sorting claim 
such as the one presented in this case—is 
“analytically distinct” from a vote dilution 
claim. “Whereas a vote dilution claim alleges 
that the State has enacted a ... purposeful 
device ‘to minimize or cancel out the voting 
potential of racial or ethnic minorities,’ ... the 
essence of [a racial sorting claim] is that the 
State has used race as a basis for separating 
voters into districts.”  
 
In Shaw I, the Supreme Court faced two 
patently bizarre legislative districts. One 
resembled a “Rorshach ink-blot test” or a 
“bug splattered on a windshield,” while the 
other was “even more unusually shaped”: 
 
[The district] is approximately 160 
miles long and, for much of its length, 
no wider than the I–85 corridor. It 
winds in snakelike fashion through 
tobacco country, financial centers, 
and manufacturing areas until it 
gobbles in enough enclaves of black 
neighborhoods. Northbound and 
southbound drivers on I–85 
sometimes find themselves in 
separate districts in one county, only 
to “trade” districts when they enter 
the next county. Of the 10 counties 
through which District 12 passes, 5 
are cut into 3 different districts; even 
towns are divided. At one point the 
district remains contiguous only 
because it intersects at a single point 
with two other districts before 
crossing over them. One state 
legislator has remarked that “if you 
drove down the interstate with both 
car doors open, you'd kill most of the 
people in the district.” 
 
Although the text of the legislation was 
facially neutral, the Court found that “it 
rationally can be viewed only as an effort to 
segregate the races for purposes of voting, 
without regard for traditional districting 
principles.” 
 
For that reason, rather than requiring the 
plaintiffs to present evidence of 
discriminatory purpose and discriminatory 
effect, the Supreme Court treated the 
legislation as tantamount to a suspect facial 
classification and employed strict scrutiny.  
 
In order to prove a racial sorting claim, a 
plaintiff must show that the legislature 
“subordinated” traditional race-neutral 
districting principles in crafting the district's 
boundaries: 
 
The plaintiff's burden is to show, 
either through circumstantial 
evidence of a district's shape and 
demographics or more direct 
evidence going to legislative purpose, 
that race was the predominant factor 
motivating the legislature's decision 
to place a significant number of 
voters within or without a particular 
district. To make this showing, a 
plaintiff must prove that the 
legislature subordinated traditional 
race-neutral districting principles, 
including but not limited to 
compactness, contiguity, and respect 
for political subdivisions or 
communities defined by actual shared 
interests, to racial considerations. 
 
This threshold standard is “a demanding 
one.” Indeed, the Plaintiffs must overcome a 
presumption that the legislature acted 
correctly and in good faith. Thus, the plaintiff 
“must show that the State has relied on race 
in substantial disregard of customary and 
traditional districting practices.”  
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If the plaintiff makes the requisite showing, 
the State must demonstrate that the 
redistricting legislation is narrowly tailored 
to advance a compelling state interest. In 
redistricting cases where the State claims a 
compelling interest in compliance with the 
VRA, the legislature must show that it had a 
“strong basis in evidence” to support its use 
of race-based districting. In other words, the 
legislature must have “good reasons to 
believe” that its use of racial classifications 
was “required” by the VRA, “even if a court 
does not find that the actions were necessary 
for statutory compliance” after the fact.  
 
C. The Voting Rights Act 
 
In addition to these constitutional 
imperatives, redistricting legislation must 
also comply with the VRA. “The Voting 
Rights Act was designed by Congress to 
banish the blight of racial discrimination in 
voting [.]” Enacted pursuant to Congress' 
enforcement powers under the Fifteenth 
Amendment, the VRA prohibits states from 
adopting plans that would result in vote 
dilution under Section 2 or—in covered 
jurisdictions—retrogression under Section 5. 
 
Section 2 of the VRA prohibits the 
imposition of any electoral practice or 
procedure that “results in a denial or 
abridgement of the right of any citizen ... to 
vote on account of race or color....” A § 2 
violation occurs when, based on the totality 
of circumstances, the political process results 
in minority “members hav[ing] less 
opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their 
choice.” By adopting the “discriminatory 
effect” language from Regester and omitting 
any requirement to prove discriminatory 
intent as required by Lodge, Congress created 
a statutory “results test” that could be brought 
by plaintiffs who might be otherwise unable 
to bring a claim of racial vote dilution under 
the Equal Protection Clause.  
In order to prove a § 2 violation, a plaintiff 
must satisfy three prerequisites: 
compactness, political cohesiveness, and 
bloc voting. “First, the minority group must 
be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently 
large and geographically compact to 
constitute a majority in a single-member 
district.” “Second, the minority group must 
be able to show that it is politically cohesive.” 
“Third, the minority must be able to 
demonstrate that the white majority votes 
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the 
absence of special circumstances, such as the 
minority candidate running unopposed—
usually to defeat the minority's preferred 
candidate.” These final two factors are often 
referred to collectively as “racial 
polarization.” Once these prerequisites have 
been satisfied, the court evaluates the 
plaintiff's evidence based on the totality of 
the circumstances. The totality of 
circumstances must be considered with a 
focus on whether the minority group in 
question was denied “equal political 
opportunity.”  
 
With respect to redistricting legislation, § 2 
establishes a “natural floor” based on the 
State's demographics for the number of 
districts wherein members of a minority 
group must maintain an “equal political 
opportunity” to “elect representatives of their 
choice.” Where a minority group is 
sufficiently large and geographically 
compact to constitute a numerical majority in 
a hypothetical district, § 2 requires the 
creation of a district wherein members of that 
group maintain the equal ability to elect 
representatives of their choice. Proving this 
hypothetical requires the plaintiffs to present 
an alternative redistricting plan.  
 
Section 5 of the VRA, on the other hand, 
forbids voting changes with “any 
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discriminatory purpose” as well as voting 
changes that diminish the ability of citizens, 
on account of race, color, or language 
minority status, “to elect their preferred 
candidates of choice.” Sections 2 and 5 
“differ in structure, purpose, and application. 
Section 5 applies only in certain jurisdictions 
specified by Congress and ‘only to proposed 
changes in voting procedures.’ ”  
 
Section 5 was enacted as “a response to a 
common practice in some jurisdictions of 
staying one step ahead of the federal courts 
by passing new discriminatory voting laws as 
soon as the old ones had been struck down.” 
By requiring that proposed changes be 
approved in advance, Congress sought “ ‘to 
shift the advantage of time and inertia from 
the perpetrators of the evil to its victim,’ by 
‘freezing election procedures in the covered 
areas unless the changes can be shown to be 
nondiscriminatory.’ ” The purpose of this 
approach was to ensure that “no voting-
procedure changes would be made that would 
lead to a retrogression in the position of racial 
minorities with respect to their effective 
exercise of the electoral franchise.”  
 
“Retrogression, by definition, requires a 
comparison of a jurisdiction's new voting 
plan with its existing plan. It also necessarily 
implies that the jurisdiction's existing plan is 
the benchmark against which the ‘effect’ of 
voting changes is measured.” Unlike the 
“natural floor” of § 2 ensuring equal ability 
to elect, the retrogression standard of § 5 
creates a “relative floor” based upon the 
existing benchmark plan. Under § 5, the State 
must ensure that the new plan does not “lead 
to a retrogression in the position of racial 
minorities with respect to their effective 
exercise of the electoral franchise” by 
diminishing the ability of minority voters to 
elect their preferred candidates of choice as 
compared to the State's existing plan. 
 
Therein lies the rub. To comply with federal 
statutory command (the VRA), the State must 
consider and account for race in drawing 
legislative districts in order to craft a 
compliant plan. However, to avoid violating 
the federal constitution, the State must not 
subordinate traditional, neutral principles to 
racial considerations in drawing district 
boundaries. 
 
And, at the same time, the State must also 
comply with the “one person, one vote” 
constitutional requirement as specified in 
Reynolds v. Sims. That, of course, is not a 
traditional redistricting principle to be 
weighed as part of the predominance inquiry, 
as Alabama makes clear. But it is a federal 
constitutional requirement that, of necessity, 
is central to the redistricting process and that 
is highly instrumental in the drawing of 
district boundaries. 
 
It is within the context of this legal 
framework that the Virginia General 
Assembly sought to design and enact a 
compliant redistricting plan. And these 
principles are central to the resolution of this 
case. 
 
Before proceeding to the facts of the case, the 
Court feels it necessary to pause and 
recognize that Delegate Jones, members of 
the redistricting committee, and other 
legislators involved in the crafting and 
amendment of HB 5005 did not have the 
benefit of either the Supreme Court's 
guidance in the recent Alabama decision or 
the guidance provided in the opinion entered 
here today. Based on the evidence and 
testimony provided in the record, the Court 
believes that all of the legislators involved 
proceeded in a good faith attempt to comply 
with all relevant constitutional and statutory 
demands, as they understood them at the 
time. 
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III. Factual Background 
 
A. The 2011 Redistricting Process 
 
The first steps in the redistricting process 
began well before the United States Census 
Bureau released its population and 
demographic data. On August 23, 2010, 
Delegate Mark Cole announced that the 
redistricting subcommittee of the House of 
Delegates Committee on Privileges and 
Elections had scheduled a series of six public 
hearings throughout the Commonwealth to 
solicit input into the House redistricting 
process. These public hearings were held 
between September 8, 2010 and December 
17, 2010. Following these hearings, 
Governor McDonnell signed Executive 
Order 31 on January 10, 2011, creating the 
“Independent Bipartisan Advisory 
Redistricting Commission” (“Governor's 
Commission”) to develop plan proposals, 
review public input, and analyze 
recommendations from other stakeholders in 
the voting public.  
 
Redistricting began in earnest in February 
2011 when the 2010 census data was released 
via Public Law 94–171. On March 25, 2011, 
the House Committee on Privileges and 
Elections adopted a resolution setting out the 
criteria that the committee would follow in 
reviewing redistricting plans. The House 
Committee established six criteria, which 
were as follows: 
 
I. Population Equality: The population of 
legislative districts shall be determined solely 
according to the enumeration established by 
the 2010 federal census. The population of 
each district shall be as nearly equal to the 
population of every other district as 
practicable. Population deviations in House 
of Delegates districts should be within plus-
or-minus one percent. 
 
II. Voting Rights Act: Districts shall be 
drawn in accordance with the laws of the 
United States and the Commonwealth of 
Virginia including compliance with 
protections against the unwarranted 
retrogression or dilution of racial or ethnic 
minority voting strength. Nothing in these 
guidelines shall be construed to require or 
permit any districting policy or action that is 
contrary to the United States Constitution or 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
 
III. Contiguity and Compactness: Districts 
shall be comprised of contiguous territory 
including adjoining insular territory. 
Contiguity by water is sufficient. Districts 
shall be contiguous and compact in 
accordance with the Constitution of Virginia 
as interpreted by the Virginia Supreme Court 
in the cases of Jamerson v. Womack. 
 
IV. Single–Member Districts: All districts 
shall be single-member districts. 
 
V. Communities of Interest: Districts shall be 
based on legislative consideration of the 
varied factors that can create or contribute to 
communities of interest. These factors may 
include, among others, economic factors, 
social factors, cultural factors, geographic 
factors, governmental jurisdictions and 
service delivery areas, political beliefs, 
voting trends, and incumbency 
considerations.... Local government 
jurisdiction and precinct lines may reflect 
communities of interest to be balanced, but 
they are entitled to no greater weight as a 
matter of state policy than other identifiable 
communities of interest. 
 
VI. Priority: All of the foregoing criteria shall 
be considered in the districting process, but 
population equality among districts and 
compliance with federal and state 
constitutional requirements and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 shall be given priority in 
385 
 
the event of conflict among the criteria. 
Where the application of any of the foregoing 
criteria may cause a violation of applicable 
federal or state law, there may be such 
deviation from the criteria as is necessary, but 
no more than is necessary, to avoid such 
violation. 
 
These criteria were substantially similar to 
the criteria adopted by the committee in the 
2001 redistricting cycle, with two exceptions. 
First, the 2001 criteria had permitted a 
population deviation of “plus-or-minus two 
percent,” rather than one percent, which 
Delegate Jones stated was altered to better 
“approximate the one-person-one-vote 
[standard] in the Virginia constitution.” 
Second, the 2001 criteria were updated to 
include a citation to the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Virginia in Wilkins v. West 
as part of the “Contiguity and Compactness” 
criterion. 
 
B. The 55% Black Voting Age Population 
Floor 
 
At the time the redistricting process began, 
the twelve Challenged Districts had black 
voting-age populations (“BVAP”) ranging 
from 46.3% to 62.7%. Three of the districts 
had BVAPs below 55%. All others were 
above 55%. Several legislators believed that 
the twelve “ability-to-elect” districts found in 
the 2001 redistricting plan (or “Benchmark 
Plan”) needed to contain a BVAP of at least 
55% in the 2011 redistricting plan to avoid 
“unwarranted retrogression” under Section 5 
of the VRA and to comply with Criterion II 
of their own redistricting rules. 
 
The existence of a fixed racial threshold can 
have profound consequences for the Court's 
predominance and narrow tailoring inquiries 
in a racial sorting claim, so a substantial 
amount of time at trial was devoted to 
questions related to this factual topic. 
However, the most important question—
whether such a figure was used in drawing 
the Challenged Districts—was not disputed. 
Rather, the parties disputed whether the 55% 
BVAP was an aspiration or a target or a rule. 
In the end, it is not relevant whether the 55% 
BVAP was a rule or a target because all the 
parties agree—and the Court finds—that the 
55% BVAP figure was used in structuring the 
districts and in assessing whether the 
redistricting plan satisfied constitutional 
standards and the VRA, and whether the plan 
would be precleared by the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”). 
 
At trial, two additional questions regarding 
the 55% figure dominated the discussion. 
First, whether the BVAP figure included or 
excluded those who identified themselves in 
the census process as ethnically Hispanic and 
racially black. And second, what the source 
of the 55% BVAP figure was. 
 
The parties hotly debated whether the 
appropriate measure of BVAP used in the 
redistricting process did or did not include 
individuals who identified as racially black 
and ethnically Hispanic in the census data. 
The supposed importance of this dispute was 
that, if black Hispanics were excluded from 
the black population count, three of the 
Enacted Plan's majority-minority districts 
would actually contain a BVAP percentage 
just shy of 55%. That, according to 
Intervenors, would support a finding that 
there was not a 55% BVAP floor in deciding 
on the twelve Challenged Districts. 
 
The record shows that delegates attempting 
to comply with the 55% BVAP floor 
submitted their proposed changes using data 
that included black Hispanics in the BVAP 
count. Although Delegate Jones claimed to 
personally believe that the DOJ would use a 
BVAP figure excluding black Hispanics, this 
was not a distinction that he discussed with 
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any other delegates, and he repeatedly 
asserted on the House floor that all majority-
minority districts in the proposed legislation 
had a BVAP of 55% or higher. Moreover, 
Delegate Jones “assumed” that Virginia, in 
its preclearance submissions to the DOJ, 
would represent that all 12 majority-minority 
districts contained at least 55% BVAP. This 
turned out to be the case.  
 
At trial, Intervenors relied on a spreadsheet 
prepared by the Division of Legislative 
Services (“DLS”) in an attempt to show that 
including Hispanics in the BVAP count 
would be erroneous. The spreadsheet 
contains rows of data by district and, in each 
column, contains metrics such as total 
population, population by race, racial 
population by percentage, population by 
ethnicity, and ethnic population by 
percentage. After adding the racial and ethnic 
population totals column by column, the 
Intervenors dramatically revealed that the 
number exceeded that of the district's total 
population. But this exercise reflects an error 
on the part of the Intervenors, not DLS. 
Because ethnicity measures a different 
variable than race, the racial and ethnic data 
are not meant to be added in the first place. If 
one removes the ethnicity column from the 
count (on the assumption that Hispanic 
individuals of any race are already counted in 
their respective racial columns), then the total 
population figure is corrected. That does not, 
however, imply that Hispanics who are 
racially black should be excluded from the 
black population count because to do so 
would undercount the number of black 
individuals in the BVAP percentage. 
 
The record shows that the ethnic data 
provided by the census only has redistricting 
implications in states that may need to craft 
majority-Hispanic districts or majority-
“black-plus-Hispanic” (or “coalition”) 
districts. In states such as Virginia, on the 
other hand, black Hispanics would count 
towards the total black population of a district 
for retrogression purposes. That appears to be 
consistent with the DOJ's (admittedly 
confusing) guidance on this question: “If 
there are significant numbers of responses 
which report Latino and one or more minority 
races (for example, Latinos who list their race 
as Black/African American), those responses 
will be allocated alternatively to the Latino 
category and the minority race category.” 
This “alternating” approach presumably 
applies to situations where the district would 
be majority-“black-plus-Hispanic,” in which 
case counting black Hispanic individuals as 
either black or Hispanic in alternating fashion 
would avoid counting those individuals twice 
in the same district. Thus, the Court finds that 
the proper count includes black Hispanics 
within the BVAP percentage of each 
majority-minority district. This method of 
counting results in a BVAP above 55% for all 
twelve majority-minority districts, ranging 
from 55.2% to 60.7%. 
 
Regardless, this debate—like the first—
generated more heat than light. The actual 
differences in BVAP percentages were 
minute, and both parties eventually agreed 
that the distinction was not one of great legal 
significance.  
 
Unlike the first two questions, the answer to 
the third question—i.e., the source of the 
55% rule—can carry great legal significance. 
Testimony on this question is a muddle. 
Delegate Dance testified that her 
understanding came from Delegate Jones and 
that the 55% figure was necessary in order to 
achieve DOJ approval, but her speech from 
the House floor appears to represent it as her 
own understanding. Delegate McClellan 
understood the committee's adopted criteria 
to require “each of the majority-minority 
districts ... to have a black voting-age 
population of at least 55 percent,” and 
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testified that she came to this understanding 
“[t]hrough conversations with Delegate 
Jones and with Legislative Services.” 
Delegate Tyler testified that her 
understanding came from Delegate Spruill, 
and Delegate Armstrong testified that, “as far 
as [he] could tell, the number was almost 
pulled out of thin air.”  
 
Delegate Jones initially testified that the 
figure was drawn from the public hearings 
held with the community. Although this 
testimony is consistent with his prior 
statements from the House floor, the trial 
record does not support it. At trial, Delegate 
Jones admitted that he had not read the 
transcripts from every hearing and could not 
recall a single instance of a member of the 
public requesting a 55% BVAP level. 
Moreover, most of these hearings were 
transcribed and submitted as evidence. A 
review of the public hearing transcripts from 
the Fall of 2010 fails to reveal any mention of 
the 55% figure.  
 
Delegate Jones also claimed that the 55% 
figure came from “Delegate Dance, and 
Delegate Tyler, Delegate Spruill, and one or 
two othe[r] ... African–American members of 
the House.” This was then narrowed to 
Delegates Dance, Tyler, and Spruill. After 
further questioning, the 55% figure appears 
to have come from feedback that Delegate 
Spruill received from various groups in 
Virginia and from concerns that Delegate 
Tyler would be unable to hold her seat in HD 
75 with a lower BVAP percentage. In 
discussing Delegate McClellan's seat, by 
contrast, Delegate Jones indicated that, while 
“no one” was comfortable leaving the BVAP 
percentage in HD 71 at 46%, “they felt that 
we needed to have a performing majority-
minority district, and from the members that 
I spoke to, they felt that it needed to be north 
of 50 percent minimum.”  
 
Based on the foregoing testimony, and the 
evidence set forth below, the Court finds—
based on the record presented—that the 55% 
BVAP floor was based largely on concerns 
pertaining to the re-election of Delegate 
Tyler in HD 75 and on feedback received 
from Delegate Spruill and, to a lesser extent, 
Delegates Dance and Tyler. That figure was 
then applied across the board to all twelve of 
the Challenged Districts. 
 
C. The Passage and Enactment of HB 5005 
 
During the redistricting process, the General 
Assembly initially considered three plans: 
HB 5001, HB 5002, and HB 5003. HB 5001 
was the plan designed and proposed by 
Delegate Jones. HB 5002 and HB 5003, on 
the other hand, were designed by university 
students and proposed by other members of 
the House of Delegates. According to 
Delegate Jones, HB 5002 paired somewhere 
between 40 and 48 incumbents, contained six 
majority-minority districts, and had over a 
9% population deviation. HB 5003, on the 
other hand, paired somewhere between 32–
34 incumbents, contained nine or ten 
majority-minority districts, and also did not 
meet the population deviation criteria. The 
Governor's Commission also designed two 
plans that contained 13 and 14 majority-
minority districts, respectively; however, 
those plans were never formally introduced 
or proposed. 
 
Once the House had coalesced around HB 
5001 and the plan was married with the 
Senate's redistricting plan, the bill was ready 
for passage and enactment. On April 12, 
2011, the Virginia General Assembly passed 
HB 5001. Based largely upon objections to 
the Senate plan, then-Virginia Governor 
Robert McDonnell vetoed HB 5001 three 
days later. After relatively minor revisions to 
the House plan and more substantial 
revisions to the Senate plan, the legislature 
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passed HB 5005, which was signed by the 
Governor and enacted into law on April 29, 
2011. 
 
To comply with its obligations under the 
VRA, the Commonwealth then submitted the 
Enacted Plan (or “the Plan”) to the DOJ for 
preclearance. The DOJ precleared the Plan on 
June 17, 2011, and the first election under the 
new districts was held on November 8, 2011. 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
The questions raised in a racial sorting claim 
are deceptive in their simplicity but profound 
in their implications. Resting at the 
crossroads of race, politics, and the 
constitutional limits of federal power, the 
claim raises vital questions about how we 
identify as citizens and how we project that 
identity in the halls of the legislature. The 
Supreme Court has crafted an interpretive 
standard for navigating this field: the 
legislature must not allow racial 
considerations to predominate over (i.e., to 
subordinate) traditional redistricting criteria. 
If this results from attempted compliance 
with the VRA, the State must show a “strong 
basis in evidence” that its use of race was 
necessary to comply with a constitutional 
reading of the statute. 
 
What this standard provides in conceptual 
grace, however, it lacks in practical guidance. 
For legislators, it does little to signal when it 
may be constitutionally permissible to cut 
through a precinct or move a boundary line to 
alter the demographic composition of a 
district for purposes of complying with 
similarly mandatory federal law. For 
litigators, it provides an enticingly vague 
standard and invites litigation that can drive 
up the cost of conducting and defending the 
State's redistricting endeavor. And for courts, 
it provides an uncomfortable amount of 
discretion in a field that the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly admonished “represents a 
serious intrusion on the most vital of local 
functions.” By asking courts attempting to 
identify predominance to engage in a 
searching factual inquiry and comprehensive 
balancing before applying strict scrutiny—
and to justify strict scrutiny—the test gives 
the judicial branch the relatively broad power 
to strike down or uphold legislative districts 
without much guidance in how to do so, 
notwithstanding exhortations to exercise 
“extraordinary caution” to the contrary. 
 
Therefore, to sharpen the judicial inquiry, to 
ensure that the requisite burden is satisfied, 
and to assess whether redistricting legislation 
has successfully navigated the narrow 
passage between constitutional and 
unconstitutional redistricting, it is 
appropriate to articulate how the Court 
understands the predominance and strict 
scrutiny inquiries are to proceed as a matter 
of law. The statewide and district-by-district 
evidence then will be assessed within that 
framework. 
 
A. The Racial Sorting Framework 
 
The essence of the racial sorting analysis is 
quite easy to articulate and comprehend. 
First, courts examine whether racial 
considerations predominated over—or 
“subordinated”—traditional redistricting 
criteria. If a court so finds, then the court 
applies strict scrutiny. Second, the court 
examines whether the legislature had a strong 
basis in evidence for believing federal law 
required its use of race, assuming this is the 
basis upon which the State seeks to justify its 
decision. 
 
But, as this case demonstrates, the devil is in 
the details. The parties actually have 
proposed conflicting rules regarding the 
“subordination” test. And each believes that 
the Supreme Court's recent Alabama decision 
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reinforces its position. But both cannot be 
right, and we think that neither is. 
 
The Plaintiffs' case and our colleague's 
dissent revolve chiefly around the evidence 
that legislators employed a 55% BVAP floor 
when crafting the Challenged Districts. 
According to Plaintiffs' theory, “race 
predominates if it is the most important 
criterion.” In other words, subordination 
“does not require open conflict with 
‘traditional’ districting criteria.” 
 
Thus, the Plaintiffs, like the dissent, propose 
a per se rule: the drafters' use of the 55% 
BVAP floor in districting is verboten and 
automatically satisfies Miller's predominance 
standard. This, the Plaintiffs argue, is the 
central thrust of the Alabama case: 
 
This case boils down to a very simple 
proposition: May Virginia's General 
Assembly utilize a fixed numerical 
racial threshold in establishing 
district lines.... The answer to this 
question has been addressed and 
definitively settled by the United 
States Supreme Court in its recent 
Alabama decision which 
unambiguously condemned the use of 
racial thresholds in redistricting[.] 
 
Despite its tempting simplicity and visceral 
appeal, the Court must reject this proposal. 
Although the Alabama decision condemned 
the use of unwritten racial thresholds, it did 
not establish a per se predominance rule. In 
Alabama, the Court accepted the lower 
court's finding that legislators had employed 
BVAP percentage floors in the challenged 
districts. If the use of those thresholds 
constituted predominance per se, then there 
would have been little reason for the Supreme 
Court to have remanded the case to the 
district court to determine whether race 
predominated.  
Rather, the Court pointed out that “[t]here 
[was] considerable evidence that this goal 
had a direct and significant impact on the 
drawing of at least some of [the district's] 
boundaries.” “That [the State] expressly 
adopted and applied a policy of prioritizing 
mechanical racial targets above all other 
districting criteria (save one-person, one-
vote) provides evidence that race motivated 
the drawing of particular lines in multiple 
districts in the State.”  
 
The Alabama case could not be clearer that 
use of racial BVAP floors constitutes 
evidence—albeit significant evidence—of 
predominance. But, we do not read Alabama 
to hold that use of a BVAP floor satisfies the 
Plaintiffs' predominance burden merely 
because the floor was prioritized “above all 
other districting criteria” in “importance.” 
Rather, the significance of the racial floor is 
its impact on the creation of the district. This 
demands “actual conflict between traditional 
redistricting criteria and race that leads to the 
subordination of the former, rather than a 
merely hypothetical conflict that per force 
results in the conclusion that the traditional 
criteria have been subordinated to race.”  
 
To understand why this is so, one must 
remember the origin of—and the rationale 
for—the Shaw claim. The district boundaries 
in Shaw were so outlandish that—despite any 
express textual classification by race in the 
statute—“it rationally [could] be viewed only 
as an effort to segregate the races for 
purposes of voting, without regard for 
traditional districting principles.” In 
response, the Court treated the legislation as 
though it had employed a facial classification 
and subjected the legislation to strict scrutiny 
rather than requiring the plaintiffs to prove 
both discriminatory purpose and 
discriminatory effect. 
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In Shaw, the Court compared the districts to 
racial “balkanization” and “political 
apartheid” and cautioned that such districts 
threaten expressive harm—i.e., the 
stigmatization of individuals “by reason of 
their membership in a racial group” and the 
incitement of “racial hostility”—as well as 
representative harm—i.e., the threat that 
elected officials would begin to “believe that 
their primary obligation is to represent only 
the members of that group, rather than their 
constituency as whole.”  
 
Unlike in its racial and political vote dilution 
cases, however, the Supreme Court did not 
charge plaintiffs with producing evidence 
that such discriminatory effects had, in fact, 
come to pass. Such evidence is not necessary 
in a racial sorting claim because “[e]xpress 
racial classifications are immediately 
suspect” and are subjected to strict scrutiny. 
This is similarly true for the functional 
equivalents of express racial classifications: 
statutes “unexplainable on grounds other than 
race” or statutes that are an “obvious pretext 
for racial discrimination.”  
 
No sooner had the ink dried on the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Shaw, than it was faced 
with a slightly different question. What if the 
district's boundaries are not “bizarre” or 
“irrational,” but still reflect a clear 
manifestation of racial classification? In 
Miller, the Court recognized that Shaw 
represented an “analytically distinct” claim, 
but decided that the litigation before it 
“require[d] [the Court] further to consider the 
requirements of the proof necessary to 
sustain this equal protection challenge.” 
Rather than abandoning the claim's 
animating principles, the Court altered the 
threshold showing and clarified that parties 
bringing a racial sorting claim are “neither 
confined in their proof to evidence regarding 
the district's geometry and makeup nor 
required to make a threshold showing of 
bizarreness.” 
 
The district challenged in Miller was not as 
bizarre as those found in Shaw, but, “when its 
shape [was] considered in conjunction with 
its racial and population densities,” it became 
“exceedingly obvious” that the district 
employed “narrow land bridges” in “a 
deliberate attempt to bring black populations 
into the district.” There, the district's various 
spindly appendages contained nearly 80% of 
the district's total black population. These 
facially evident deviations from neutral 
districting conventions could only be 
explained on the basis of race. Thus, districts 
such as the one found in Miller still raise the 
specter of expressive or representative harms 
and still manifest, on the face of the law, the 
lawmakers' clear intent to “us[e] race as a 
basis for separating voters into districts.” 
Moreover, these districts necessarily reflect 
the kind of “very stereotypical assumptions 
the Equal Protection Clause forbids;” 
namely, the “demeaning notion that members 
of the defined racial groups ascribe to certain 
‘minority views' that must be different from 
those of other citizens.”  
 
However, when racial considerations do not 
entail the compromise of neutral districting 
norms, the basis for a racial sorting claim 
evaporates. Traditional, neutral districting 
principles reflect certain judgments about 
voters, but these are the same judgments that 
animate all geographic—as opposed to 
proportional—representation systems: that 
those who live near each other in the same 
communities, counties, and cities have 
something in common, something that 
warrants their representation as a reasonably 
defined geographical—rather than racial or 
political—unit. 
 
More importantly, holding that otherwise 
reasonably neutral districts are subject to 
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strict scrutiny because of a merely theoretical 
or latent conflict between race and traditional 
districting criteria would unlash the Shaw 
claim from the mooring of facial 
classification jurisprudence. If this legal 
equivalence is forfeited, it is unclear why the 
“analytically distinct” nature of the claim 
should not unravel entirely, forcing plaintiffs 
to prove the expressive or representative 
harms postulated in Shaw. 
 
Admittedly, the issue presented in this case is 
a difficult one. The Supreme Court reserved 
from the very outset the question of whether 
the intentional use of a 50% BVAP threshold 
was sufficient to sustain a racial sorting 
claim: 
 
It is unnecessary for us to decide 
whether or how a reapportionment 
plan that, on its face, can be explained 
in nonracial terms successfully could 
be challenged. Thus, we express no 
view as to whether “the intentional 
creation of majority-minority 
districts, without more,” always gives 
rise to an equal protection claim. 
 
Although the principal opinion in Bush v. 
Vera attempted to put this question to rest, 
Justice Kennedy expressed some doubts in 
his concurring opinion: 
 
I join the plurality opinion, but the 
statements in ... the opinion that strict 
scrutiny would not apply to all cases 
of intentional creation of majority-
minority districts require comment. I 
do not consider these dicta to commit 
me to any position on the question 
whether race is predominant 
whenever a State, in redistricting, 
foreordains that one race be the 
majority in a certain number of 
districts or in a certain part of the 
State. 
Based on the Supreme Court's recent decision 
in Alabama, the Court now appears to be 
divided, or at least equivocal, on whether 
BVAP thresholds alone are sufficient to 
constitute predominance.  
 
Although the unwritten use of a racial floor 
by legislators may seem repugnant at first 
blush, the interpretation of predominance 
proposed by the Plaintiffs and the dissent has 
quite serious repercussions. If the use of a 
BVAP threshold—any BVAP threshold—is 
sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny in the 
absence of a facial manifestation in the lines 
themselves through the subordination of 
traditional redistricting principles, then the 
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act—
as applied to redistricting—would be drawn 
into question. More fundamentally, the 
compatibility of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth 
Amendment's Enforcement Clause might be 
drawn into question. The Court does not 
believe that the Constitution—or that 
Supreme Court precedent—either requires or 
permits the Plaintiffs' view of predominance 
and, therefore, does not believe that the racial 
sorting claim extends any further than its 
original purpose: to strike down those 
districts that, on their face, reflect racial 
classifications. 
 
Moreover, the Plaintiffs do not take umbrage 
at the use of racial targets, so long as those 
targets serve the ends of preserving minority 
voters' ability to elect. Quoting from the 
Alabama decision during their closing 
statement, the Plaintiffs observed that, in 
order to be narrowly tailored, the legislature 
must ask “to what extent must we preserve 
existing minority percentages in order to 
maintain the minorities' present ability to 
elect the candidate of its choice.” But, the 
inquiry into whether the targets are 
adequately justified only occurs after finding 
race predominant. If targets themselves 
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constitute subordination, then it is hard to see 
how the Plaintiffs have not smuggled one 
inquiry into the next. This would again 
threaten the foundations of the VRA by 
making all its redistricting applications 
subject to strict scrutiny and set up a potential 
conflict between the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and 
the Fifteenth Amendment's Enforcement 
Clause. 
 
After this journey, we thus arrive back where 
we started: Miller's predominance test. In 
Miller, the Court described the Plaintiffs' 
burden as follows: 
 
The plaintiff's burden is to show, 
either through circumstantial 
evidence of a district's shape and 
demographics or more direct 
evidence going to legislative purpose, 
that race was the predominant factor 
motivating the legislature's decision 
to place a significant number of 
voters within or without a particular 
district. To make this showing, a 
plaintiff must prove that the 
legislature subordinated traditional 
race-neutral districting principles, 
including but not limited to 
compactness, contiguity, and respect 
for political subdivisions or 
communities defined by actual shared 
interests, to racial considerations. 
 
Plaintiffs would prefer we stop reading 
Miller at this exact punctuation mark. And, 
under that formulation, they could plausibly 
argue that they have proved racial 
predominance merely upon proof that 
legislators used a 55% BVAP floor. But the 
very next sentence in Miller leads where this 
Court must follow: “Where these or other 
race-neutral considerations are the basis for 
redistricting legislation, and are not 
subordinated to race, a State can ‘defeat a 
claim that a district has been gerrymandered 
on racial lines.’ ” The Court's quotation of 
Shaw in this instance rather clearly reflects its 
intention: 
 
[T]raditional districting principles 
such as compactness, contiguity, and 
respect for political subdivisions ... 
are important ... because they are 
objective factors that may serve to 
defeat a claim that a district has been 
gerrymandered on racial lines .... Put 
differently, we believe that 
reapportionment is one area in which 
appearances do matter. 
 
Therefore, we rely on the principal opinion in 
Bush, which stated that the “neglect of 
traditional districting criteria” is “necessary, 
[but] not sufficient” for strict scrutiny to 
apply.  
 
Our dissenting colleague advocates a 
different reading of predominance. The 
dissent views the 55% BVAP floor as a “filter 
through which all line-drawing decisions had 
to pass” and argues that this “racial filter 
necessarily ... rendered all traditional criteria 
that otherwise would have been ‘race-
neutral,’ tainted by and subordinated to race.” 
According to the dissent, “a legislative 
district necessarily is crafted ‘because of race 
’ ” when such a filter is employed. The 
dissent takes the view that the “application of 
strict scrutiny in this suit was never a close 
question” because when the legislators 
“intentionally created [55% BVAP] 
districts,” this “was sufficient to show that 
race was a predominant factor in its 
redistricting.” We respectfully decline to 
adopt this reading of predominance. 
 
First, the dissent's interpretation echoes the 
view that was rejected by the principal 
opinion in Bush v. Vera. In his separate Bush 
concurrence, Justice Thomas wrote: 
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In my view, [the intentional creation 
of a 50% BVAP district] means that 
the legislature affirmatively 
undertakes to create a majority-
minority district that would not have 
existed but for the express use of 
racial classifications—in other words, 
that a majority-minority district is 
created “because of,” and not merely 
“in spite of,” racial demographics. 
When that occurs, traditional race-
neutral districting principles are 
necessarily subordinated (and race 
necessarily predominates), and the 
legislature has classified persons on 
the basis of race. The resulting 
redistricting must be viewed as a 
racial gerrymander. 
 
Although Justice Thomas recognized that this 
question was “expressly reserved” in Shaw I, 
he believed that the Court had “effectively 
resolved it in subsequent cases.”  
 
Justice Thomas first pointed to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena, as evidence that “all 
governmental racial classifications must be 
strictly scrutinized.” But this presumes what 
must in fact be proven: that the Virginia 
legislature's facially neutral redistricting 
legislation was the legal equivalent of a 
facially racial classification. Predominance is 
itself the arbiter of this legal equivalency. 
 
In Adarand, the question was whether a 
contracting clause providing “financial 
incentive[s] to hire subcontractors controlled 
by ‘socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals' ... violates the equal protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause.” In that case, federal law 
required the use of the clause in most federal 
agency contracts, and expressly “require[d] 
the clause to state that ‘[t]he contractor shall 
presume that socially and economically 
disadvantaged individuals include Black 
Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native 
Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and 
other minorities[.]’ ”  
 
The dissent retreads this path by citing to City 
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. As in 
Adarand, the Croson Court was faced with a 
city ordinance expressly requiring 
contractors to subcontract at least 30% of 
their work on city contracts to “Minority 
Business Enterprises” owned and controlled 
by “[c]itizens of the United States who are 
Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, 
Eskimos, or Aleuts.”  
 
We have no doubt that strict scrutiny is 
applied to all express racial classifications, 
but neither Adarand nor Croson help light 
our path to interpreting predominance. 
Adarand itself explicitly disclaimed any 
application to facially neutral legislation, 
stating that “this case concerns only 
classifications based explicitly on race, and 
presents none of the additional difficulties 
posed by laws that, although facially race 
neutral, result in racially disproportionate 
impact and are motivated by a racially 
discriminatory purpose.” 
 
Justice Thomas next pointed to Miller and 
argued that the State's “concession that it 
intentionally created [50% BVAP] districts 
was sufficient to show that race was a 
predominant, motivating factor in its 
redistricting.” The dissent also relies upon 
Miller to argue that strict scrutiny is 
warranted when a legislature is “motivated 
by,” rather than merely “conscious of,” race 
in its districting. But this demands the 
impossible. We cannot ask legislators to 
accidentally wander into compliance with the 
VRA, and Miller cannot be read to invoke 
strict scrutiny whenever legislators 
intentionally create a district with a 
predetermined BVAP floor. 
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In Miller, there was considerable evidence 
showing “that the General Assembly was 
motivated by a predominant, overriding 
desire to assign black populations to the 
Eleventh District and thereby permit the 
creation of a third majority-black district.” It 
was the State's overriding assignment of 
voters on the basis of race, rather than other 
districting criteria, that made the third 
majority-minority district constitutionally 
offensive. If Miller stood for the proposition 
that the intentional creation of a 50% BVAP 
district alone constituted “predominance,” 
then all three majority-minority districts 
would have constituted racial gerrymanders. 
Instead, the opinion focused on the Eleventh 
District, which was a geographic 
“monstrosity” and required the State to add 
lengthy appendages, split precincts, and 
abandon “all reasonable standards of 
compactness and contiguity.”  
 
The Miller decision does, of course, 
recognize that “statutes are subject to strict 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause 
not just when they contain express racial 
classifications, but also when, though race 
neutral on their face, they are motivated by a 
racial purpose or object.” But it is Miller's 
subordination test itself that mans the 
floodgates to ensure that the predominance 
exception to traditional facial classification 
jurisprudence does not swamp the standing 
rule that Equal Protection Clause claims 
against facially neutral statutes usually 
require plaintiffs to prove discriminatory 
purpose and discriminatory effect. 
 
Subordination in the enacted plan (rather than 
subordination of hypothetical plans) is 
required because a map that reflects neutral 
conventions on its face eliminates the 
assumption of expressive and representative 
harm found in Shaw I without necessarily 
imposing any other constitutionally 
cognizable harms in its stead. The Supreme 
Court recognized as much in Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke. 
 
In Bakke, the Supreme Court struck down a 
higher education admissions program that 
reserved a specific number of seats for 
minority applicants. The problem with this 
scheme was that it “prefer[red] the 
designated minority groups at the expense of 
other individuals who [were] totally 
foreclosed from competition for the 16 
special admissions seats[.]” As Justice 
Powell wrote, “[w]hen a classification denies 
an individual opportunities or benefits 
enjoyed by others solely because of his race 
or ethnic background, it must be regarded as 
suspect.” 
 
Justice Powell contrasted this holding with 
the Supreme Court's holding the previous 
year in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey 
(UJO). In UJO, the State of New York had 
redrawn its voting districts “to enhance the 
electoral power of certain ‘nonwhite’ voters” 
and “meet [the] objections of the [DOJ] under 
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act [.]” The 
Supreme Court affirmed the plan. According 
to Justice Powell, UJO was distinguishable 
“as a case in which the remedy for an 
administrative finding of discrimination 
encompassed measures to improve the 
previously disadvantaged group's ability to 
participate, without excluding individuals 
belonging to any other group from enjoyment 
of the relevant opportunity—meaningful 
participation in the electoral process.” When 
a legislature crafts a plan that reflects 
traditional, neutral, districting conventions 
and does not intentionally dilute any group's 
meaningful participation in the electoral 
process, there is no constitutionally 
cognizable offense to be found. The use of a 
quota does not change this.  
From this vantage, the second problem with 
the dissent's reading comes into view: an 
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interpretation of predominance that ignores 
“discriminatory effect” and deploys strict 
scrutiny when a neutral statute is adopted 
“because of” race-based motives would allow 
claims to proceed on “racial purpose” alone. 
Such an interpretation raises vexatious 
justiciability and balance of powers 
questions. 
 
A redistricting plan struck down “solely 
because of the motivations of the men who 
voted for it” regardless “of its facial content 
or effect ... would presumably be valid as 
soon as the legislature or relevant governing 
body repassed it for different reasons.” That 
is because the offense is not in the legislative 
content of the enactment but only in the 
mental content of the legislators. Although 
divining the amalgamated motivations of an 
entire legislature may be tolerable when a 
showing of discriminatory effect further girds 
the inquiry, a “purpose only” equal protection 
claim would require courts to rest judgment 
upon the thoughts of a coequal branch alone. 
We decline to take that path. As Chief Justice 
Burger once wrote, 
 
The seductive plausibility of single 
steps in a chain of evolutionary 
development of a legal rule is often 
not perceived until a third, fourth, or 
fifth ‘logical’ extension occurs. Each 
step, when taken, appeared a 
reasonable step in relation to that 
which preceded it, although the 
aggregate or end result is one that 
would never have been seriously 
considered in the first instance. This 
kind of gestative propensity calls for 
the ‘line drawing’ familiar in the 
judicial, as in the legislative process: 
‘thus far but not beyond.’ 
 
The dissent's interpretation might be a logical 
step in the evolution of the equal protection 
“predominance” test. But we think it would 
be one step too far. Predominance requires 
that racial considerations manifest in the 
enacted plan itself through the actual 
subordination of other districting criteria. 
That determination cannot be made without 
examining the respective roles of both race 
and the other redistricting factors in the actual 
plan before the Court. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reject the 
invitation to read the unwritten use of a 55% 
BVAP floor as a per se satisfaction of the 
predominance inquiry in a racial sorting 
claim. Of course, evidence of such thresholds 
is still significant when examining those 
districts that exhibit deviations from 
traditional, neutral districting principles. 
Shaw II, for example, recognized that racial 
deviations from neutral principles cannot be 
saved by later resort to non-racial 
explanations.  
 
According to the dissent, Shaw II compels a 
finding of predominance whenever non-
racial factors are only considered “consistent 
with the racial objective.” But the district at 
issue in Shaw II was “highly irregular and 
geographically non-compact by any 
objective standard that can be conceived.” 
Simply put, the Shaw II Court was faced with 
a situation wherein some “race-neutral” 
goals—such as partisan balance—could still 
be partially advanced despite the qualitative 
predominance of race, but it was not faced 
with a situation wherein racial districting 
goals posed no conflict with neutral 
districting criteria whatsoever. 
 
Moreover, the author of Shaw II, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, joined the principal 
opinion issued the same day in Bush v. Vera, 
suggesting that these two opinions can—and 
should—be read in harmony. The Bush 
opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
explicitly rejected the interpretation that the 
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dissent now attributes to his opinion in Shaw 
II. 
 
We adopt a reading consistent with Shaw II, 
as evidenced by our finding of racial 
predominance in HD 75. A State cannot 
district predominantly on the basis of race 
and then insulate such racial line drawing by 
pointing to other non-racial goals advanced 
by the racial sort. 
 
Alabama, like its predecessors in the Shaw–
Miller line, holds that racial thresholds 
constitute evidence, not dispositive proof, of 
racial predominance. If the thresholds 
employed by the legislators crafting the bill 
do not manifest in the formation of the 
enacted district, then there is no facial 
classification equivalent upon which to rest 
Shaw's “analytically distinct” framework. 
 
If one strict predominance rule were not 
enough, Intervenors advance a counter-
theory that they claim is derived from 
Alabama. As the Intervenors stated during 
their closing argument: 
 
“[T]he question you must answer to 
get to strict scrutiny ... is whether the 
use of race resulted in any district 
which violated Virginia law or 
traditional redistricting criteria of the 
state, or, as the state did here, their 
specifically adopted criteria.” 
 
Intervenors drew the Court's attention to a 
passage in the Alabama decision where the 
Court “talk[ed] about [the State] 
transgressing its own state guidelines, its own 
state criteria.” And so it did: 
 
There is considerable evidence that 
[the racial thresholds] had a direct and 
significant impact on the drawing of 
at least some of District 26's 
boundaries .... Transgressing their 
own redistrictinq guidelines, the 
drafters split seven precincts between 
the majority-black District 26 and the 
majority-white District 25, with the 
population in those precincts clearly 
divided on racial lines. 
 
But, as is clear from the cited passage, the 
drafters' transgression of their own 
redistricting guidelines—like their informal 
use of a racial threshold—is evidence of 
predominance, not dispositive proof. That is 
because “subordination” is not the same as a 
“violation” or “transgression.” Subordination 
requires a balancing of degree to determine 
whether non-racial criteria or racial criteria 
predominated. 
 
For example, it is difficult to understand what 
a “transgression” of “compactness” would 
even entail. Compactness, like temperature, 
falls along a range, and there is no 
professional consensus about what degree of 
departure (from any of more than twenty 
measures) is enough to say a district is “not 
compact.”  
 
More importantly, the “traditional” criteria 
discussed in the Shaw–Miller cases are 
informed by, but not defined by, state law. 
Rendering the predominance inquiry subject 
to state law would make the existence of a 
federal constitutional claim dependent upon 
an individual state's resolutions, statutes, or 
constitution. 
 
The determinative question is not whether a 
State's individualized districting 
requirements are “violated,” but whether 
traditional, neutral districting criteria and 
other districting criteria have been generally 
“subordinated” to racial considerations on the 
whole. A State's violation of, or departure 
from, its own stated criteria can constitute 
evidence in the predominance analysis, but 
Alabama does not require that the State do so 
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in order to make out a racial sorting claim. 
Intervenors' proposed interpretation is, 
accordingly, rejected. 
 
1. Predominance Analysis 
 
As common courtesy holds, one should not 
shoot down a suggestion without offering an 
approach to replace it. Although 
“predominance,” “subordination,” 
“dilution,” and “retrogression” are all 
standards not amenable to hard rules or safe 
harbors, the Court does have an obligation to 
the parties to explain its reasoning as clearly 
and definitively as possible. Therefore, the 
Court will walk through each of the steps of 
the analytical framework that it has applied to 
arrive at its conclusions with respect to the 
Challenged Districts. 
 
A racial sorting claim is “one area in which 
appearances do matter.” Because a district 
must exhibit “substantial disregard of 
customary and traditional districting 
practices” in order to animate the racial 
sorting doctrine's central concern with facial 
classification, the Court will evaluate each 
Challenged District for “subordination” in 
three steps. 
 
First, the Court will review the district on the 
basis of its compliance with traditional, 
neutral districting criteria, including, but not 
limited to, compactness, contiguity, nesting, 
and adherence to boundaries provided by 
political subdivisions and natural geographic 
features. 
 
Second, the Court will examine those aspects 
of the Challenged District that appear to 
constitute “deviations” from neutral criteria. 
These may be particular, isolated areas along 
the district's boundary, or—on occasion—the 
district itself may seem facially questionable. 
Based on the evidence submitted and 
testimony provided, the Court will examine 
the record to ascertain the underlying 
rationale for those deviations. In determining 
the reasons for deviations from the traditional 
neutral criteria, it will be necessary to 
determine whether a deviation was caused in 
part or entirely by the need to comply with 
the one-person, one-vote precepts16 or by 
political circumstances such as protection of 
incumbents. 
 
Third, the Court will weigh the totality of the 
evidence and determine whether racial 
considerations qualitatively subordinated all 
other non-racial districting criteria. 
 
a. Neutrality 
 
A racial sorting claim requires the Court find 
that the State subordinated traditional, neutral 
criteria, and other non-racial districting 
criteria to racial considerations. Traditional 
districting principles include, inter alia, 
compactness, contiguity, respect for political 
subdivisions, and communities “defined by 
actual shared interests.” These conventions 
neutrally advance the values inherent in a 
geographic—rather than proportional—
system of representation, such as 
responsiveness, accountability, familiarity, 
ease of access, ease of administration, and 
political engagement. 
 
The specific traditional criteria outlined in 
Miller and Shaw are not constitutionally 
required. Rather, these criteria are important 
because they reflect the neutrality that is 
central to a redistricting statute that complies 
with the Equal Protection Clause. 
Traditional, neutral conventions are 
important to evaluate in a racial 
gerrymandering claim “because they are 
objective factors that may serve to defeat a 
claim that a district has been gerrymandered 
on racial lines.” 
Of course, states may continue to develop 
new neutral districting principles, and a 
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State's consistent adherence thereto would 
also be considered an objective factor to help 
defeat a claim of gerrymandering. Existing 
traditional districting conventions “evolved 
over the years through the political process” 
itself. What renders these guiding principles 
important for redistricting purposes is that 
they observe and advance neutral democratic 
values. 
 
The fact that a district deviates from neutral 
criteria on its face does not, however, mean 
that those deviations were racially motivated. 
Other, non-racial districting criteria may also 
be used to defeat a claim of racial 
gerrymandering by demonstrating that the 
district's deviations from neutral criteria are 
attributable to race-neutral motives. Chief 
among these are political and incumbency 
considerations.  
 
During the first stage of the predominance 
inquiry, the Court examines whether the 
redistricting legislation—on its face—raises 
questions about the use of discriminatory, 
individualized criteria (such as race, politics, 
or incumbency) or whether it appears to be 
predominantly explainable on the basis of 
traditional, neutral, geographic criteria (such 
as compactness, contiguity, or respect for 
political subdivisions). 
 
In reviewing the Challenged Districts, the 
Court will consider neutral criteria in the 
following manner: 
 
i. Compactness 
 
As Justice Stevens stated in Karcher v. 
Daggett, “geographical compactness serves 
independent values; it facilitates political 
organization, electoral campaigning, and 
constituent representation.” Although “non-
compact” districts may sometimes be 
necessary to serve these values—such as 
when a “major transport corridor might ... 
minimum[ize] travel time for a representative 
to travel around the district”—“drastic 
departures from compactness are a signal that 
something may be amiss.”  
 
Yet, compactness is surprisingly ethereal 
given its seemingly universal acceptance as a 
guiding principle for districting. All of the 
expert testimony provided reveals one deep 
conceptual dilemma: no one can agree what 
it is or, as a result, how to measure it. There 
are “at least 20” measures, not one of which 
can claim any greater legitimacy than its 
peers. The Reock test measures geographical 
dispersion and therefore is sensitive to—and 
its scoring punishes—elongated districts. The 
Polsby–Popper test measures perimeter 
dispersion and therefore is sensitive to—and 
its scoring punishes—oddly shaped district 
boundaries with large numbers of 
indentations. Meanwhile, the Schwartzberg 
test looks at “a normalized standard deviation 
of the distance from every point to the center 
of the district,” and the Boyce–Clark test 
measures the “center of inertia” or “how far 
is the farthest voter from the center of the 
district.” One notable political scientist has 
quipped that all of these measures are just 
variants of “the intraocular test”: “people 
look at distric[t] maps, they figure out which 
districts they think look ugly, and then they 
choose the compactness measure which 
comports with their eyeball view of the 
mapping.”  
 
But compactness is not important for its own 
sake. Rather, compactness is important 
because it serves certain values of geographic 
representation. Therefore, the “major 
transportation corridor” district discussed by 
Justice Stevens would fare poorly on the 
Reock metric, but would serve its purposes in 
a manner that might be reflected by another 
measure (such as driving time). Meanwhile, 
a district that adheres to highly irregular 
county lines, or easily identifiable geographic 
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features, might score poorly on the Polsby–
Popper test, but would enhance the values 
served by those neutral criteria, as discussed 
below. If the price of advancing these other 
neutral criteria is compactness, then the cost 
is not a judicial concern. 
 
Nor does a district's “absolute” compactness 
score matter so much as its “relative” score. 
The Court's examination of a district's 
compactness measure may be informed by 
the average in the State (which is important 
to take account of a State's inalterable 
features), may be informed by the average in 
the nation (which is important to take account 
where a State's own averages may be far 
above or far below the national average), and 
may be informed by historical averages 
(which is important to account for trends in 
compactness over several districting cycles), 
(noting it is “perfectly reasonable” to use 
compactness measures “in comparing two 
maps for the same state”). These are all 
factors that courts must consider when 
evaluating this criterion. 
 
In short, the Court would be remiss to look at 
compactness scores in a vacuum, but that 
does not render them useless as evaluative 
tools in the predominance inquiry. The key is 
not “absolute” compactness, “relative” 
compactness, or even a State's adherence to 
its own constitutional or statutory 
compactness definitions (although these may 
be illuminating); rather, the key is whether 
compactness deviations are attributable to 
something meaningful, such as other neutral 
criteria or a legitimate use of non-neutral 
criteria. As Dr. Hofeller stated at trial, 
echoing Justice Stevens' sage advice, 
compactness is “more like a flag than a 
conclusion.” 
 
ii. Contiguity 
 
Contiguity, like compactness, serves 
important democratic purposes, binding 
geographic communities together and 
helping to enable effective representation. In 
upholding a district under the Virginia 
constitution's contiguity provision despite its 
division by water, the Supreme Court of 
Virginia reflected upon this raison d'être: 
 
Although the record shows that travel 
between [some] precincts and the 
remainder of the district requires 
travel through another district, there 
is nothing in this record showing that 
such access is unreasonable, unduly 
burdensome, or adversely impacts the 
ability of residents to secure 
meaningful representation of their 
interests or effective communication 
with their elected representative. 
 
As the Page court reminded, “contiguity and 
other traditional districting principles are 
‘important not because they are 
constitutionally required,’ but rather ‘because 
they are objective factors' courts may 
consider in assessing racial gerrymandering 
claims.” 
 
A district split by water has not “violated” 
contiguity for the purposes of a racial sorting 
claim any more than a district connected by a 
single point on land has “respected” 
contiguity. As with compactness, contiguity 
admits of degrees. Districts that are not 
divided by water are more contiguous than 
those that are, and districts that are at least 
connected by a water crossing—such as a 
bridge—are more contiguous than districts 
that are not. Land contiguity is important not 
because it is determinative, but because it 
reflects the common understanding that 
bodies of water may mark the natural divide 
between communities of interest or constitute 
barriers to the effective function of 
democratic activities. 
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Of course, deviations from land contiguity 
may also reflect adherence to other neutral 
districting criteria. Many cities lie across 
rivers or around harbors and, indeed, are built 
outward from the central focal point of the 
community: the waterfront. In such cases, a 
body of water that “divides” a community 
may actually be the primary factor that unites 
it. In other words, a “deviation” from 
“contiguity” standards may be an attempt to 
respect a distinct community of interest or 
political subdivision. The subordination of 
contiguity conventions is, like compactness, 
simply a factor that the Court must consider 
in conducting its predominance analysis. 
 
iii. Political Subdivisions 
 
A common and significant neutral districting 
criterion is respect for political subdivisions, 
such as counties or cities. “Subdivision 
boundaries tend to remain stable over time. 
Residents of political units such as 
townships, cities, and counties often develop 
a community of interest, particularly when 
the subdivision plays an important role in the 
provision of governmental services.” 
Moreover, adherence to subdivision 
boundaries can facilitate civic engagement, 
enhance democratic accountability, and 
increase administrative convenience. As 
Justice Powell once wrote: 
 
Most voters know what city and 
county they live in, but fewer are 
likely to know what [legislative] 
district they live in if the districts split 
counties and cities. If a voter knows 
his [legislative] district, he is more 
likely to know who his representative 
is. This presumably would lead to 
more informed voting. It also is likely 
to lead to a representative who knows 
the needs of his district and is more 
responsive to them. 
 
When a legislative district is “nothing more 
than an artificial unit divorced from, and 
indeed often in conflict with, the various 
communities established in the State,” 
legislators cannot represent their constituents 
properly and voters cannot exercise the ballot 
intelligently. A report produced by the 
Governor's Commission distilled the 
overarching themes that were repeatedly 
voiced during its public forums from around 
the Commonwealth. As the Commission 
noted, “the splitting of municipal and county 
jurisdictions drew the ire of citizens, who ... 
pointed out the difficulties that citizens have 
in knowing who to contact, who to hold 
accountable, and who among several 
legislators should coordinate or lead the 
representation of local city and county 
interests in the General Assembly.”  
 
In evaluating whether neutral criteria were 
subordinated, a legislature's adherence to city 
and county boundaries provides an important 
reference point for courts undertaking the 
predominance analysis. Of course, the 
legislature may, and often will, need to 
deviate from political subdivision borders to 
comply with federal- or state-mandated 
population constraints. In such situations, the 
Court will look to whether another neutral 
criterion—such as compactness, geographic 
boundaries, precinct boundaries, or 
communities of interest—helps to explain the 
method of departure. In this manner, neutral 
criteria can often form a “backstop” for one 
another when one criterion cannot be fully 
satisfied, thus ensuring that neutral criteria 
are still predominating in the balance. 
 
iv. Natural Geography 
Geographic features, such as mountains 
ranges or rivers, may also be used to provide 
a neutral boundary during the districting 
process. Oftentimes, these geographic 
indicators mark the boundaries of distinct 
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communities of interest or can provide a 
point of reference for voters, candidates, and 
representatives. In many cases, these natural 
boundaries may already constitute the basis 
for governmental subdivision lines.  
 
Over time, artificial geography may also 
come to play a similar role. Major 
transportation thoroughfares may slowly 
generate distinct communities of interest on 
either side of the divide, or the marker may 
be used as a useful reference point for voters, 
candidates, and representatives seeking to 
understand their own district's boundaries. 
These are important factors to consider, 
especially when adherence to traditional 
subdivision lines is not possible. 
 
v. Nesting 
 
Nesting refers to the practice of putting two 
or more districts of the lower chamber of the 
state legislature wholly within each district of 
the upper chamber. “By permitting voters 
readily to identify their voting districts and 
corresponding representatives, a nested plan 
can be expected to foster voter participation.” 
Nesting may result in a House district 
boundary that appears inexplicable by neutral 
criteria until the corresponding Senate district 
is laid atop. 
 
vi. Precincts 
 
Precincts and Voting Tabulation Districts 
(“VTDs”) are often the smallest objectively 
identifiable geographic groupings that 
legislators use to organize legislative 
districts. They may occasionally correspond 
to towns, neighborhoods, or other identifiable 
communities of interest, but they are not 
“governmental jurisdictions” in their own 
right. In Virginia, VTDs generally 
correspond to voting precincts. 
Given their small size, compliance with 
precinct or VTD boundaries alone will rarely 
be sufficient to show adherence to neutral 
criteria. This is because VTDs can easily be 
strung together into grotesque formations 
having little regard for compactness, 
contiguity, political subdivisions, or other 
important neutral criteria advancing 
democratic values. In short, a district could 
avoid splitting any VTDs but remain highly 
suspicious on its face. 
 
For these same reasons, however, VTD splits 
will often provide a flag for further *539 
inquiry. The unexplained splitting of several 
VTDs in a single district can call into 
question the criteria guiding that district's 
construction. 
 
vii. Communities of Interest 
 
Among traditional, neutral districting 
principles, the concept of respecting 
“communities of interest” is the most 
enigmatic. On the one hand, respect for such 
communities is often considered the guiding 
light of the other neutral principles. On the 
other hand, defining some “communities of 
interest” may involve straddling the fence 
between neutral and discriminatory criteria. 
For example, communities of interest may be 
defined by relatively objective factors, such 
as service delivery areas, media markets, or 
major transit lines. Similarly, communities 
may be somewhat objectively characterized 
as rural, suburban, or urban. These can be 
valid neutral criteria, assuming that 
legislators actually have access to this 
information and rely upon it.  
 
The “communities of interest” criterion 
becomes less neutral, however, when one 
considers “cultural,” “social,” or “religious” 
communities of interest. This tendency to 
morph into a more individualized metric 
explains the Miller Court's qualification that 
traditional districting principles include 
“respect for ... communities defined by actual 
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shared interests.” To give effect to this 
elusive delineation, it is important to have 
demonstrable evidence of shared interest 
when the boundaries cannot be explained on 
an objective or neutral basis. 
 
viii. State Criteria 
 
For the reasons discussed above, a plaintiff 
does not need to prove that a State “violated” 
its own districting criteria in order to prove 
predominance. A State's deviation from its 
own constitutional, statutory, or adopted 
criteria does, however, constitute evidence 
that is probative of subordination. 
 
b. Deviations 
 
If the Challenged Districts, or significant 
parts of the Challenged Districts, appear 
inexplicable by reference to the consistent 
application of traditional, neutral principles, 
then the Court will examine the basis for 
those departures. Deviations from neutral 
criteria signal the presence of potential 
subordination and lay the foundation for the 
sorting claim; namely, that the districts 
reflect racial classifications of individual 
voters and do not constitute neutral, 
geographic representative units. 
 
The Supreme Court has cited several sources 
of direct and circumstantial evidence that 
courts can rely upon in identifying racial 
deviations, including: 
 
[S]tatements by legislators indicating 
that race was a predominant factor in 
redistricting; evidence that race or 
percentage of race within a district 
was the single redistricting criterion 
that could not be compromised; ... use 
of land bridges in a deliberate attempt 
to bring African–American 
population into a district; and creation 
of districts that exhibit disregard for 
city limits, local election precincts, 
and voting tabulation districts. 
 
Because traditional, neutral principles 
advance fundamental democratic values and 
neutral state interests, districts that 
substantially disregard these principles can 
“caus[e] a severe disruption of traditional 
forms of political activity.” In Bush v. Vera, 
Justice O'Connor described the impact that 
such districts can have: 
 
Campaigners seeking to visit their 
constituents “had to carry a map to 
identify the district lines, because so 
often the borders would move from 
block to block”; voters “did not know 
the candidates running for office” 
because they did not know which 
district they lived in. In light of [the 
State's] requirement that voting be 
arranged by precinct, with each 
precinct representing a community 
that shares local, state, and federal 
representatives, it also created 
administrative headaches for local 
election officials[.] 
 
Such complaints have been echoed by local 
election officials in Virginia who “end up 
taking the brunt of complaints from voters 
who can't understand why they can't vote in 
their old precinct, why they can't find any of 
their current office holders on the ballot, and 
why they are in the same district as a relative 
who lives nowhere near them[.]”  
 
Of course, the presence of identifiable 
deviations alone does not satisfy the 
predominance inquiry because 
“subordination” requires “substantial 
disregard” for traditional, neutral districting 
criteria. The substantiality of any identified 
deviations—and whether it is sufficient to 
support a finding of predominance—is 
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examined when the Court weighs the 
evidence as a whole in the final stage. 
 
In reviewing the Challenged Districts, the 
Court will consider evidence bearing on 
legislators' bases for the deviations. 
Deviations may be attributed to any number 
of considerations, but legislators typically 
rely upon the following: population equality, 
race, political affiliation or preference, and 
incumbency. The Court will evaluate these 
bases for deviation in the following manner: 
 
i. Population 
 
“[A]n equal population goal ... is part of the 
redistricting background, taken as a given, 
when determining whether race, or other 
factors, predominate in a legislator's 
determination as to how equal population 
objectives will be met.” Thus, achievement 
of the population goal is not a traditional 
redistricting factor that is considered in the 
balancing that determines predominance. 
However, the requirement to comply with 
federally imposed population goals is 
relevant to assessing why a district may 
appear to deviate from neutral criteria. This is 
particularly true where the census data shows 
significant losses or gains of population in 
certain geographic areas of a State. 
 
The Court's analysis does not change just 
because the State has decided to adopt a 
lower percentage deviation threshold than 
constitutionally required. In Alabama, the 
legislature adopted “a more rigorous 
deviation standard than our precedents have 
found necessary under the Constitution.” 
There, as here, it seems that “[c]ompliance 
with these two goals”—BVAP targets and a 
±1% population deviation rule—“posed 
particular difficulties with respect to ... the 
State's ... majority-minority districts[.]” But 
“legislative efforts to create districts of 
approximately equal population” more 
stringent than the 5% deviation held 
generally permissible in Brown v. Thomson, 
cannot explain away deviations from neutral 
principles. The predominance inquiry 
examines the basis upon which voters were 
sorted into appropriately apportioned 
districts. Where apportionment by political 
subdivision must be sacrificed to equal 
population goals, for example, other neutral 
principles such as compactness and precinct 
boundaries can often pick up the slack. A 
substantial deviation from neutral principles, 
therefore, only admits of answer by other, 
non-neutral criteria, such as race or political 
affiliation. 
 
ii. Racial Deviations 
 
One explanation for a district's deviations 
from neutral districting criteria may be 
voters' race. The mere awareness or 
consideration of race by legislators in their 
districting decisions does not, on its own, 
provide sufficient evidence to support a claim 
of racial sorting under the Equal Protection 
Clause. It takes more than consideration of 
race to prove that race predominated over 
traditional factors. Of course, if legislators' 
use of race entailed the subordination of other 
districting criteria, it must be adequately 
justified under the strict scrutiny regime. 
 
iii. Political Deviations 
 
Another explanation for a district's deviations 
from neutral districting criteria may be 
voters' political opinions, affiliations, and 
beliefs. As with race, the mere awareness or 
consideration of voters' political affiliation 
by legislators is both unavoidable and 
constitutionally permissible. Accordingly, 
districting on the basis of political affiliation 
may be a legitimate criterion for the 
legislature to consider.  
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The Intervenors have raised the argument 
that some of the Challenged Districts have 
political, rather than racial, justifications. 
 
iv. Incumbency Deviations 
 
Yet another explanation for a district's 
deviations from neutral districting criteria 
may be incumbency considerations. In 
Gaffney v. Cummings, the Supreme Court 
observed that: “It would be idle, we think, to 
contend that any political consideration taken 
into account in fashioning a reapportionment 
plan is sufficient to invalidate it.... 
Redistricting may pit incumbents against one 
another or make very difficult the election of 
the most experienced legislator.” 
Accordingly, a district's impact on an 
incumbent may be a legitimate criterion for 
the legislature to consider.  
 
However, as with political deviations, 
deviations from neutral districting principles 
for incumbency purposes are not always 
permissible. In Bush, the Court recognized 
“incumbency protection, at least in the 
limited form of ‘avoiding contests between 
incumbent[s],’ as a legitimate state goal.” 
This state interest “aim[s] at maintaining 
existing relationships between incumbent 
congressmen and their constituents and 
preserv[es] the seniority the members of the 
State's delegation have achieved in the 
United States House of Representatives,” but 
does not necessarily invade the province of 
the voters. As the LULAC Court advised:  
 
“[I]ncumbency protection can be a 
legitimate factor in districting, but 
experience teaches that incumbency 
protection can take various forms, not 
all of them in the interests of the 
constituents.”  
Here, the Intervenors allege that many of the 
Challenged Districts' deviations have 
“incumbency protection” justifications. 
Some of these deviations reflect an interest in 
drawing district lines between incumbents' 
residences to avoiding pairing incumbents. 
Other deviations, however, reveal an effort to 
fence in the incumbent's preferred voters or 
fence out the incumbent's detractors or 
challengers. Whether this latter definition of 
“incumbency protection” states a legitimate 
government interest need not be decided here 
because no one has presented that issue.  
 
That said, we share the dissent's concern over 
Intervenors' “implicit suggestion that 
approval by incumbent legislators” can 
somehow “rescue” a plan from a finding of 
racial predominance. We fully agree that 
“[t]he [VRA] and the Equal Protection 
Clause are intended to protect the rights of the 
individual voter, not to promote the self-
interest of incumbents in majority-minority 
districts.” And, to be clear, the framework we 
adopt today condones no such thing. 
 
For example, if legislators attempt to “ 
‘pac[k]’ minority voters into a particular 
majority-minority district for the purpose of 
protecting the incumbent,” this would still 
constitute racial sorting regardless of the 
“goal” of incumbency protection. This is 
precisely what we find occurred in HD 75, 
and we hold that race predominated 
accordingly. 
 
On the other hand, if legislators attempt to 
pack supporters into their districts or attempt 
to remove detractors or challengers, then it 
could hardly be said that race drove the 
districting deviation. This does not imply that 
such actions are immune from constitutional 
challenge. Although the Supreme Court has 
only sanctioned a state interest in 
“incumbency pairing prevention,” the 
Plaintiffs simply did not raise any challenge 
to the Commonwealth's alleged interest in a 
wider definition of “incumbency protection.” 
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Thus, we are in no position to decide that 
constitutional question. 
Simply put, if incumbency interests 
constitute the predominate criterion driving 
the construction of the district, then a claim 
of racial gerrymandering must fail. That, 
however, does not imply that a claim of 
political gerrymandering would face a similar 
fate. 
 
c. Weighing 
 
The final step in the predominance inquiry of 
a racial sorting claim involves the weighing 
of the evidence in total to determine whether 
the deviations attributable to race 
“predominate” over all other districting 
criteria employed by the legislature, 
including both neutral criteria and deviations 
attributable to non-racial motives. To 
demonstrate predominance, the Plaintiffs 
must show that the legislature “subordinated” 
or exhibited “substantial disregard” for these 
other criteria. 
 
In making its predominance determination, 
the Court “must be sensitive to the complex 
interplay of forces that enter a legislature's 
redistricting calculus” and “exercise 
extraordinary caution.” “Federal-court 
review of districting legislation represents a 
serious intrusion on the most vital of local 
functions,” and the Plaintiffs' burden is 
understandably “a demanding one.” 
Therefore, the redistricting enactments of a 
legislature are entitled to a presumption of 
correctness and good faith, and the burden is 
upon the plaintiff to dislodge that 
presumption. 
 
It should be noted, however, that the 
predominance balancing inquiry is 
qualitative rather than quantitative. In Miller, 
for example, the challenged district 
employed gangly arms at various points to 
capture black population centers, but the 
district's overall shape was not far from 
routine. Looking at the complete picture, 
however, the district court found that “[r]ace 
was ... the predominant, overriding factor 
explaining the General Assembly's decision 
to attach to the [district] various appendages 
containing dense majority-black 
populations.” 
 
In conducting the predominance balancing, 
two particular issues warrant the Court's 
careful attention. 
 
i. Racial & Political Correlation 
 
Occasionally, a deviation may appear equally 
explainable by racial or political motivations. 
Because the State is presumed to have acted 
lawfully and in good faith, the plaintiff must 
provide evidence that race—rather than 
politics—represented the primary basis for 
the classification. Evidence may include the 
sources of data relied upon in drawing the 
district, the use of fixed (or “aspirational”) 
political or racial targets or floors, and 
statements from legislators regarding the 
relative priority of their racial and political 
goals. 
 
A political objective, however, does not 
immunize the use of race as a basis for 
classification because race cannot be used as 
a proxy for political characteristics, even if 
there is a proven correlation between race and 
political preference in the state. This is 
because “to the extent that race is used as a 
proxy for political characteristics, a racial 
stereotype requiring strict scrutiny is in 
operation.”  
 
This is consistent with the Supreme Court's 
holding in Hunt v. Cromartie (Cromartie I). 
The lesson of Cromartie I was that a political 
classification would not be considered racial 
simply because the Democratic voters 
happened to be black. The lesson was not that 
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a racial classification would be considered 
political simply because black voters 
happened to be Democrats. 
 
In the latter scenario, the State still makes 
decisions about individuals based on the 
color of their skin. It is the act of using race 
as a proxy that constitutes an offensive 
stereotype. The fact that a stereotype might 
have some basis in fact—or is relied upon to 
achieve “non-racial” purposes—does not 
render it any less offensive. 
 
Evidence of a racial floor will also lend 
support to the argument that race, rather than 
politics, can be attributed for particular 
deviations from neutral principles. Although 
such a floor will not result in per se 
predominance where a district is formed 
predominantly on the basis of neutral criteria, 
its use can buttress a plaintiff's argument that 
race was the primary reason for a deviation 
where race and politics would otherwise 
seem equally plausible. 
 
Lastly, statements about the relative priority 
of districting goals may constitute evidence 
to support a finding of racial predominance. 
Taken alone, the parroting of federal 
requirements or the acknowledgment that 
certain compliance obligations are 
“mandatory” or “nonnegotiable” does not 
lend any weight in the predominance balance. 
If it did, the State would start the 
predominance balancing at an immediate 
disadvantage. However, if evidence is 
provided that demonstrates legislators held a 
false belief that certain artificial criteria—
such as fixed BVAP floor—were necessary 
to comply with federal law, then statements 
by those particular legislators regarding 
compliance are relevant evidence in the 
predominance inquiry. 
 
ii. Core Retention 
 
Core retention—or “respecting existing 
district boundaries”—appears to be facially 
neutral and serves neutral political values, 
such as increased administrative ease, 
electoral accountability, and enhanced voter 
awareness and engagement. Unlike the other 
neutral criteria identified above, however, 
core retention holds a special place in the 
predominance balance. That is because “core 
preservation ... is not directly relevant to the 
origin of the new district inhabitants.” 
Moreover, core retention may be used to 
insulate the original basis for the district 
boundaries. 
 
Thus, where district lines track a path similar 
to their predecessor districts or where “core 
retention” seems to predominate, courts 
should also examine the underlying 
justification for the original lines or original 
district. Legislators' use of the core retention 
principle should certainly receive some 
degree of deference. But, the inquiry in a 
racial sorting claim examines the basis upon 
which voters were placed “within or without 
a particular district.” “That's the way we've 
always done it” may be a neutral response, 
but it is not a meaningful answer. 
 
The Court applied the foregoing principles 
when weighing all of the evidence in the 
record and in ascertaining whether voters 
were sorted into a district predominantly on 
the basis of their race. 
 
2. Strict Scrutiny Analysis 
 
Having applied these precepts to the 
evidence, we found that the Plaintiffs met 
their burden to prove that race was 
predominant in the formation of HD 75, 
making it necessary to apply strict scrutiny as 
to that district. To survive strict scrutiny, the 
redistricting statute must be narrowly tailored 
to a compelling state interest. In the 
redistricting context, this familiar test takes 
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on a somewhat different appearance, which 
the Court will now examine. 
 
a. Compelling Interest 
 
In prior cases, the Supreme Court has 
assumed, without deciding, that compliance 
with federal antidiscrimination laws can 
constitute a compelling state interest. Various 
members of the Court have also expressed 
their separate views on the matter. 
 
This already complex posture was rendered 
even less certain by the recent decision in 
Shelby County. There, the Supreme Court 
struck down the coverage formula under 
Section 4 of the VRA, but “issue[d] no 
holding on § 5 itself[.]” The Supreme Court 
did not help matters in Alabama when it 
stated, “[W]e do not here decide whether, 
given Shelby County v. Holder, continued 
compliance with § 5 remains a compelling 
interest [.]”  
 
Here, the Intervenors claim compelling 
interests founded on both Section 2 and 
Section 5 of the VRA. To resolve whether 
compliance with the VRA was a compelling 
interest at the time of enactment, the Court 
finds the rationale offered by Justice Scalia in 
his LULAC opinion convincing. As to 
Section 5, Justice Scalia wrote, in a passage 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Thomas, and Justice Alito: 
 
We long ago upheld the 
constitutionality of § 5 as a proper 
exercise of Congress's authority 
under § 2 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment to enforce that 
Amendment's prohibition on the 
denial or abridgment of the right to 
vote. If compliance with § 5 were not 
a compelling state interest, then a 
State could be placed in the 
impossible position of having to 
choose between compliance with § 5 
and compliance with the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
 
We find this reasoning persuasive, with the 
proviso that the State's interest must be in 
actual compliance with the standards 
articulated in federal antidiscrimination law 
as interpreted by the federal courts. 
 
This distinction is an important one. In 
Miller, the Supreme Court stipulated that 
“compliance with federal antidiscrimination 
laws cannot justify race-based districting 
where the challenged district was not 
reasonably necessary under a constitutional 
reading and application of those laws.” That 
fundamental limitation remains applicable. In 
drafting redistricting legislation, the State 
must pass a state law that complies with both 
federal law and the federal constitution. 
Thus, the goal of “actual compliance” is 
clearly compelling. If the State achieves 
actual compliance with the demands of a 
federal statute, and the federal statute is itself 
constitutional, then there can be little doubt 
that the state law is similarly constitutional. 
The State also has an interest in avoiding 
preclearance denial under Section 5 (or 
liability under Section 2). This goal of 
“defensive compliance,” however, is not a 
compelling interest. This is because 
defensive compliance could often entail a 
violation of constitutional law itself: 
subordinating traditional, neutral criteria and 
other districting criteria to racial 
considerations.  
 
But Section 5 does not require—and cannot 
be read to require—states to subordinate 
traditional, neutral districting principles to 
race in the redistricting process. The DOJ's 
own regulations state this explicitly. 
Therefore, a state that finds itself engaging in 
predominant racial sorting to fulfill an 
interest in defensive compliance will begin to 
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forfeit any credible interest in preventing 
retrogression and may be said to have 
adopted an interpretation of Section 5 that 
would itself render Section 5 unconstitutional 
as applied. 
 
In sum, we hold that Virginia's interest in 
actual compliance with the standards of 
federal antidiscrimination law—as the 
federal courts have interpreted them—was a 
compelling interest at the time the 2011 
redistricting plan was designed and enacted. 
Apart from that question, the Court believes 
that an interest that is compelling at a 
redistricting plan's inception is capable of 
sustaining the plan until the next districting 
cycle. As the district court in Alabama stated, 
“We evaluate the plans in the light of the 
legal standard that governed the Legislature 
when it acted, not based on a later decision of 
the Supreme Court that exempted [the State] 
from future coverage under section 5 of the 
[VRA].” Because the legislature possessed a 
compelling interest in actual compliance with 
federal antidiscrimination laws as interpreted 
by the federal courts at the time the plan was 
enacted, and because redistricting plans are 
inherently subject to periodic revision on a 
reasonable, decennial basis, we conclude that 
the compelling interest underlying the statute 
at enactment remains a compelling interest 
during its effective duration. 
 
b. Narrow Tailoring 
 
The next question in the analytical calculus is 
whether the State's redistricting statute was 
“narrowly tailored” to this compelling 
interest. In particular, the question is whether 
a State's “attempt” at actual compliance could 
be viewed as “reasonably necessary under a 
constitutional reading and application of 
[federal antidiscrimination] laws.” In 
Alabama, the Supreme Court explained that 
narrow tailoring is satisfied if there is a 
“strong basis in evidence” for the 
predominant use of race in drawing a 
challenged district. 
 
The conceptual difficulty for the narrow-
tailoring inquiry is this: if a finding of 
predominance means that race subordinated 
other considerations, and a constitutional 
reading of the antidiscrimination standards 
does not require race to subordinate other 
considerations, then how can an 
unconstitutional reading of a federal statute 
by the State be the interest that saves the 
State's unconstitutional racial gerrymander? 
The answer is this: if the disregard for non-
racial criteria could have reasonably been 
viewed as not substantial, and the State 
shows a strong basis in evidence that its 
deviations appeared necessary to ensure 
actual compliance with the federal standard, 
then the district could still have been 
considered reasonably necessary under a 
constitutional reading of the statute. 
 
Therefore, as the finder of fact, we employ a 
“preponderance” standard during the 
predominance inquiry, but apply a 
“sufficiency” standard during the narrow 
tailoring inquiry. Justice Breyer's dissent in 
Abrams v. Johnson makes this rationale clear: 
 
This legal distinction—between 
whether a plan really violates § 2 or 
might well violate § 2—may seem 
technical. But it is not. A legal rule 
that permits legislatures to take 
account of race only when § 2 really 
requires them to do so is a rule that 
shifts the power to redistrict from 
legislatures to federal courts (for only 
the latter can say what § 2 really 
requires). A rule that rests upon a 
reasonable view of the evidence (i.e., 
that permits the legislature to use race 
if it has a “strong basis” for believing 
it necessary to do so) is a rule that 
leaves at least a modicum of 
409 
 
discretionary (race-related) 
redistricting authority in the hands of 
legislators. 
 
In Abrams, a federal court was already 
required to undertake the districting 
endeavor, so Justice Breyer's dissent was 
unavailing. Because the lower court decided 
that it could not create a second majority-
black district without subordinating neutral 
principles, it declined to do so. This does not 
mean, however, that a court reviewing a 
State's plan cannot accept the State's alternate 
judgment, so long as the legislature had a 
strong basis for believing its plan was 
compliant. 
 
Therefore, for predominance, the inquiry is 
whether, as a matter of fact, the State 
substantially disregarded non-racial criteria. 
For narrow tailoring, the inquiry is whether 
the State had good reason to believe that its 
actions were required for actual compliance 
with the non-dilution or non-retrogression 
standard. Because substantial disregard of 
non-racial criteria is not required under a 
constitutional reading of either standard, this 
inquiry necessarily entails also asking 
whether the State had good reason to believe 
that its own departure from non-racial criteria 
was not substantial. 
 
Because the standards of the racial sorting 
claim and the standards of non-dilution and 
non-retrogression often stand in tension, the 
Court must recognize that the State is 
attempting to “toil with the[se] twin 
demands” and provide a fairway for the 
State's objectively reasonable efforts. There 
may be a variety of plans that reasonably 
avoid dilution and retrogression and also 
reasonably respect traditional, neutral 
districting principles. If the legislature had a 
strong basis in evidence for its districting 
decision and reasonable individuals could 
have come to a different conclusion, then the 
court should accept that reasonable judgment 
during the narrow tailoring stage. 
 
Thus, the question a court must ask at the 
narrow-tailoring stage is whether the 
legislature has shown that it had “good 
reasons” to believe—i.e., that it had a strong 
basis in evidence for believing—that its 
actions were reasonably necessary to achieve 
actual compliance with federal 
antidiscrimination standards based on a 
constitutional reading of those standards. Or, 
could a reasonable legislator have come to 
the conclusion that the challenged district 
violated neither federal law nor any 
constitutional limitations upon that federal 
law. 
 
This formulation also explains why the 
Plaintiffs and Intervenors proposed 
seemingly different narrow tailoring 
inquiries. Plaintiffs argue that the State “must 
show that [it] had a ‘strong basis in evidence’ 
for believing that all of the Challenged 
Districts needed to meet or exceed a 
predetermined BVAP target to avoid 
retrogression.” Pls.' Post–Trial Brief at 28. 
Intervenors argued at trial that the narrow 
tailoring question is “how much that district 
violates the state's criteria.” Both of these 
inquiries are necessary, but neither is 
sufficient. 
 
The narrow tailoring inquiry asks whether 
“the legislature ha[d] a ‘strong basis in 
evidence’ in support of the (race-based) 
choice that it has made.”  
 
This standard ... does not demand that 
a State's actions actually be necessary 
to achieve a compelling state interest 
in order to be constitutionally valid. 
And legislators may have a strong 
basis in evidence to use racial 
classifications in order to comply 
with a statute when they have good 
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reasons to believe such use is 
required, even if a court does not find 
that the actions were necessary for 
statutory compliance. 
 
With respect to Section 5, for example, this 
inquiry into whether the “race-based choice” 
had a “strong basis in evidence” reaches both 
the standard of retrogression and—because a 
constitutional interpretation of retrogression 
does not require subordination—the standard 
of subordination. 
 
With respect to subordination, the Supreme 
Court has noted that the extent of a State's 
disregard of neutral criteria “is not irrelevant 
to the narrow tailoring inquiry” when it 
“exhibit[s] a level of racial manipulation that 
exceeds what [the VRA] could justify.” In 
other words, part of showing that a district is 
narrowly tailored to an interest in actual 
compliance with a constitutional reading of 
the retrogression standard entails showing 
that the district is one that a reasonable 
legislator could believe entailed only 
reasonable and minor deviations from neutral 
districting conventions. 
 
Nor is an inquiry into whether the State 
possessed a “strong basis in evidence” that its 
actions were necessary to “prevent 
retrogression” limited to the BVAP 
percentages in the Benchmark Plan's existing 
majority-minority districts. When Congress 
amended Section 5, it rejected the Supreme 
Court's decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft, and 
“adopted the views of the dissent.” The 
dissent “made clear that courts should not 
mechanically rely upon numerical 
percentages but should take account of all 
significant circumstances.” Thus, there can 
be no argument that retrogression “locks in” 
the BVAP of each particular district.  
 
The retrogression standard also does not 
“lock in” a specific number of majority-
minority districts. This holds true not only as 
a legal principle, but as a matter of logic. 
Based on demographic changes within the 
State, it simply may not be feasible to create 
the same number of majority-minority 
districts because performing Section 5 
districts must also avoid unreasonable 
deviations from neutral districting criteria. 
 
A retrogression analysis must “take account 
of all significant circumstances,” while 
retaining Section 5's “anchoring reference to 
electing a candidate of choice.” This mandate 
is now part of the statute itself. “Clearly, 
‘ability to elect’ is the statutory watchword.”  
 
Therefore, once a court finds that race 
predominated, the strong basis in evidence 
standard asks not only whether the legislature 
had good reasons for believing the BVAP 
percentage employed in the district—as well 
as the district itself—was necessary to avoid 
retrogression, but also whether the district is 
one that a reasonable legislator could believe 
generally respected neutral districting 
principles. As the Alabama Court reminded: 
“The standards of § 5 are complex; they often 
require evaluation of controverted claims 
about voting behavior; the evidence may be 
unclear; and, with respect to any particular 
district, judges may disagree about the proper 
outcome.” This applies to reasonable state 
judgments about subordination as well. In the 
context of redistricting, the “narrow 
tailoring” inquiry permits the State to 
overshoot the bull's-eye, so long as it hits the 
target. 
 
The foregoing legal framework for analyzing 
a racial sorting claim provides the guidepost 
for the statewide and district-by-district 
findings that follow. 
 
B. Evidence Of General Application To All 
Districts 
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“A racial gerrymandering claim ... applies to 
the boundaries of individual districts” and 
must be proven on a “district-by-district” 
basis. However, the Plaintiffs provided some 
evidence that applied across all districts. 
Therefore, the Court will assess that evidence 
before proceeding to its district-by-district 
analysis. In like fashion, the 
Commonwealth's evidence may apply across 
districts. Our findings on the evidence are 
based on our credibility determinations and 
how particular evidence squares with the 
record as a whole. 
 
First, the Intervenors frequently discussed the 
substantial population changes experienced 
on both a statewide level and in the 
Challenged Districts. That evidence has a 
role to play in the predominance analysis, but 
it is a limited one. 
 
As the Supreme Court held in Alabama, “an 
equal population goal is not one factor among 
others to be weighed against the use of race 
to determine whether race ‘predominates.’ ” 
Instead, “it is part of the redistricting 
background, taken as a given, when 
determining whether race, or other factors, 
predominate in a legislator's determination as 
to how equal population objectives will be 
met.” 
 
Although the equal population goal is not a 
traditional factor to be considered in the 
balance in deciding predominance, its 
“background” role is nonetheless important 
in assessing why certain redistricting actions 
were taken. For example, gains or losses in 
population affect where in a State new 
districts must be created or where old districts 
cannot stand. That, in turn, is pertinent to 
which neutral redistricting criteria can—or 
cannot—be fully satisfied. 
Second, for the reasons provided in the 
factual discussion in Section III above, the 
Court finds that a 55% BVAP floor was 
employed by Delegate Jones and the other 
legislators who had a hand in crafting the 
Challenged Districts. Those delegates 
believed this necessary to avoid retrogression 
under federal law, and we do not doubt the 
sincerity of their belief. 
 
Third, the Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Stephen 
Ansolabehere, testified about his analysis of 
VTDs in the Commonwealth. In particular, 
Dr. Ansolabehere used statistical models to 
examine the movement of VTDs into and out 
of the Challenged Districts and opined 
whether, in his view, those movements were 
predominantly “racial” or “political.”  
 
With respect to Dr. Ansolabehere's analysis 
regarding race and politics as “predictors” of 
the likelihood of inclusion of VTDs in one of 
the Challenged Districts, the Court has both 
initial technical concerns and more 
fundamental substantive concerns about the 
method employed that cause us not to credit 
his views as to the reasons for VTD 
placement. First, even though Dr. 
Ansolabehere's analysis provides a 
“regional” control to avoid examining VTDs 
that could not have feasibly found their way 
into the Challenged Districts, that does not 
account for whether a VTD in that region 
could be considered to “hop” over another 
VTD in the region en route to the target 
district in violation of contiguity 
conventions. 
 
More fundamentally, however, Dr. 
Ansolabehere's “race versus politics” 
opinions miss the mark because they do not 
consider the extent to which the boundaries 
themselves are justifiable by neutral criteria 
or any other motivation besides race or 
political disposition. The models that he 
employed do not, for example, consider 
“economic factors, social factors, cultural 
factors, geographic factors, governmental 
jurisdictions and service delivery areas.” If a 
412 
 
district is intentionally designed as a 
performing district for Section 5 purposes, 
there should be little surprise that the 
movement of VTDs into or out of the district 
is correlated—even to a statistically 
significant degree—with the racial 
composition of the population. This does not 
mean, however, that race “predominated” for 
the purposes of a racial sorting claim. 
 
The predominance question requires an 
inquiry into whether the movement of VTDs 
into and out of a district subordinated other 
criteria in the process. Dr. Ansolabehere's 
analysis, for the most part, just does not 
provide any specific insights into this inquiry. 
Dr. Ansolabehere's partial correlation 
analysis, which holds other factors—
including party—steady can be considered in 
determining whether a district's deviations 
from neutral criteria may be more attributable 
to race or politics, but it can only be 
considered in assessing—not refuting—
testimony that provides non-racial reasons 
for particular deviations from neutral 
principles. Moreover, using Dr. Katz's 
admittedly crude, but nonetheless reliable, 
approximation for the limitation that VTDs 
are not equally susceptible to being included 
in every district, the statistical significance of 
the racial justification disappears, at least 
with respect to the question of whether race 
or politics is a more significant predicator of 
VTD placement. On balance, Dr. 
Ansolabehere's analysis on the VTD issue is 
not reliable proof on the predominance issue. 
Lastly, the Court finds that some “statewide” 
compactness information is useful as a point 
of comparison for the district-by-district 
analysis set out in Section IV.C. below. In the 
Challenged Districts, the average Reock 
score was .320, the average Polsby–Popper 
Score was .192, and the average 
Schwartzberg score was 2.365. In the Non–
Challenged Districts, the average Reock 
score was .360, the average Polsby–Popper 
Score was .243, and the average 
Schwartzberg score was 2.128. Id. Under the 
Reock and Polsby–Popper measures, higher 
scores represent more compact districts. 
Under the Schwartzberg measure, lower 
scores represent more compact districts. Of 
the 100 House districts, seven of the 
Challenged Districts are in the “bottom 
50”—with the lowest Reock scores—and 
five of the Challenged Districts are in the “top 
50”—with the highest Reock scores.  
 
With these generally applicable findings in 
mind, the Court now advances to the requisite 
district-by-district analysis. In so doing, the 
analysis is guided by the legal principles and 
the framework outlined in Section IV.A. 
above. 
 
C. District–by–District Analysis 
 
As with the generally applicable factual 
findings above, our district-by-district 
analysis itself is a factual one that we have 
based on our examination of the record as a 
whole and on our assessment of the 
credibility of the witnesses. 
 
1. District 63 
 
HD 63 is found in the Dinwiddie–Greensville 
area and was represented by then-Delegate 
Rosalyn Dance during the 2011 redistricting 
process. Under the Benchmark Plan, the 
district contained all of Dinwiddie and 
Petersburg City, and part of Chesterfield. 
Under the Enacted Plan, the district now 
contains all of Petersburg City and parts of 
Chesterfield, Dinwiddie, Hopewell, and 
Prince George. This increased the number of 
county and city splits from 1 to 4 and 
increased the number of split VTDs from 0 to 
8. HD 63 has a core retention percentage of 
80.2, and is contiguous by land. 
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On its face, the district is unusually shaped. 
After chopping Dinwiddie County in half, the 
southern border of the district tends to follow 
precinct boundaries from west to east until it 
cuts through Dinwiddie precinct along 
Interstate 85. After that, the district line 
constricts, carving out a hook around New 
Hope. After a brief return to a rather normal 
configuration around Petersburg City, the 
district narrows to avoid the Jefferson Park 
area and the homes of Delegates Cox and 
Ingram. It then continues in a narrow form 
through Prince George, into various parts of 
Hopewell, and terminates at the James River. 
 
The district had Reock and Polsby–Popper 
scores of .61 and .48 under the Benchmark 
Plan and experienced a steep drop to scores 
of .25 and .16 under the Enacted Plan. This 
marks the largest Reock compactness 
reduction of any district in the Enacted Plan. 
The district's Schwartzberg score is 2.506.  
 
The district's deviations from neutral 
redistricting criteria begin with the splitting 
of Dinwiddie County. This split appears to be 
avowedly racial. Delegate Dance testified 
that the southern half of Dinwiddie “went to 
Delegate Tyler to try to get her number ... [o]f 
African–American voters up to 55 percent.” 
Within this deviation are two sub-deviations: 
(1) the splitting of Dinwiddie precinct; and 
(2) the hook that wraps around New Hope 
precinct. 
 
The Dinwiddie precinct is split along I–85, 
but this is not listed among the redistricting 
criteria, which undermines its explanatory 
value as a districting criterion. Although 
established transit corridors may split areas 
into “communities of interest” over time, 
there was no evidence that this precinct is 
comprised of distinct communities on either 
side of the highway. On the other hand, the 
artificial border provided by I–85 may 
provide a clear boundary to voters and 
candidates alike that reside in Dinwiddie 
precinct and wish to know their House 
district. In the absence of any further 
explanation by the Intervenors or the 
Plaintiffs, however, the Court declines to 
identify any particular rationale for this “sub-
deviation,” meaning that the Plaintiffs have 
not carried their burden of attributing it to 
race. 
 
The other “sub-deviation”—the hook around 
New Hope—is decidedly not racial. After 
reviewing the evidence, the Court finds that 
the purpose for this deviation was 
“challenger prevention” and “incumbency 
protection.” This deviation was negotiated 
between Delegates Dance, Tyler, and Jones. 
Delegate Jones testified that the cutout 
accounted for “the bulk of the splits in [the 
75th] district,” that New Hope was retained 
in HD 63 because “a tremendous amount of 
[Delegate Dance's] employees or constituents 
had family” there, and that Delegate Dance 
had “a potential primary opponent she 
wanted to draw out of her district.” So, if it 
looks like the hook is reaching for something, 
that's because it is: a potential threat to the 
incumbent. 
 
Thus, at this point the record is that one 
reason for the configuration of HD 63 was 
racial and one reason was purely political. 
 
The other component of HD 63's unusual 
shape is its reach north and east from U.S. 
460 to the James River in a way that runs 
through both Prince George County and the 
City of Hopewell. In so doing, this 
component of HD 63 increases the number of 
localities in the district from three to five, and 
it also splits a number of VTDs. According to 
Delegate Dance's testimony, “that's what it 
took to get [Delegate Tyler] to the 55 percent 
strength of African–American voters.” Not 
only did this help satisfy the 55% threshold 
in District 75, it also helped maintain a 
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substantial African–American population in 
District 63. Delegate Dance “picked up parts 
of Prince George ... to get more African–
Americans ... [a]nd then ... picked up the 
concentration of African–Americans in 
Hopewell[.]” 
 
However, the record shows that the eastern 
border advanced other criteria, both neutral 
and political. In order to unwind the water 
crossing in the Benchmark HD 74, Delegate 
Jones decided to move precincts in Hopewell 
City out of HD 74 and into HD 63. Thus, HD 
63's eastern configuration improved HD 74's 
adherence to contiguity conventions. 
Moreover, by placing these precincts in HD 
63 rather than HD 62 or HD 64, the District's 
eastern boundary avoids solving the water 
crossing problem to the detriment of 
Republican districts on either side. Thus, it 
appears that this aspect of HD 63's unusual 
shape can be explained on a neutral, racial, 
and political basis. 
 
It is the Plaintiffs' burden to show that the 
racial considerations subordinated all other 
criteria, including neutral criteria and other 
non-racial criteria. The evidence provided 
thus far is in equipoise, and the Plaintiffs 
have not yet satisfied their burden on the 
predominance issue. 
 
Plaintiffs rely on the testimony of Dr. 
Ansolabehere to complete their task. To 
begin, Dr. Ansolabehere notes the drop in 
compactness scores but, as discussed above, 
that is more of a flag than a conclusion. If 
compactness has been sacrificed to enhance 
contiguity or serve political ends, then race 
alone has not subordinated this criterion. Dr. 
Ansolabehere also analyzed VTD 
movements but, as discussed above, that 
analysis fails to account for other criteria that 
may be shaping the district, such as 
incumbency considerations or solving 
contiguity issues in nearby districts. Finally, 
Dr. Ansolabehere notes the number of VTD 
splits. But the majority of splits are 
attributable to incumbency considerations 
rather than race. Moreover, some splits 
appear to be attributable to Delegate Jones' 
twin aims of solving the water crossing and 
limiting population deviations to ±1%. In 
sum, we find Dr. Ansolabehere's testimony 
on each point to be unconvincing. Thus, his 
evidence did not help the Plaintiffs in their 
obligation to prove predominance and to 
dislodge the presumption of lawful action to 
which the General Assembly's redistricting 
plan is entitled. 
 
Based on the record, the Court finds that the 
Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden to 
prove that racial considerations subordinated 
all other neutral and race-neutral districting 
criteria in the formation of HD 63. And, on 
the basis of the record, the Court holds, as a 
matter of fact, that race did not predominate 
in the drawing of HD 63. 
 
2. District 75 
 
HD 75 is found in the Dinwiddie–Greensville 
area and was represented by Delegate Roslyn 
Tyler during the 2011 redistricting process. 
Under the Benchmark Plan, the district 
contained all of Sussex County, Greensville, 
and Emporia City and parts of Brunswick, 
Franklin City, Isle of Wight, Lunenberg, and 
Southampton. Under the Enacted Plan, the 
district now contains all of Emporia City and 
Greensville and parts of Brunswick, 
Dinwiddie, Franklin City, Isle of Wight, 
Lunenberg, Southampton, Surry, and Sussex. 
This increased the number of county and city 
splits from 5 to 8 and increased the number 
of split VTDs from 4 to 13. HD 75 has a core 
retention percentage of 78.64, and is 
contiguous by land. 
 
On its face, the district appears relatively 
compact, despite its odd tendency to leak 
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across county and city lines. The district had 
Reock and Polsby–Popper scores of .42 and 
.22 under the Benchmark Plan, which shifted 
to scores of .41 and .19 under the Enacted 
Plan. The district's Schwartzberg score is 
2.282. Although the district's technical 
compactness remained “about the same 
between the two plans,” Delegate Tyler 
testified that her district has “[v]ery irregular 
borders” and is “not an easy district to 
follow.” 
 
A review of HD 75's boundaries suggests that 
she is right. Although the district has a clear 
southern border, that provides no solace 
because her district borders North Carolina. 
Unlike population equality and VRA 
compliance, state borders are not just 
mandatory; they admit no variation. As such, 
state borders are a nullity in the 
predominance balance. The only other 
county boundaries seemingly respected are 
those segments bordering Mecklenburg, 
Nottoway, Prince George, and Suffolk 
counties. Notable in this regard, is the 
addition of the district's lower left corner, 
which makes Brunswick County whole.  
 
Delegate Dance testified that the creation of 
HD 75 “gave us a little trouble to try to get to 
the 55 percent.” To get to the 55% BVAP, the 
district “required some drastic 
maneuvering[.]” Delegate Tyler herself 
testified that she “was concerned about the 
decrease in number of black people in my 
district.”  
 
Although the irregularity of the district 
boundaries can be seen to buttress Delegate 
Dance's testimony that HD 75 required 
“drastic maneuvering” in order to comply 
with the 55% BVAP floor, the Intervenors 
have offered their own explanations for the 
district's “very irregular borders.” Delegate 
Jones testified that Dinwiddie County was 
split because the district was in need of 
population. That appears to be the case 
because HD 75 was underpopulated. The 
choice to go north, however, was “to try to 
get [Delegate Tyler's] number ... [o]f 
African–Americans voters up to 55 percent.” 
Therefore, while underpopulation may help 
explain the changes to the district, it cannot 
be weighed against race in the predominance 
analysis. 
 
The district's irregular eastern and western 
borders can be also attributed to race because, 
according to Delegate Dance, moving 
coherently to the “east [or] west would have 
been Euro–Americans, and she needed some 
African Americans to get to that 55 percent.” 
Delegate Jones' testimony did not contradict 
that assessment. 
 
Delegate Jones testified that many of the 
changes, such as swapping out the Wakefield 
and Dendron precincts, splitting Franklin 
City, and excluding the Berlin and Ivor 
precincts were done on the basis of a 
“member request” or because Delegate Tyler 
did not receive many votes in those removed 
precincts. Delegate Jones accepted these 
changes even though adherence to political 
subdivisions and compactness would be 
subordinated in the process. But attributing 
the changes to “member requests” or 
performance concerns begs, rather than 
answers, the relevant question: was the 
request racial or political? 
 
Like in HD 63, the evidence admits of both a 
racial purpose and a political purpose. For 
instance, Delegate Jones himself testified that 
Delegate Tyler's request to swap Wakefield 
and Dendron was based on “real concerns” 
stemming from the fact that she “didn't break 
51 percent” in a general election race “with a 
Caucasian” and that she “won by less than 
300 votes” in a “five-way race in a primary 
with two Caucasians.” That bespeaks an 
effort to both protect the incumbent and 
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prevent retrogression. Similarly, Delegate 
Jones testified: “[S]he was worried about too 
low of a black voting-age population for her 
to be able to be successful in an election.” 
This too reflects an effort to protect the 
incumbent while also preserving minority 
voters' ability to elect their candidate of 
choice. 
 
Unlike in HD 63, however, here there is no 
ambiguity about the basis upon which voters 
were sorted. Intervenors' Post–Trial Brief 
relies upon the overlapping racial and 
political purposes to argue that race did not 
“predominate.” According to the Intervenors, 
Delegate Tyler's deposition testimony “made 
crystal clear her view that ‘[w]hat I'm saying 
is most of the time blacks vote Democratic,’ 
and that ‘in [her] mind, the purpose of 
ensuring 55 percent BVAP was to help 
Democrats be elected.’ ” But, attributing a 
political purpose to—or justification for—the 
55% BVAP floor does not somehow render it 
a non-racial classification. Whether the 
changes were made to comply with Section 
5, enhance Democratic performance, or 
protect the incumbent, the changes were still 
made based on voters' skin color. 
 
Weighing all the evidence and testimony 
provided on the record, the Court finds that 
racial considerations subordinated traditional 
districting principles and other non-racial 
districting criteria in the creation of HD 75. 
The testimony from the three delegates 
primarily responsible for shaping the district, 
Delegates Jones, Tyler, and Dance, shows 
that the overriding objective was to achieve a 
55% BVAP in HD 75. Achieving a 55% 
BVAP floor required “drastic maneuvering” 
that is reflected on the face of the district and, 
according to Delegate Jones, would not 
otherwise have been undertaken due to the 
impact on traditional county boundaries. 
Delegate Tyler herself found the boundaries 
“very irregular,” worried about her ability to 
cover her district with ease, and was 
“concern[ed] about the decrease in number of 
black people in [her] district.” 
 
Intervenors attempt to explain the boundary 
deviations by ascribing a political purpose to 
them. But that attempt is not successful. As 
in Bush, the record shows that, in building 
HD 75, race was used by Delegate Tyler 
herself as a proxy for Democratic voters in an 
effort to protect her own position as an 
incumbent at the expense of traditional 
districting principles. When a legislator sorts 
voters by political affiliation or performance, 
then the deviation from neutral principles is a 
political one. But, when a legislator sorts 
voters by race, for whatever purpose, then the 
deviation is a racial one. As explained above, 
the lesson of Cromartie was that a political 
deviation would not be considered racial 
simply because the Democratic voters 
happened to be black. The lesson was not that 
a racial deviation would be considered 
political simply because the black voters 
happened to be Democrats. That is using race 
as a proxy for political affiliation, an 
approach that is prohibited. 
 
As to HD 75, the Plaintiffs have proved 
(without reference to Dr. Ansolabehere's 
testimony) that race was the predominate 
criterion leading to the disregard of neutral 
conventions in forming HD 75. Moreover, to 
the extent that political interests were 
considered and achieved, it appears that those 
criteria were secondary to, and only satisfied 
by, adherence to the 55% BVAP floor.  
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court 
finds that race was the predominate criterion 
driving the formation and configuration of 
HD 75; and, therefore, the legislature's 
decision is subject to strict scrutiny. To 
survive strict scrutiny, the Intervenors must 
show that the legislature had a “strong basis 
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in evidence” for its racial districting 
decisions. 
 
The Court finds that this burden has been 
satisfied and that, accordingly, HD 75 
survives the Plaintiffs' challenge. First, 
Delegate Jones' determination that HD 75 (or 
its environs) reflected an “ability-to-elect” 
district requiring protection against 
retrogression was a reasonable 
determination. As Plaintiffs themselves point 
out, HD 75 appeared to be a performing 
ability-to-elect district before the State's 
redistricting efforts. Therefore, retaining this 
ability to elect reasonably can be viewed as 
necessary to ensure actual compliance with 
the federal non-retrogression standard. 
 
Next, as to HD 75, the 55% BVAP floor is 
grounded in a “strong basis in evidence” 
because the primary source of the 55% 
BVAP threshold appears to have been an 
analysis of HD 75 itself. For example, 
Delegate Jones testified that he did not feel a 
52% BVAP threshold across all districts 
would be acceptable “based on ... the 
functional analysis that I had done using the 
Tyler primary, for example, and the Tyler 
general election in 2005.” These were close 
races, prompting “real concerns.” Delegate 
Jones met with Delegate Tyler “probably half 
a dozen times to configure her district as she 
felt it needed to be configured for ... [minority 
voters] to elect a candidate of their choice for 
her district.”  
 
Delegate Jones examined turnout rates in HD 
75, an issue about which Delegate Tyler was 
particularly concerned. In addition, Delegate 
Jones considered the district's prison 
population and relied upon his knowledge of 
the district's electoral history. These are 
precisely the kinds of evidence that 
legislators are encouraged to use “[i]n 
determining whether the ability to elect exists 
in the benchmark plan and whether it 
continues in the proposed plan[.]”  
 
Plaintiffs dispute the need for raising the 
BVAP percentage in HD 75, arguing that the 
district was already a performing Section 5 
district for minority-preferred candidates 
going into the 2011 redistricting. Here, that 
argument only strengthens the Intervenors' 
hand. Under the Benchmark Plan, BVAP in 
HD 75 was 55.3%. Under the Enacted Plan, 
BVAP in HD 75 was 55.4%. Considering the 
intricacies of redistricting, the new HD 75 
could effectively be considered to have the 
“same” BVAP level as the old HD 75. And, 
considering the evidence relied upon by 
Delegate Jones, it appears abundantly clear 
that he had “good reasons” for holding the 
BVAP in HD 75 just above 55% to ensure 
that the district remained a performing 
Section 5 district for minority-preferred 
candidates, as Plaintiffs' themselves suggest. 
 
Nor does the 55% floor appear unreasonable 
when subjected to expert review. Plaintiffs' 
own expert noted that HD 63 and 75 “exhibit 
high rates of [racial] polarization because 
large majorities of Whites vote in the 
opposite way as large majorities of African 
Americans.” Intervenors' expert agreed, 
observing that the 2011 and 2013 elections 
held in HD 75 were racially polarized. Dr. 
Ansolabehere ultimately opined that a 55% 
BVAP threshold was not necessary in HD 75,  
but ex post statistical analyses cannot upset 
the State's ex ante judgment so long as that 
decision was “reasonably necessary” based 
on strong evidence. In this case, it was so 
based. Simply put, there were “good reasons” 
to believe that a 55% BVAP threshold was 
necessary to ensure that minority voting 
influence did not retrogress in HD 75, and the 
Court will not upset that reasonable 
judgment. 
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The Court finds that legislators had good 
reason to believe that maintaining a 55% 
BVAP level in HD 75 was necessary to 
prevent actual retrogression (and not just to 
attain preclearance), and that this was 
achieved by reasonable deviations from 
traditional redistricting criteria (judged by a 
sufficiency standard). Because the State has 
provided a “strong basis in evidence” for its 
use of race-based districting in its 
configuration of HD 75, the Court holds that 
HD 75 passes constitutional muster under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 
3. District 69 
 
HD 6938 is found in the Richmond area and 
was represented by Delegate Betsy *560 Carr 
during the 2011 redistricting process. Under 
both the Benchmark Plan and the Enacted 
Plan, the district contains parts of 
Chesterfield and Richmond City. Although 
the number of county and city splits remained 
the same, redistricting increased the number 
of split VTDs from 2 to 4. HD 69 has a core 
retention percentage of 74.7.  
 
On its face, the district appears to reflect a 
large, compact swath of Richmond below the 
Fan District and to the south of the James 
River. The district had Reock and Polsby–
Popper scores of .37 and .20 under the 
Benchmark Plan, which increased to scores 
of .52 and .34 under the Enacted Plan. The 
district's Schwartzberg score is 1.712. As 
Delegate Jones testified, the changes from the 
Benchmark Plan made the district more 
“Richmond centric,” which appears on its 
face to have enhanced the district's alignment 
with a distinct political subdivision and 
community of interest. 
 
The Plaintiffs recognize that HD 69 has 
become more compact and retained its 
“core,” but argue that the district has become 
more compact “only by incorporating heavily 
African–American communities at the 
outskirts of the benchmark district.” Delegate 
McClellan also testified at trial that HD 69 
had to satisfy the 55% BVAP floor, 
according to Delegate Jones. But all of this is 
largely irrelevant. The question is whether 
the Commonwealth's consideration of race or 
a racial floor subordinated traditional, neutral 
criteria. Plaintiffs have offered no evidence to 
show subordination, relying instead on the 
erroneous view that proof of a 55% BVAP 
floor would be sufficient to carry their 
burden. As explained previously, it is not. 
 
With respect to potential deviations from 
neutral criteria, it should be noted that HD 69 
is not contiguous by land. However, the 
district contains multiple river crossings, and 
no evidence has been provided by the 
Plaintiffs to show that the district improperly 
combines two distinct communities of 
interest rather than uniting one community of 
interest. Moreover, the Plaintiffs have not 
provided any evidence that this split has 
diminished representation for communities 
on either side of the James. As such, there is 
no evidence that contiguity was 
“subordinated” to non-neutral criteria. 
 
In short, the Plaintiffs have failed to carry 
their burden of proof with respect to HD 69, 
and the Court holds, as a matter of fact, that 
race did not predominate in the drawing of 
HD 69. 
 
4. District 70 
 
HD 70 is found in the Richmond area and was 
represented by Delegate Delores McQuinn 
during the 2011 redistricting process. Under 
both the Benchmark Plan and the Enacted 
Plan, the district contains parts of 
Chesterfield, Henrico, and Richmond City. 
Although the number of county and city splits 
remained the same, redistricting increased 
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the number of split VTDs from 2 to 3. HD 70 
has a core retention percentage of 67.31.  
 
On its face, the district appears coherent and 
generally compact, perhaps with the 
exception of the “turret” on top of the district. 
HD 70 straddles the intersection of 
Richmond City, Chesterfield County, and 
Henrico County, with most of the boundaries 
therein drawn on the basis of precinct and 
VTD lines. The district had Reock and 
Polsby–Popper scores of .47 and .14 under 
the Benchmark Plan, which shifted to scores 
of .40 and .19 under the Enacted Plan. In 
other words, the district became slightly more 
elongated, but also removed some of its more 
convoluted and irregular boundaries in the 
process. The district's Schwartzberg score is 
2.290.  
 
As the Plaintiffs contend, the redistricting 
“pull[ed] the district substantially out of the 
city of Richmond and pull[ed] it into the 
Chesterfield area and deeper into Henrico 
County.” Plaintiffs believe that this shows a 
disregard for core retention, but this is 
precisely the reason the Court cautioned 
about “core retention” arguments above. 
Redistricting, by its very nature, involves the 
changing of districts. If a state completely 
abandoned its prior map and started from 
scratch, a hypothetical new “HD 70” might 
bear no resemblance whatsoever to the 
benchmark “HD 70,” but that would not—
taken alone—be suspicious. Moreover, such 
a hypothetical would entail “removing” the 
entire population of HD 70 and then “adding” 
that entire number back. Again, nothing 
about that would be inherently suspicious. 
 
The question is whether the boundaries—or 
the changes to the boundaries—are justifiable 
by reference to traditional, neutral criteria. 
Here, they are. Delegate Jones testified that 
HD 70's overall configuration was altered to 
better represent suburban interests—where 
population had expanded—and to cede more 
Richmond-centered population to HD 69 and 
HD 71. The Plaintiffs' case supports that 
point. These represent objectively 
identifiable communities of interest. 
 
Plaintiffs also argue that HD 70 was not 
under-populated before the redistricting 
process, but “the General Assembly added 
about 26,000 people and removed about 
26,000 people in redrawing the district.” As 
discussed above, if properly populated 
districts were presumptively required to 
remain untouched, then all the other districts 
would need to wrap around them (in 
substantial disregard of neutral principles) in 
order to achieve population equality. Nor is 
the substitution in population numbers 
particularly shocking. If a properly populated 
district must shift locations, then it will 
necessarily “remove” a large amount of 
people from its old location and “add” the 
same amount from its new location. That 
result seems rather obvious. 
 
With respect to deviations, HD 70—like HD 
69—is divided by the James, but contains a 
river crossing. And—like HD 69—Plaintiffs 
have offered no evidence to suggest that this 
has had any effect on representation or local 
communities of interest. As such, there is no 
evidence that contiguity was “subordinated” 
to non-neutral criteria. 
 
The only facially odd deviation sits atop the 
northern edge of the district. This “turret” 
appears to deviate from districting norms, 
especially insofar as it pokes across 
Richmond City lines. However, Intervenors 
offered a simple, non-racial explanation for 
this deviation: Delegate McQuinn, the 
incumbent, lives there. As Delegate Jones 
testified: “[H]ad she not lived there, I could 
have actually had all of the 71st District in the 
city of Richmond because I could have taken 
these couple of precincts and there wouldn't 
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have been any going into the Radcliffe 
precinct in Henrico County for 71.”  
 
In weighing the evidence, the Court 
recognizes that Delegate McClellan testified 
that HD 70 was drawn to comply with the 
55% BVAP floor, but the legislature's pursuit 
of this goal is not the “predominate” criterion 
employed unless it subordinates all others. 
The Court finds that HD 70 is largely 
explained by reference to traditional, neutral 
districting criteria, and that the only deviation 
therefrom is explainable on the basis of 
“incumbent pairing prevention.” As a result, 
this Court holds, as a matter of fact, that race 
did not predominate in the drawing of HD 70. 
 
5. District 71 
 
HD 71 is found in the Richmond area and was 
represented by Delegate Jennifer McClellan 
during the 2011 redistricting process. Under 
both the Benchmark Plan and the Enacted 
Plan, the district contains parts of Henrico 
and Richmond City. Although the number of 
county and city splits remained the same, 
redistricting increased the number of split 
VTDs from 1 to 3. HD 71 has a core retention 
percentage of 78.31, and is contiguous by 
land. 
 
On its face, the district appears quite compact 
and generally follows normal districting 
conventions. The district had Reock and 
Polsby–Popper scores of .24 and .19 under 
the Benchmark Plan, which increased to 
scores of .33 and .24 under the Enacted Plan. 
The district's Schwartzberg score is 2.045.  
The district remains bounded to the south by 
the James River—a natural geographic 
boundary—and became “more Richmond 
centric” with the 2011 redistricting thanks to 
the removal of Summit Court, Hilliard, and 
Stratford Hall precincts from its western 
edge. 
 
The district itself includes the Fan, moves 
east through Richmond's downtown, and 
continues up to Church Hill. The district 
contains the majority of the North Side, and 
contains one precinct in eastern Henrico 
County. 
 
The only facially evident deviations are along 
HD 71's eastern border. Here, the district's 
one Henrico precinct and the 701, 702, and 
706 VTDs seem to form a set of “horns” on 
the eastern side of the district. 
 
In examining these deviations, it should first 
be noted that the northern-most horn adheres 
to the boundaries of Ratcliffe precinct, 
whereas the two other horns appear to adhere 
to the boundaries of VTDs 701, 702, and 706. 
Plaintiffs have argued that VTDs 701 and 702 
were included because they were “heavily 
African American” and “very densely 
populated.” The Plaintiffs have not discussed 
whether Ratcliffe was added to capture black 
voters. Although Delegate McClellan 
testified that the 55% BVAP rule affected the 
districting decisions as to HD 71, the 
Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the 
decision subordinated neutral criteria in the 
process. 
 
Plaintiffs have not satisfied that burden. 
Delegate Jones offered a far more convincing 
reason for HD 71's eastern horns. As 
discussed above, Delegate McQuinn lives 
right on the border of VTDs 703 and 705.  
“[H]ad [Delegate McQuinn] not lived [in 
Richmond], I could have actually had all of 
the 71st District in the city of Richmond 
because I could have taken these couple of 
precincts and there wouldn't have been any 
going into the Radcliffe precinct in Henrico 
County for 71.” 
 
Plaintiffs also noted the split of VTD 505, 
which was previously wholly within HD 71. 
Although a VTD split constitutes a deviation 
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from neutral principles, the decision to split 
505 advanced other neutral principles, such 
as compactness. Plaintiffs have not 
demonstrated that this split “subordinated” 
such neutral principles. 
 
Delegate McClellan also spoke extensively 
about the removal of precinct 207 from her 
district, which split the Fan neighborhood. 
Precinct 207 had “highly democratic voter 
turnout,” and Delegate McClellan had “quite 
a base there[.]” 
 
But this split does not appear to substantially 
disregard neutral principles on its face. A 
local resident might wonder why the Fan 
straddled two House districts, but any 
observer of the map would see that precinct 
207 was removed and replaced with precinct 
204, making the district more compact. 
 
Nor does that swap appear obviously racial. 
As Delegate McClellan testified, precinct 
204 is “demographically similar to 207 
racially.” Delegate McClellan testified that 
she couldn't keep “any portion of 207” 
because it would “push the [BVAP] below 55 
percent,” but if the 55% BVAP goal could be 
achieved without subordinating neutral 
principles on the whole, it does not matter 
what Delegate McClellan's personal 
preferences were. 
 
And here, her personal preferences appeared 
in conflict with those of another legislator: 
Delegate Loupassi. According to Delegate 
Jones, Delegate Loupassi used to be on the 
Richmond City Council and his former ward 
abutted precinct 207 where he had strong 
support, so he “wanted that precinct in his 
district.” Delegate McClellan argued that 
adding precinct 207 to Delegate Loupassi's 
district “didn't help him” because he is a 
Republican, but Delegate Jones testified that 
Delegate Loupassi has “a broad base of 
support from the democratic side of the aisle” 
and had a personal “community of 
interest”—rather than partisan—connection 
to the area. 
 
There is a difference between pruning the 
edges of the political thicket and striding 
headlong into it. By verifying a district's 
overall compliance with neutral criteria that 
do not discriminate between citizens based 
on their race or other individualized 
characteristics, the Court fulfills its 
constitutional duty to ascertain whether state 
legislation violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. The Court should not, however, 
become embroiled in a credibility dispute 
between two legislators, especially when 
resolving that “factual” issue is unnecessary 
to find that neutral criteria predominated in 
the drawing of the district boundaries. HD 71 
does not substantially disregard traditional, 
neutral districting principles, and that is 
sufficient for the Court to find that these 
principles were not subordinated to race. The 
existence of a 55% BVAP floor does not 
disturb that fact.40 Therefore, the Court 
holds, as a matter of fact, that race did not 
predominate in the drawing of HD 71. 
 
6. District 74 
 
HD 74 is found in the Richmond area and was  
represented by Delegate Joseph Morrissey 
during the 2011 redistricting process. Under 
the Benchmark Plan, the district contained all 
of Charles City and parts of Henrico, 
Hopewell City, and Richmond City (as well 
as part of Prince George containing no 
population). Under the Enacted Plan, the 
district now contains all of Charles City and 
parts of Henrico and Richmond City. This 
decreased the number of county and city 
splits from 4 to 2, with the number of split 
VTDs remaining the same. HD 74 has a core 
retention percentage of 80.08, and is 
contiguous by land. 
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On its face, the ax-shaped district arouses 
some suspicion. The “blade” of the ax 
encompasses all of Charles City, but the 
eastern “handle” is curious. The district had 
Reock and Polsby–Popper scores of .16 and 
.10 under the Benchmark Plan, which 
remained almost identical—with scores of 
.16 and .12–under the Enacted Plan. The 
district's Schwartzberg score is 2 .839. These 
low scores reflect the district's substantially 
elongated shape. 
 
Despite its elongation, however, the district is 
not as unreasonable as it first appears. The 
north edge of the handle tracks the Henrico 
county line, while the lower edge is almost 
entirely retained within Henrico County. In 
fact, Delegate Jones' revision permitting the 
upper edge to track Henrico county lines “put 
some more good Republican precincts in 
there that the gentleman in the 97th did not 
want to lose[.]” The district has also 
improved on neutral metrics over the last 
three districting cycles. In particular, the 
2011 plan removed the water crossing 
discussed in Wilkins v. West.  
 
The Intervenors also noted that the BVAP 
percentage in the district had been lowered 
substantially from the Benchmark Plan. But 
the fact that the BVAP percentage dropped 
does not, taken alone, indicate that race was 
not the predominate criterion influencing the 
district's construction. As the Plaintiffs 
observe, much of the black population ceded 
from HD 74 went to other Challenged 
Districts, such as HD 63 and HD 71. Unlike 
in a racial vote dilution claim, a racial 
predominance inquiry does not necessarily 
concern itself with whether the BVAP went 
up or down. A district formed primarily to 
eject black voters would employ the same 
racial classification as a district formed 
primarily to include black voters. 
 
In the end, however, the primary objection to 
this district amounts to a criticism that the 
district is too long. But predominance is not 
merely a beauty contest centered on Reock-
style compactness. Although this district 
certainly does not earn high marks in a 
qualitative predominance analysis, the 
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that 
neutral criteria were substantially 
disregarded in the formation of HD 74. The 
district contains all of Charles City and, for 
most of its length, has readily identifiable 
boundaries. Moreover, the shifting of black 
population into HD 63 and HD 71 largely 
improved HD 74's compliance with neutral 
criteria, such as contiguity and compactness. 
Moreover, the district has retained roughly 
the same long shape since 1991. Core 
retention alone cannot be used to save an 
otherwise offensive district, but it is worth 
holding in the balance if the familiarity of the 
boundaries has “allow[ed for the] 
development of relationships and 
communities of interest relative to election of 
delegates.”  
 
On the whole, the Court finds that the 
Plaintiffs have failed to meet the 
predominance inquiry's “demanding burden” 
to show that racial considerations 
subordinated both neutral criteria and other 
race-neutral explanations in the formation of 
HD 74. Therefore, the Court holds, as a 
matter of fact, that race did not predominate 
in the drawing of HD 74. 
 
7. District 77 
 
HD 77 is found in the Portsmouth area and 
was represented by Delegate Lionel Spruill 
during the 2011 redistricting process. Under 
both the Benchmark Plan and the Enacted 
Plan, the district contains parts of 
Chesapeake and Suffolk. The number of 
county and city splits remained the same, and 
the number of split VTDs decreased from 4 
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to 3. HD 77 has a core retention percentage 
of 74.4. 
 
At first glance, this jagged and elongated 
district is suspect. However, upon closer 
inspection, the top-right corner of the district 
hews to strange county lines, while many 
curious features on the lower side of the 
district track natural water boundaries and 
precincts that are themselves rather jagged 
and elongated. The district had Reock and 
Polsby–Popper scores of .18 and .17 under 
the Benchmark Plan, which shifted to scores 
of .19 and .15 under the Enacted Plan. The 
district's Schwartzberg score is 2.542. With 
respect to neutral criteria, it appears that 
compliance therewith could still result in an 
inherently oddly-shaped district, but the 
record lacks guidance in this regard. 
 
The record is similarly unclear and 
incomplete respecting deviations from 
traditional criteria. The district's large 
western chunk is admittedly attributable to a 
single precinct, but that does not answer why 
that whole half of the district is thrust so far 
into HD 76 as to nearly sever it in half. As 
Delegate Jones observed, the 76th and 77th 
districts share the most geographical 
boundary area on the map.  
 
Based on the alternative districting plans 
referenced by the Plaintiffs, it appears that it 
was possible to create the same number of 
performing districts in this region without 
resorting to this westward leap. So was this 
deviation necessary to reach the 55% BVAP 
floor (in which case, race might 
predominate), or was this deviation 
motivated by a desire to remove Democrat 
performing precincts from Delegate Jones' 
district (in which case politics might 
predominate)? Or, is this overall structure 
attributable to the “knock-on” effects of 
avoiding pairing incumbents in this region? If 
so, incumbency considerations might 
predominate, political performance might 
predominate, or racial considerations might 
predominate. These are all questions that 
Plaintiffs bore the burden of answering. The 
Court is not in a position to guess based on 
the skimpy evidence submitted. 
 
But, the record does show that the district's 
already-strange 2001 design was somewhat 
ameliorated in HB 5005 by moving the 
“Airport District” precinct from HD 77 to HD 
76, and “reuniting” the “old city of South 
Norfolk” at Delegate Spruill's request, which 
allowed segments of the new district to more 
closely track county boundaries and water 
boundaries. These changes also served 
political ends. The Airport District is 
primarily Republican, so this transfer helped 
Delegate Jones, whereas the “old city of 
South Norfolk” surrounds Delegate Spruill's 
residence, which was seen as politically 
advantageous for him as well, Although the 
neighborhoods added around Delegate 
Spruill also contained meaningful black 
populations, Tanglewood, Oaklette, Norfolk 
Highlands, Indian River, and Johnson Park 
were all majority-white precincts.  
 
The Court also observes that the district is not 
contiguous by land and does not appear to 
possess a water crossing within its bounds,  
but Plaintiffs have offered no substantive 
evidence on whether this deviation relates in 
any way to the attainment of the district's 
BVAP level, which is 58.8% in the Executed 
Plan. 
 
Based on the testimony, evidence, and 
arguments, the Court cannot ascertain from 
the record whether race, politics, or other 
criteria predominated in the formation of HD 
77. Frankly, if the presumption of correctness 
and good faith has any meaning, it is 
applicable in this instance. The Plaintiffs 
simply point to the threshold's attainment of 
the 55% BVAP floor, evidence of racial 
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correlation, and a low compactness score to 
prove that race predominated. There is no 
evidence-based explanation to show how, if 
at all, the racial floor impacted the boundaries 
of HD 77 or why voters were placed there in 
the redistricting process. The Plaintiffs 
cannot hand the Court a stone and expect 
back a sculpture. 
 
It is at least as likely that politics and 
traditional districting factors account for the 
configuration and composition of HD 77 as it 
is that race was responsible. Because the 
Plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence as 
to the ways in which racial considerations 
might have had a “direct and significant 
impact” on the District's formation, the Court 
finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to meet the 
burden of proof required to show that race 
predominated in the construction of HD 77. 
 
8. District 80 
 
HD 80 is found in the Portsmouth area and 
was represented by Delegate Matthew James 
during the 2011 redistricting process. Under 
the Benchmark Plan, the district contained 
parts of Chesapeake, Norfolk, and 
Portsmouth. Under the Enacted Plan, the 
district now contains parts of Chesapeake, 
Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Suffolk. This 
increased the number of county and city splits 
from 3 to 4 but decreased the number of split 
VTDs from 2 to 1. HD 80 has a core retention 
percentage of 59.94. 
 
At trial, Intervenors stated, “I think it's fair to 
say honestly that this district looks a little 
irregular.” But “a little irregular” is “a little 
bit of an understatement.” The district is quite 
unusually configured. The district had Reock 
and Polsby–Popper scores of .39 and .26 
under the Benchmark Plan, which 
experienced a substantial drop to scores of 
.26 and .11 under the Enacted Plan. The 
district's Schwartzberg score is 3.054—the 
highest of all the Challenged Districts.  
 
Because the district makes little rational 
sense as a geographical unit, the Court will 
move directly to ascertaining the 
predominant purpose of the deviations. To 
begin, it is hard to identify what is now a 
“deviation” because it is hard to identify what 
is now the core of the district. The district is 
split by water twice without any apparent 
crossing enabling residents to stay within the 
district on either occasion.  
 
The Plaintiffs correctly note that HD 80's 
western border “winds its way around low 
BVAP precincts like Silverwood (14.9%), 
Churchland (8.3%), and Fellowship (14.2%) 
to capture high BVAP precincts such as 
Yeates (56.3%) and Taylor Road (48.8%).” 
Considering the district's attainment of the 
BVAP floor, this is the kind of detailed 
explanation that might lead the Court to find 
that racial considerations subordinated all 
others. In this case, however, the Plaintiffs' 
racial explanation must contend with other 
“dominant and controlling” considerations: 
incumbency protection as well as geographic 
features and a naval base. 
 
In addition to the constraints imposed by the 
James River, the Atlantic Ocean, and the 
Norfolk naval base, the district needed to 
retain the residence of Delegate James while 
avoiding the residences of Delegate Johnny 
Joannou (HD 79) and then-Delegate Kenneth 
Alexander (HD 89). The general—and 
relatively simple—problem was “a loss of 
population” in the area and the need to move 
district boundaries “from the oceanfront back 
... western to Suffolk” to capture population. 
This problem became far more complex, 
however, because Delegates Alexander, 
Joannou, and Jones all live in relatively close 
proximity. To avoid pairing incumbents, the 
westward shift of the districts had to wrap 
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around the residences of the incumbents, 
resulting in the distortion found here. Thus, 
the map needed to “roll the population around 
... to make sure Delegate Joannou had a 
sufficient number of residents in his district” 
and narrow the neck of the district before 
leaping further out westward to avoid 
Delegate Joannou while capturing Delegate 
James. 
 
That explanation addresses why neutral 
criteria were subordinated, but it does not 
provide the basis upon which voters were 
sorted into the corresponding districts. 
“Incumbent pairing prevention” may have 
resulted in “population rolls,” but an equal 
population goal itself is not part of the 
predominance balance.  
 
“Incumbency protection,” on the other hand, 
does provide an explanation for the 
amalgamation of precincts selected for HD 
80. As the Intervenors explained: 
 
Although HD80 could have been 
drawn to take territory from HD76—
represented by Delegate Jones—the 
precincts there were Republican 
strongholds, and neither Jones nor 
HD80's representative, Democrat 
Matthew James, wanted that trade. 
Drawing HD80 into the former 
territory of HD79 gave those 
Democratic-leaning precincts to 
James, and not Jones. This 
arrangement made HD80 less 
compact than it would have been had 
it taken territory from Jones, but it 
was politically preferable. HD80 was 
also drawn to protect other 
incumbents, Johnny Joannou (HD79) 
and Kenneth Alexander (HD89), who 
resided near the borders they shared 
with HD80, making it impossible for 
HD80 to take territory to the north 
and northeast without pairing 
incumbents. 
 
Based on this record, it appears just as likely 
that precincts were selected for being highly 
Democratic and avoided for being highly 
Republican, as it is that precincts were 
selected for being highly African–American 
and avoided for being highly Caucasian. 
And, just because “the most loyal Democrats 
happen to be black Democrats” does not 
mean that a political gerrymander is thereby 
transformed into a racial gerrymander. 
 
On the whole, the Court finds that the 
Plaintiffs have not carried the burden of 
demonstrating that racial considerations 
subordinated neutral districting criteria and 
other non-racial districting criteria, including 
incumbent pairing prevention and 
incumbency protection. Although the 
existence of the BVAP floor itself weighs in 
favor of a racial predominance finding, the 
Court finds, as a matter of fact, that—
qualitatively—the “dominant and 
controlling” factor dictating the construction 
of HD 80 was incumbency protection, and 
that race did not predominate in the drawing 
of HD 80. 
 
9. District 89 
 
HD 89 is found in the Norfolk area and was 
represented by then-Delegate Kenneth 
Alexander during the 2011 redistricting 
process. Under both the Benchmark Plan and 
the Enacted Plan, the district is contained 
wholly within Norfolk. There were no county 
or city splits and the number of split VTDs 
remained the same under both plans. HD 89 
has a core retention percentage of 76.86.  
 
On its face, the district appears reasonably 
compact and generally follows precinct lines 
within Norfolk. The district had Reock and 
Polsby–Popper scores of .58 and .31 under 
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the Benchmark Plan, which dropped to scores 
of .40 and .20 under the Enacted Plan. The 
district's Schwartzberg score is 2 .263.  
 
Although the district is not contiguous by 
land, it does contain water crossings within 
the district. One of these crossings is largely 
to blame for the district's relative drop in 
compactness. The added precinct—
Berkley—contains a high BVAP percentage,  
but is also relatively close to Delegate 
Alexander's residence. 
 
In addition, the district added a small “pipe” 
to its northernmost border, which includes a 
funeral home owned by Delegate Alexander. 
As Delegate Jones explained, Virginia state 
legislators are “part-time citizen legislators,” 
many of whom regularly interact with their 
constituents in their professional capacities. 
As such, having a business within the district 
enables incumbents to more readily engage 
with their constituents. 
 
Weighing all evidence, it appears that a 
couple of small deviations possibly could be 
attributable either to racial or to incumbency 
considerations, but the district's composition 
is predominantly attributable to traditional, 
neutral principles. Therefore, the Court holds 
that the Plaintiffs did not carry the burden of 
proving that race predominated in the 
drawing of HD 89. 
 
10. District 90 
 
HD 90 is found in the Norfolk area and was 
represented by Delegate Algie Howell, Jr. 
during the 2011 redistricting process. Under 
the Benchmark Plan, the district contained 
parts of Chesapeake, Norfolk, and Virginia 
Beach. Under the Enacted Plan, the district 
now contains parts of Norfolk and Virginia 
Beach. This decreased the number of county 
and city splits from 3 to 2 and the number of 
split VTDs remained the same. HD 90 has a 
core retention percentage of 63.21.  
 
On its face, the district appears to represent a 
reasonably compact geographic unit. The 
district had Reock and Polsby–Popper scores 
of .35 and .24 under the Benchmark Plan, 
which shifted to scores of .46 and .20 under 
the Enacted Plan. Ints.' Ex. 15 at 15, Table 9. 
The district's Schwartzberg score is 2.221.  
 
Apart from the district's two extensions into 
Virginia Beach and lack of land contiguity, 
HD 90 seems to largely comply with 
traditional, neutral districting conventions. 
Even these “deviations,” however, must be 
viewed in context. Specifically, the 2011 
redistricting plan improved the district's 
compliance with the “political subdivisions” 
criterion by removing a segment from 
Chesapeake. And, the southern appendage 
that reaches into Virginia Beach tracks the 
county line on its western border. Moreover, 
one of the district's jumps across water 
connects parts of Norfolk. As such, this land-
contiguity failure simultaneously serves to 
unite a political subdivision and community 
of interest. 
 
On the record submitted, neutral criteria 
appear to predominate. Even if the southern 
appendage reaching into Virginia Beach were 
enough for the district as a whole to exhibit a 
“substantial disregard” for neutral principles, 
it hardly appears that this offending piece of 
land could be viewed as racially driven. In 
fact, that segment of Virginia Beach contains 
some of the lowest BVAP percentages in the 
entire district. Therefore, the Court holds that 
the Plaintiffs did not carry the burden to 
prove that race predominated in the drawing 
of HD 90, notwithstanding that it satisfies the 
55% BVAP floor. 
 
11. District 92 
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HD 92 is found in the Hampton area and was 
represented by Delegate Jeion Ward during 
the 2011 redistricting process. Under both the 
Benchmark Plan and the Enacted Plan, the 
district is contained wholly within Hampton. 
The district contains no county or city splits, 
and redistricting lowered the number of split 
VTDs in the district from 3 to 0. HD 92 has a 
core retention percentage of 77.27. 
 
On the whole, the Court finds it hard to 
imagine a better example of a district that 
complies with traditional, neutral districting 
principles. The district had Reock and 
Polsby–Popper scores of .28 and .15 under 
the Benchmark Plan, which increased to 
scores of .34 and .26 under the Enacted Plan. 
The district's Schwartzberg score is 1.970.  
 
As a result of the 2011 redistricting process, 
the district became more compact, reunified 
downtown Hampton, and eliminated all 
precinct splits. Moreover, most of the 
district's southern border is marked by the 
waterfront and much of the district's western 
border now follows the Hampton boundary, 
making it easily identifiable to voters. 
Although the district is not contiguous by 
land, it contains water crossings to allow 
voters to travel between parts of the district 
without traversing other districts. The Court 
holds, as a matter of fact, that traditional, 
neutral criteria—not race—predominated in 
the construction of HD 92. 
 
12. District 95 
 
HD 95 is found in the Hampton area and was 
represented by Delegate Mamye BaCote 
during the 2011 redistricting process. Under 
both the Benchmark Plan and the Enacted 
Plan, the district contains parts of Hampton 
and Newport News. Although the number of 
county and city splits remained the same, 
redistricting increased the number of split 
VTDs from 1 to 6. HD 95 has a core retention 
percentage of 62.15, and is contiguous by 
land. 
 
Their proximity notwithstanding, HD 92 and 
HD 95 share little in common. From bottom 
to top, the district begins by encompassing 
the full width of Newport News but soon 
departs from any observable neutral criteria. 
As the district moves northwest, a sliver 
attributable to the River precinct extends into 
HD 94 before the district works its way 
entirely over into Hampton City. There it 
remains for a period before extending briefly 
back into Newport News via the South 
Morrison precinct. After retreating back into 
Hampton City the district then hits water and 
York County, which it weaves around before 
running up through the middle of Newport 
News in a narrow spike. If there is any 
reasonably neutral explanation for the route 
followed, this Court was not informed. The 
district had Reock and Polsby–Popper scores 
of .43 and .28 under the Benchmark Plan, 
which dropped to scores of .14 and .14 under 
the Enacted Plan. This rendered HD 95 the 
least compact district on the map under the 
Reock metric. The district's Schwartzberg 
score is 2.657.  
 
Rather than attempting to explain the district 
through neutral criteria, the Intervenors 
themselves acknowledge that the 
construction of the district was “significantly 
political.” According to Delegate Jones, the 
district's movement north follows heavily 
Democratic precincts and then narrowly 
jumps through two Republican precincts in 
order to capture another strongly Democratic 
voting area at its northernmost tip. Moreover, 
the district's eastward “zig” followed by its 
westward “zag” managed to avoid including 
the residence of Delegate Robin Abbott in 
HD 95. This avoided pairing female 
Democratic incumbents and, in conjunction 
with the partisan maneuvering above, placed 
Delegate Abbott in a more heavily 
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Republican swing seat. As Intervenors 
explained: “HD95 was crafted carefully to 
avoid taking HD94's Republican precincts 
and instead take Democratic-leaning 
population left behind by HD93 and reach 
into precincts surrounded by HD93 to dilute 
Democratic voting strength in that area.” 
The Court finds that explanation persuasive. 
Where there is a correlation between race and 
party, the burden is upon the Plaintiffs to 
dislodge the evidence showing that voters 
were sorted predominantly on the basis 
political preference rather than race. Delegate 
Jones had access to political performance 
data as well as racial data. As the Intervenors 
asked during closing argument: “[I]f race was 
the principal factor, why [did the legislature] 
pass by all these areas which have more black 
voters [in the southern part of the peninsula 
and] go up there [to the northern tip of the 
district]? ... We don't hear any analysis from 
the other side on that point. There's no 
contradictory testimony.” On the evidence 
submitted, political advantage (based on 
partisan performance data) has been shown to 
have been the dominant and controlling 
consideration guiding the district's 
unorthodox boundaries. As a result, the Court 
holds, as a matter of fact, that race did not 
predominate in the construction of HD 95. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds 
that each of the twelve Challenged Districts 
withstands constitutional scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause, and judgment will 
be entered for the Defendants and the 
Intervenor–Defendants. 
 
It is so ORDERED. 
 
… 
 
BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit 
Judge, dissenting: 
Today, despite the Supreme Court's clear 
warning against the mechanical use of racial 
targets in redistricting, this court upholds the 
Virginia General Assembly's application of a 
one-size-fits-all racial quota to twelve highly 
dissimilar legislative districts. This quota was 
used to assign voters to districts based on the 
color of their skin without the constitutional 
protection afforded by strict scrutiny. 
I recognize that the legislature in this case did 
not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Alabama, and I do not doubt that 
individual legislators acted in good faith in 
the redistricting process. Nevertheless, the 
resulting legislative enactment has affected 
Virginia citizens' fundamental right to vote, 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Accordingly, I would invalidate Virginia's 
2011 redistricting plan. 
 
I. 
 
Redistricting decisions are almost always 
made with a “consciousness of race,” and 
such awareness does not necessarily result in 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
However, when a legislature is “motivated” 
by racial considerations, this inherently 
suspect system of racial classification must 
satisfy the rigorous requirements of strict 
scrutiny.  
 
A plaintiff asserting a race-based equal 
protection claim in a redistricting case has the 
burden of proving “that race was the 
predominant factor motivating the 
legislature's decision to place a significant 
number of voters within or without a 
particular district.” Under this predominance 
test, a plaintiff must show that “the 
legislature subordinated traditional race-
neutral districting principles ... to racial 
considerations.” When a legislature has 
“relied on race in substantial disregard of 
customary and traditional districting 
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principles,” such traditional principles have 
been subordinated to race.  
 
Strict scrutiny is required when race was the 
predominant factor that categorically was 
accorded priority over race-neutral districting 
factors. As the Supreme Court has explained, 
traditional factors have been subordinated to 
race when “[r]ace was the criterion that, in 
the State's view, could not be compromised,” 
and when traditional, race-neutral criteria 
were considered “only after the race-based 
decision had been made.” Thus, while a 
redistricting plan may reflect certain 
traditional districting criteria, that plan 
nevertheless remains subject to strict scrutiny 
when those criteria have been subordinated to 
a process that has sorted voters primarily by 
race. 
 
Contrary to the majority's view, this 
predominance inquiry does not require that 
the use of race in drawing district boundaries 
be in “conflict” with traditional districting 
criteria. In fact, the race of a voter often 
correlates with other districting 
considerations, including partisan preference, 
incumbency protection, and communities of 
interest. The conclusion logically follows, 
therefore, that racial sorting frequently will 
not be in “conflict” with these and other 
districting criteria. 
 
Because such districting criteria can be used 
to mask racial sorting, courts must carefully 
examine the evidence under the test for 
predominance articulated in Miller and Shaw 
II. Under that test, race necessarily 
predominates when the legislature has 
subordinated traditional districting criteria to 
racial goals, such as when race is the single 
immutable criterion and other factors are 
considered only when consistent with the 
racial objective.  
 
II. 
This case presents a textbook example of 
racial predominance, in which a uniform 
racial quota was the only criterion employed 
in the redistricting process that could not be 
compromised. This one-size-fits-all quota 
automatically made racial sorting a priority 
over any other districting factor. Although a 
legislature is entitled to a presumption of 
good faith, this presumption must yield when 
the evidence shows that citizens have been 
assigned to legislative districts primarily 
based on their race. For this reason, I disagree 
with the majority's conclusion that a uniform 
racial quota merely is “evidence” of 
predominance, and instead would hold that 
the existence of such a widely applied quota 
establishes predominance as a matter of law. 
 
A. 
 
I first observe that while the parties have 
engaged in a semantical debate whether the 
55% BVAP threshold was an “aspirational 
target” or a “rule,” the evidence presented at 
trial clearly established that the legislature 
employed the 55% BVAP figure as a fixed, 
non-negotiable quota. Three individual 
delegates testified regarding their 
understanding of the mandatory nature of the 
quota. And, despite Delegate Jones' trial 
testimony that the 55% BVAP figure was 
merely an “aspirational ... rule of thumb,” he 
promoted the plan during the House of 
Delegates floor debates as having achieved a 
55% minimum BVAP for all majority-
minority districts. The legislators' subjective 
understanding that the 55% figure operated 
as a mandatory floor further was 
corroborated by the fact that, in the 2011 
plan, the BVAP in most of the twelve 
challenged districts converged toward 55% 
while each district satisfied the 55% BVAP 
floor.  
 
B. 
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The “disregard of individual rights” is the 
“fatal flaw” in such race-based 
classifications. By assigning voters to certain 
districts based on the color of their skin, 
states risk “engag[ing] in the offensive and 
demeaning assumption that voters of a 
particular race, because of their race, think 
alike, share the same political interests, and 
will prefer the same candidates at the polls.” 
Quotas are especially pernicious 
embodiments of racial stereotypes, because 
they threaten citizens' “‘personal rights' to be 
treated with equal dignity and respect.”  
 
Here, the plan contravened the rights of 
individual voters by applying a one-size-fits-
all racial quota for black voters in twelve 
highly dissimilar districts, without regard to 
the characteristics of the voters or of their 
communities. The 55% quota thus is a classic 
example of race-based stereotyping and 
unequal treatment prohibited by the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
 
The Supreme Court's skepticism of racial 
quotas is long-standing. However, the Court 
has yet to decide whether use of a one-size-
fits-all racial quota in a legislative 
redistricting plan or, in particular, use of such 
a quota well exceeding 50%, establishes 
predominance as a matter of law under 
Miller. 
 
The Court recently has cautioned against 
“prioritizing mechanical racial targets above 
all other districting criteria” in redistricting. 
Although the Court in Alabama did not 
decide whether the use of a racial quota well 
exceeding 50%, of itself, can establish 
predominance, the Court made clear that such 
“mechanical racial targets” are highly 
suspicious. After issuing this admonishment 
and identifying several errors in the district 
court's analysis, the Court ultimately 
remanded the case to the district court to 
reconsider the question of predominance. 
The uniform racial quota employed in the 
present case is more suspicious on its face 
than the racial thresholds at issue in Alabama. 
The legislature in Alabama sought to 
maintain preexisting racial percentages 
specific to each district with the aim of 
avoiding retrogression under Section 5. In 
contrast, the racial quota used in the present 
case was applied indiscriminately to all 
twelve districts irrespective of the particular 
characteristics of those districts. The Virginia 
plan's one-size-fits-all quota thus raises even 
more serious concerns that the legislature's 
districting decisions were driven primarily by 
race. 
 
In view of the Virginia legislature's 
application of a single racial quota to 
numerous districts in the case before us, this 
court is not presented with the question 
whether a particular fixed BVAP percentage 
would trigger strict scrutiny if applied to a 
single district. Nor is this court asked to 
decide whether strict scrutiny is required 
every time a legislature intentionally creates 
a majority-minority district.  
 
Instead, the more narrow question before this 
court is whether strict scrutiny is required 
when a uniform racial quota of 55% has been 
applied by a legislature in drawing twelve 
legislative districts that are highly dissimilar 
in character. Here, because traditional 
districting criteria were considered solely 
insofar as they did not interfere with this 55% 
minimum floor, the quota operated as a filter 
through which all line-drawing decisions had 
to pass. Such a racial filter necessarily had a 
discriminatory effect on the configuration of 
the districts, because it rendered all 
traditional criteria that otherwise would have 
been “race-neutral” tainted by and 
subordinated to race. Under these 
circumstances, although a legislature may 
take into account traditional districting 
criteria, race-neutral application of those 
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criteria becomes impossible and all decisions 
necessarily are affected by race. Therefore, I 
would hold that the plaintiffs have 
established as a matter of law under Miller 
that race predominated in the legislative 
drawing of each of the challenged districts, 
and I would apply strict scrutiny in 
examining the constitutionality of those 
districts. 
 
III. 
 
In stark contrast, the majority's predominance 
analysis accepts the use of this facially 
suspicious racial quota. In doing so, the 
majority places an unwarranted burden on the 
plaintiffs to show that the quota had 
identifiable effects on the drawing of 
particular district lines. The majority thus 
effectively would require the plaintiffs to 
present an alternative legislative map 
showing how lines could have been drawn 
differently without imposing the 55% quota. 
Such an onerous burden, however, far 
exceeds the required showing for establishing 
predominance. 
 
Additionally, under the majority's test, visual 
inspection of a district would be fatal to an 
equal protection claim if the district's 
boundaries appear to be consistent with 
traditional criteria, irrespective of direct 
evidence that the line-drawing was racially 
motivated at the outset. Thus, as a result of 
the majority's analysis, and its requirement 
that the use of race be in actual “conflict” 
with traditional districting criteria, future 
plaintiffs asserting a racial sorting claim will 
be restricted to challenging districts that 
manifest extreme line-drawing unexplainable 
on race-neutral grounds, like the district at 
issue in Shaw I. 
 
As the Supreme Court has emphasized, 
however, a district that is bizarre in shape is 
not the constitutional harm prohibited by the 
Equal Protection Clause. Rather, as stated 
above, the constitutional harm results from 
individual voters being sorted into districts 
based on the color of their skin. By requiring 
that use of race actually “conflict” with 
traditional redistricting criteria, the majority's 
predominance test often will fail to identify 
constitutionally suspect racial sorting. 
 
IV. 
 
In reviewing a redistricting plan, courts 
typically examine whether a plan complies 
with traditional districting factors, such as 
compactness and contiguity, when evaluating 
whether there is evidence of racially 
motivated decision making. When a 
legislative district is bizarre in shape, that fact 
“may be persuasive circumstantial evidence 
that race for its own sake, and not other 
districting principles, was the legislature's 
dominant and controlling rationale in 
drawing its district lines.” Here, however, the 
majority relies on shape and other traditional 
districting factors to uphold the 2011 plan, 
even in the face of the overwhelming, direct 
evidence of racial motivation evidenced by 
the use of a one-size-fits-all racial quota. 
 
The majority's analysis is not aided by 
Cromartie II and Bush. In Cromartie II, the 
Court described the predominance inquiry as 
requiring plaintiffs to show that a district's 
boundaries were drawn “because of race 
rather than because of” other districting 
criteria. However, a legislative district 
necessarily is crafted “because of race” when 
a racial quota is the single filter through 
which all line-drawing decisions are made. 
 
Similarly, the principal opinion in Bush 
explained that “[s]ignificant deviations from 
traditional districting principles ... cause 
constitutional harm insofar as they convey 
the message that political identity is, or 
should be, predominantly racial.” The import 
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of this language is obvious. The harm caused 
by racial stereotyping is apparent when racial 
sorting manifests itself in odd district 
boundaries that are visible to any observer. 
But the incidence of constitutional harm is 
not limited to the presence of a district that is 
odd in shape. In the present case, the 
legislature's use of a racial quota resulted in 
constitutional harm, because that 
methodology “convey[ed] the message that 
political identity is, or should be, 
predominantly racial.”  
 
I also disagree with the intervenors' implicit 
suggestion that approval by incumbent 
legislators in the challenged districts 
somehow rescues the plan from a finding of 
racial predominance. The Voting Rights Act 
(VRA) and the Equal Protection Clause are 
intended to protect the rights of the individual 
voter, not to promote the self-interest of 
incumbents in majority-minority districts. To 
the contrary, immunizing incumbents from 
challenge could entrench them in 
overwhelmingly safe districts and undermine 
the representatives' accountability to their 
constituents. One can easily imagine how 
such entrenchment could harm minority 
voters by discouraging challengers from 
running and by preventing voters from 
electing a new candidate who better 
represents their interests. “Packing” minority 
voters into a particular majority-minority 
district for the purpose of protecting the 
incumbent also can reduce minority voters' 
ability to influence elections in nearby 
districts. 
 
A true predominance analysis also is not 
affected by the fact that, at the time of the 
2010 census, nine of the twelve challenged 
districts already had a BVAP of 55% or 
higher. Even assuming that such figures 
could protect the configuration of those nine 
districts in the 2011 plan, the three remaining 
districts still would be subject to strict 
scrutiny. Moreover, given the significant 
population deficits in most of the challenged 
districts, our inquiry must focus on “which 
voters the legislature decide[d] to choose” 
when moving voters between districts in 
order to achieve population equality. Here, 
the legislature's decision to move certain 
voters in order to maintain a preexisting 55% 
BVAP floor in the new plan is still a 
“mechanically numerical” method of 
redistricting that is subject to strict scrutiny. 
 
I therefore conclude that the majority's 
approach effectively and improperly places 
on plaintiffs asserting racial predominance in 
redistricting a burden never assigned by the 
Supreme Court. Under the majority's 
analysis, plaintiffs now will be required to 
show circumstantial evidence of racial 
motivation through “actual conflict” with 
traditional districting criteria, when such 
plaintiffs already have presented dispositive 
direct evidence that the legislature assigned 
race a priority over all other districting 
factors. 
 
V. 
 
Even upon applying its heightened 
predominance standard, the majority 
concludes that race was the predominant 
factor in the drawing of District 75. I would 
hold that, under the majority's test, the same 
conclusion of predominance holds true for 
neighboring District 63 as well. 
 
As a result of the “drastic maneuvering” 
required to reach a 55% BVAP in District 75, 
portions of a county previously in District 63 
were shifted into District 75, a move that the 
majority agrees was “avowedly racial.” The 
plan compensated for this loss of BVAP in 
District 63 by adding to the district new areas 
with high BVAP concentrations. Due to the 
changes in the 2011 plan, District 63 
experienced a startling reduction in 
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compactness and an increase in the number 
of split cities, counties, and VTDs. This and 
other evidence showed that implementation 
of the 55% racial quota had a marked impact 
on the configuration of both Districts 63 and 
75. 
 
VI. 
 
I further conclude that none of the challenged 
districts can survive the test of strict scrutiny, 
because the legislature's use of the 55% quota 
was not narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling state interest in any of the 
challenged districts. Evidence of narrow 
tailoring in this case is practically non-
existent. 
 
Assuming that compliance with the VRA is a 
compelling state interest, attempts at such 
compliance “cannot justify race-based 
districting where the challenged district was 
not reasonably necessary under a 
constitutional reading and application” of 
federal law. Thus, narrow tailoring requires 
that the legislature have a “strong basis in 
evidence” for its race-based decision, that is, 
“good reasons to believe” that the chosen 
racial classification was required to comply 
with the VRA.  
 
In the present case, the intervenors presented 
virtually no evidence supporting the need for 
application of a 55% BVAP in any of the 
challenged districts. In fact, Delegate Jones 
even had difficulty articulating the original 
source of the 55% figure.  
 
The only evidence suggestive of any tailoring 
involved District 75. Delegate Jones testified 
that he conducted a “functional analysis” of 
Delegate Tyler's primary and general election 
results in 2005, and considered the significant 
prison population in that district, which 
together supported the imposition of a 55% 
racial floor. However, Jones' statements were 
merely general and conclusory in nature and, 
therefore, fell far short of demonstrating a 
“strong basis in evidence” for the application 
of a racial quota. Not only did the 2005 
elections occur six years prior to the 2011 
redistricting, but Tyler ran unopposed in the 
two elections since, casting significant doubt 
on Jones' contention that District 75 was so 
competitive that a minority-preferred 
candidate required at least a 55% BVAP to be 
re-elected from 2011 onward. And, critically, 
Jones failed to provide any explanation of 
how his “functional” review led him to 
conclude that a 55% BVAP was required in 
District 75 to ensure compliance with the 
VRA. 
 
The evidence supporting the use of the 55% 
racial quota in the remaining challenged 
districts was even weaker. The House of 
Delegates did not conduct an analysis 
regarding the extent of racially polarized 
voting in any of these districts. Although 
Delegate Jones stated that he was aware of 
low registration rates among black voters, he 
also admitted that he did not review voter 
registration figures when drawing the plan. 
Nor did he examine minority turnout rates in 
most of the challenged districts, or consider 
state Senate districts, congressional maps, or 
other maps that had been pre-cleared or 
rejected by the Department of Justice. And, 
in attempting to justify imposition of the 55% 
BVAP quota in District 63, Jones stated that 
he “t[hought] there was a primary” in which 
Delegate Dance ran as an independent, which 
results he reviewed, but he did not specify 
how those results led him to select a 55% 
BVAP threshold in District 63. Such 
unsubstantiated and general comments 
plainly do not constitute the strong basis in 
evidence required to satisfy strict scrutiny. 
 
Finally, I do not think that the outcome of this 
case, in favor of either party, is dependent on 
any of the expert testimony. However, I 
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pause to note that I find the testimony offered 
by Dr. Katz to be singularly unpersuasive on 
the issue of narrow tailoring. Dr. Katz 
admitted that he provided only a “crude” 
analysis of the likelihood that a candidate 
preferred by minority voters would be 
elected. According to Dr. Katz, this “crude” 
method demonstrated that a 55% BVAP 
correlates with an 80% chance of electing a 
black candidate.  
 
Dr. Katz' crude analysis exhibits two glaring 
flaws. First, it underrepresents the likelihood 
that the preferred candidate of minority 
voters would be elected by evaluating only 
the likely success of black candidates, when 
minority voters had elected non-minority 
delegates in certain of the challenged 
districts. Second, and more fundamentally, 
Dr. Katz' analysis is flawed because the VRA 
does not guarantee the success of a candidate 
of a particular race in a given election. 
Rather, the VRA ensures that minority voters 
do not “have less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in the 
political process and to elect representatives 
of their choice,” and that minority voters 
retain their existing ability to elect their 
preferred candidates.  
For these reasons, I would find that the record 
utterly fails to show that the legislature had a 
“strong basis in evidence” for using the 55% 
racial quota in any of the challenged districts. 
Accordingly, I would hold that all the 
districts fail the test of strict scrutiny. 
 
VII. 
 
The promise of the Equal Protection Clause 
is the guarantee of true equality under the 
law, enforced by our courts for the protection 
of our citizens irrespective of the power of 
any governmental entity. The Virginia 
legislature's use of the racial quota in this 
case violated this core constitutional 
principle in the absence of a strong basis in 
evidence supporting its race-based decision. 
Thus, I would invalidate Virginia's 2011 
redistricting plan. I respectfully dissent. 
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“Supreme Court will weigh in on whether Va. districts are racially 
gerrymandered” 
 
The Washington Post 
Robert Barnes and Laura Vozzella 
June 6, 2016 
 
The Supreme Court announced Monday it 
will take its second look at whether 
Virginia’s Republican political leaders 
gerrymandered the state’s electoral maps in 
order to diminish the power of African 
American voters. 
Last month, the justices upheld a plan 
imposed by a lower court that redrew some of 
the commonwealth’s congressional districts 
and created the possibility of electing a 
second black U.S. House member. 
On Monday, the court said it would review a 
different court’s rejection of a challenge that 
said Republican leaders reduced the strength 
of minority voters by packing them into a 
dozen House of Delegates districts. 
A three-judge panel had voted 2 to 1 that the 
districts were constitutional and that race had 
not been the primary consideration in 
drawing them. 
The case will be considered in the new term 
that begins in October, and if the Supreme 
Court orders any changes in the districts, they 
would presumably take place in advance of 
the 2017 elections. 
The Supreme Court is increasingly being 
asked to consider cases of alleged racial 
gerrymandering. Unlike the usual process 
involved in selecting which cases it will 
review, federal law leaves the court little 
discretion in deciding whether to review 
redistricting challenges. 
Last year, the court sent back Alabama’s 
legislative redistricting plan, saying 
legislators had failed to find the legal sweet 
spot between districts drawn with enough 
minority voters that they can elect 
representatives of their choice but not with so 
many minority voters that surrounding 
districts are intentionally made safe for white 
Republicans. 
The Virginia cases were brought by Marc E. 
Elias and funded by the National Democratic 
Redistricting Trust. Elias is general counsel 
to Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign 
and worked on the campaign of now-Gov. 
Terry McAuliffe (D). 
Virginia House Speaker William J. Howell 
(R-Stafford) said the three-judge panel in the 
current case “plainly laid out the 
constitutionality of Virginia’s House of 
Delegates redistricting plan and we are 
confident that upon review the Supreme 
Court will affirm the lower court ruling.” 
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Supporters of the plan noted that every 
member of the Legislative Black Caucus 
voted for it when it was drawn in 2011. 
But support from black incumbents does not 
guarantee that the maps were fair, said Brian 
Cannon, executive director of 
OneVirginia2021, a nonprofit group pushing 
for nonpartisan redistricting. 
“It’s not about the black legislators. It’s about 
the black voters, whether African American 
voters have been illegally packed into 
districts,” Cannon said. “This leaves a 
number of communities split. It wrings out 
competition from elections, and it only serves 
as an incumbent-protection racket.” 
He added: “The Supreme Court has a chance 
to uphold good-government redistricting 
criteria in this case because what they’re 
faced with is a scenario in which the political 
process subverted all other good-government 
criteria in favor of politics.” 
Richmond braced for a stalemate over 
redistricting in 2011, the first time since 
Reconstruction that political map-making 
had been undertaken by a divided legislature. 
But the GOP-led House and Democratic-led 
Senate struck an informal deal: Republicans 
in the House agreed to accept Senate lines 
drawn by Democrats, and Democrats in the 
Senate agreed to accept House lines drawn by 
Republicans. 
Some Democrats complained at the time that 
the GOP could have drawn two additional 
-majority-minority districts but chose not to. 
Many black legislators spoke in favor of the 
plan, saying that their views had been taken 
into account. 
The deal sailed through the House on an 86-
to-8 vote. Most of the resistance came from 
Republicans in the closely divided Senate, 
where the map was passed on a straight party-
line vote of 22 to 18. Senate Republicans said 
at the time that the Democratic plan divided 
up too many counties and cities and 
contained districts that varied too widely in 
population. 
More recently, House Democrats have begun 
complaining about the lines. 
“We have a state that is essentially a 50-50, 
Republican-Democratic state and two-thirds 
of the House is controlled by the 
Republicans,” said House Minority Leader 
David J. Toscano (D-Charlottesville). “That 
only makes sense in terms of lines that are 
drawn to protect the incumbent Republican 
majority.” 
That may not mean much to the justices. The 
court has shown a high tolerance for partisan 
gerrymandering aimed at protecting 
incumbents. But the Constitution forbids 
gerrymandering that relies too heavily on 
race, because it harms the political clout of 
minorities. 
The lawsuit singled out 12 legislative 
districts for such criticism. But two of the 
three judges examining the plan said 
challengers had failed to prove that race was 
the predominant factor in drawing 11 of 
them. 
Dissenting Judge Barbara Milano Keenan 
disagreed, saying the state’s leaders applied a 
“one-size-fits-all racial quota” to the 
otherwise dissimilar districts. 
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In the congressional case decided last month, 
the Supreme Court did not reach the question 
of whether Virginia lawmakers had 
intentionally packed minority voters in a way 
that diminished their strength. Instead, the 
court found that the Republican congressmen 
challenging the lower court’s decision did not 
have the legal standing to bring the suit. 
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“How racial gerrymandering deprives black people of political power” 
 
Washington Post 
Kim Soffen 
June 9, 2016 
 
Thirty years ago, the Supreme Court 
expanded the meaning of one of the most 
important civil rights laws in U.S. history — 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Among other 
things, the court prohibited a then-common 
practice among some states of spreading 
minorities across voting districts, leaving 
them too few in number in any given district 
to elect their preferred candidates. The 
practice became known as "racial 
gerrymandering." 
The court’s solution required that states 
create majority-minority districts — districts 
in which the majority of the voting-age 
population belonged to a single minority. 
With voting that occurred largely along racial 
lines, these districts allowed minority voters 
to elect their candidates of choice. 
But a fascinating development occurred in 
the years since. These districts, rather than 
giving African Americans more political 
power, might have actually started to deprive 
them of it. Majority-minority districts, by 
concentrating the minority vote in certain 
districts, have the unintended consequence of 
diluting their influence elsewhere. Experts 
say some Republican legislatures have 
capitalized on this new reality, redistricting in 
their political favor under the guise of 
majority-minority districts. 
“Typically the goal in [packing minorities 
into a district] is not to reduce minority 
representation in the adjacent districts; it’s to 
reduce Democrats’ representation in those 
districts," said Nicholas Stephanopoulos, a 
professor at the University of Chicago Law 
School. "They’ve been arguably using the 
racial demographics as a way to enact a 
Republican gerrymander.” 
The issue has gained new prominence thanks 
to Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of 
Elections, a case the Supreme Court agreed 
on Monday to hear. Virginia’s Republican-
held state legislature drew its majority-
minority districts to be 55 percent black. 
Golden Bethune-Hill, among other Virginian 
voters, sued the state’s Board of Elections, 
arguing that they used race as a primary 
factor in drawing district lines for the House 
of Delegates, which is unconstitutional under 
the equal protection clause of the 14th 
Amendment. 
The state contends the redistricting process 
occurred fairly and legally, with bipartisan 
support. Republicans have generally 
defended their redistricting practices as 
following a legal practice of drawing districts 
in politically favorable ways — just as 
Democrat-controlled legislatures do. 
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Constitutional issues aside, what’s the 
practical consequence of the standard 
practice of "packing" districts with at least 50 
percent African Americans? There are 
dozens of majority-minority congressional 
districts across the country, and many more 
state-level districts. They’re concentrated in 
the South, but can be found in states like New 
York and Ohio as well. 
Consider an example: Imagine the minority-
favored candidate can win an election in a 
district if at least 30 percent of voters are 
minorities. What harm is done by the 
legislators packing the district up to 50 
percent minority voters? 
Much like political gerrymandering, it limits 
black influence in surrounding districts. It 
would require the creation of, for instance, a 
50 percent and a 10 percent black district, 
rather than two 30 percent black districts. In 
other words, the requirement would give 
black voters one representative of their 
choice rather than two. 
And even if it doesn’t decrease the number of 
representatives the black voters can elect, it 
can decrease their influence in white-
dominated districts. As shown in the graphic 
below, in a hypothetical state with five 
districts, packing the minority voters in at 50 
percent levels rather than 30 percent leads 
them to lose influence in two other districts, 
leaving them overwhelmingly white. 
In both scenarios, the minority is numerous 
enough to control the election in two districts. 
What differs is whether they have a political 
voice elsewhere in the state, which is 
ultimately necessary to pass state-wide 
legislation in their favor. 
You might be thinking that, if only 30 percent 
of a district's voters are black, it will be hard 
for African Americans to elect their preferred 
candidate. But that's increasingly not the 
case.  The reason: the decline of racially 
polarized voting. Minority and white voting 
patterns used to be starkly divergent, but 
now, more whites vote for the minority-
favored candidate, especially in primaries. 
This change came about as racial divisions, 
beginning with the decline of segregation and 
explicit racism, have faded (though 
obviously not disappeared), and the interests 
of politically like-minded blacks and whites 
have aligned. As a result, fewer minority 
voters are required for a district to elect their 
favored candidate. 
One 2002 paper found that from the 1960s to 
the 1980s, districts needed to be more than 50 
— some in the South as much as 65 — 
percent African American for their favored 
candidate to win the election. But today, 
experts place the figure between 40 and 45 
percent. Stephanopoulos says it’s “certainly 
below 50 percent” across the country. 
In majority-minority districts, minority 
voters are, by definition, packed beyond that 
threshold. Ultimately, this is detrimental to 
the minorities. David Canon, a professor of 
political science at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison said, “If you have too 
high a percent African Americans in a House 
district, it does dilute the overall 
representation of African American 
interests.” 
Since the minority electorate leans liberal, 
packing minorities has the same effect as 
packing Democrats, causing the district map 
to favor Republicans in the same way it 
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favors whites. This key correlation has made 
majority-minority districts popular among 
Republican-held state legislatures beyond 
Virginia. 
The partisanship is especially clear when 
seeing how the district lines change census-
to-census. Stephanopoulos said Republican 
legislatures take districts "that were already 
electing minority representatives and pack 
more minority voters into them," and 
Democratic legislatures tend to "unpack ... 
minority districts." In Arizona, which has a 
Republican legislature but districting is done 
by an independent commission, "there was 
much less packing of minority voters than 
there was in the other states." 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
States across the country, particularly in the 
South where legislatures tend to lean 
Republican and the Department of Justice 
historically had stronger control over voting 
rights, draw these districts. Though the court 
is more concerned with the inappropriate use 
of racial classifications rather than the 
deprivation of minority political power, its 
ruling could have implications for 
legislatures across the country. 
The Supreme Court will hear arguments in its 
next term beginning in October.
441 
 
“Court reopens race and death penalty issues” 
 
SCOTUSblog 
Lyle Denniston 
June 6, 2016 
 
[Excerpt; Some references to other cases 
have been omitted.] 
Returning to ongoing disputes over the role 
of race in criminal punishment and in 
politics, the Supreme Court on Monday 
added new cases for decisions at its next 
Term — one involving the death penalty in 
Texas, the other involving the drawing of 
new maps for election of members of 
Virginia’s state legislature. 
[…] 
The other race case that the Court agreed on 
Monday to review, Bethune-Hill v. Virginia 
State Board of Elections, brings the question 
of racial gerrymandering in redistricting 
plans back to the Court for the second time 
this Term — and in the second case involving 
Virginia.  The other case, Wittman v. 
Personhubballah, involved congressional 
redistricting; it ultimately ended last month, 
when the Justices found that none of the 
challengers had a real legal stake in the case 
and dismissed it. 
The new case focused on a plan that the 
Virginia legislature drew up in 2011, 
following a federal census, for the one 
hundred seats in its lower chamber, the 
House of Delegates.  The challenge in federal 
court to the plan focused on twelve districts 
that were assigned a majority population of 
minorities.  The claim was that each of those 
districts was the result of racial 
gerrymandering — in particular, the 
legislature’s decision to start with the 
premise that those districts should have at 
least a fifty-five-percent minority population. 
The Supreme Court has ruled several times 
that it is unconstitutional to draw up 
districting maps if race was the “predominant 
factor” in drafting the boundaries and 
deciding who should or should not be 
included in given districts.  In the House of 
Delegates case, a three-judge federal district 
court ruled that race was, in fact, the 
predominant factor in a single district, but 
even that one was not unconstitutional 
because it had been done to avoid violating 
federal civil rights law. 
The challengers apparently enhanced their 
chances of getting their complaint heard by 
the Supreme Court by pointing out, in a later 
filing, that the decision in their case 
conflicted directly with a federal court’s 
ruling finding racial gerrymandering in the 
creation of two congressional districts in 
North Carolina. 
The Supreme Court issued a major ruling on 
the racial gerrymandering issue last Term, in 
the case of Alabama Legislative Black 
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Caucus v. Alabama.   Apparently, however, 
the Court is not yet satisfied that the decision 
went far enough to clarify its views on that 
subject. 
[…] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each of the three newly granted cases will 
come up for hearing and decision in the 
Court’s next Term, starting in October.
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“Virginia House districts upheld” 
 
Daily Press 
Travis Fain 
October 22, 2015
A three judge panel dismissed a lawsuit 
Thursday challenging 12 districts in the 
Virginia House of Delegates, rejecting 
arguments that Republican legislators used 
racial politics to draw the lines. 
The districts, including two on the Peninsula, 
will stay as they are, though an appeal is 
likely. 
The decisions was 2-1. U.S. District Court 
judges Robert Payne and Gerald Bruce Lee 
said race was the predominant reason for 
drawing just one of the 12 districts – District 
75 in Sussex County – and that the legislature 
had a good reason to rely on race there. 
In the other districts, the two judges said GOP 
leaders managed to "traverse a precarious 
path between constitutional and statutory 
demands that are often in tension with one 
another." 
4th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Barbara 
Milano Keenan disagreed, saying the General 
Assembly used a "one-size fits all racial 
quote" to draw districts in "a textbook 
example of racial predominance." 
Plaintiffs had accused the assembly's GOP 
majority of packing black voters into districts 
to dilute their voting strength elsewhere, 
strengthening the party's on the House of 
Delegates. Republicans testified that partisan 
concerns, and incumbent protection, drove 
much of their thinking. 
Plaintiffs failed to prove that racial concerns 
were predominant, the majority wrote. 
The packing argument was successful in a 
separate challenge to Virginia's 3rd 
Congressional District, which is being 
redrawn now under a court order. Payne was 
the only judge to serve on both cases, and he 
disagreed with the majority's 3rd District 
decision. 
Marc Elias, whose firm brought this case, the 
3rd District case and another still-pending 
case targeting Virginia's voter ID laws, said 
his team is reviewing the Thursday decision, 
but expects to appeal. Golden Bethune-Hill, 
a well-known local activist and retired 
Riverside Health System executive, is the 
lead plaintiff in the case, and it bears her 
name. 
The majority opinion runs 155 pages and 
delves deep into redistricting history and 
theory, as well as American racial politics. 
Keenan's dissent adds another 21 pages. 
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The majority opinion describes each district's 
borders in turn, saying it's "hard to imagine a 
better example of a district that complies with 
traditional, neutral districting principles" 
than the 92nd District held by Del. Jeion 
Ward," D-Hampton. 
Not so with Del. Mamye BaCote's 95th 
District, which runs through parts of Newport 
News and Hampton. 
"If there is any reasonably neutral 
explanation for the route followed, this court 
was not informed," the judges wrote. 
House Appropriations Chairman S. Chris 
Jones, the Suffolk Republican who 
spearheaded the 2011 redistricting, testified 
that the 95th's lines were drawn to avoid two 
heavily Republican precincts, gather in 
Democrats and avoid then Del. Robin 
Abbott's home. 
That helped keep Abbott out of the 
legislature. 
This is the sort of allowed political 
gerrymandering that proves the need for 
broad redistricting reform, according to some 
groups, including OneVirginia2021, which 
re-upped its call for change following 
Thursday's decision. The majority noted that 
Elias and his team didn't argue against 
political gerrymanders, though, and indicated 
there might be room to litigate the matter. 
"Simply put, if incumbency interests 
constitute the predominate criterion driving 
the construction of the district, then a claim 
of racial gerrymandering must fail," the 
judges wrote. "That, however, does not imply 
that a claim of political gerrymandering 
would face a similar fate." 
The judges also complained of the vague and 
often competing requirements mapmakers 
face, saying that the "conceptual grace" of 
Supreme Court standards lack in "practical 
guidance." 
"For litigators, it provides an enticingly 
vague standard and invites litigation that can 
drive up the cost of conducting and defending 
the state's redistricting endeavor," they wrote. 
In a statement released late Thursday, 
Speaker of the House William Howell said 
the case "unnecessarily cost Virginia 
taxpayers hundreds of thousands of dollars." 
"The lawsuit came despite the fact that the 
House districts were adopted with bipartisan 
support, including the support of a majority 
of the African American members in the 
House of Delegates at the time, and approved 
by President Obama's Department of 
Justice," Howell said in his statement. 
There are a number of legal challenges 
ongoing in Virginia and other states ahead of 
the 2016 presidential elections. Even the 3rd 
District case here may not be fully 
adjudicated. Republican congressman are 
trying for a second time to block a redraw at 
the U.S. Supreme Court. The court hasn't 
taken the case, but called late last month for 
new briefs on the matter. 
A separate case here, challenging House 
districts not at issue in the racial gerrymander 
case, is pending in the state courts system. 
That case doesn't deal with race, but a state 
constitutional requirement that districts be 
compact. It was brought by 
OneVirginia2021. 
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A different judge will hear that case, but 
Thursday's opinion contains logic that could 
come to bear. Payne and Lee described 
compactness as "surprisingly ethereal given 
its seemingly universal acceptance as a 
guiding principle for districting." 
"All of the expert testimony provided reveals 
one deep conceptual dilemma: no one can 
agree what it is or, as a result, how to measure 
it," they wrote. "There are at least 20 
measures, not one of which can claim any 
greater legitimacy than its peers." 
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McCrory v. Harris 
15-1262 
Ruling Below: Harris v. McCrory, No. 1:13-CV-949, 2016 WL 482052 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 
2016) 
Voters challenged the constitutionality of two congressional districts in North Carolina, on the 
grounds that they were racially gerrymandered in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause. 
The District Court held that race was indeed the primary factor in the redistricting, and that this 
resulted in the redistricting criteria used by the state legislature violating the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
Question Presented: (1) Whether the court below erred in presuming racial predominance from 
North Carolina's reasonable reliance on this Court's holding in Bartlett v. Strickland that a district 
created to ensure that African Americans have an equal opportunity to elect their preferred 
candidate of choice complies with the Voting Rights Act (VRA) if it contains a numerical 
majority of African Americans; (2) whether the court below erred in applying a standard of 
review that required the State to demonstrate its construction of North Carolina Congressional 
District 1 was “actually necessary” under the VRA instead of simply showing it had “good 
reasons” to believe the district, as created, was needed to foreclose future vote dilution claims; 
(3) whether the court below erred in relieving plaintiffs of their burden to prove “race rather than 
politics” predominated with proof of an alternative plan that achieves the legislature's political 
goals, is comparably consistent with traditional redistricting principles, and brings about greater 
racial balance than the challenged districts; (4) whether, regardless of any other error, the three-
judge court's finding of racial gerrymandering violations was based on clearly erroneous fact-
finding; (5) whether the court below erred in failing to dismiss plaintiffs' claims as being barred 
by claim preclusion or issue preclusion; and (6) whether, in the interests of judicial comity and 
federalism, the Court should order full briefing and oral argument to resolve the split between the 
court below and the North Carolina Supreme Court which reached the opposite result in a case 
raising identical claims 
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David HARRIS, Christine Bowser, and Samuel Love, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Patrick MCCRORY, in his capacity as Governor of North Carolina, North Carolina State 
Board of Elections, and Joshua Howard, in his capacity as Chairman of the North Carolina 
State Board of Elections, Defendants. 
 
United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina 
Decided on February 5, 2016 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
Roger L. Gregory, United States Circuit 
Judge 
 
Circuit Judge Roger L. Gregory wrote the 
majority opinion, in which District Judge 
Max O. Cogburn, Jr., joined and filed a 
separate concurrence. District Judge William 
L. Osteen, Jr., joined in part and filed a 
dissent as to Part II.A.2: 
 
“[T]he Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment ... desired to place clear limits 
on the States' use of race as a criterion for 
legislative action, and to have the federal 
courts enforce those limitations.” For good 
reason. Racial classifications are, after all, 
“antithetical to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
whose ‘central purpose’ was ‘to eliminate 
racial discrimination emanating from official 
sources in the States.’ ”  
 
The “disregard of individual rights” is the 
“fatal flaw” in such race-based 
classifications. By assigning voters to certain 
districts based on the color of their skin, 
states risk “engag[ing] in the offensive and 
demeaning assumption that voters of a 
particular race, because of their race, ‘think 
alike, share the same political interests, and 
will prefer the same candidates at the polls.’ 
” Quotas are especially pernicious 
embodiments of racial stereotypes because 
they threaten citizens' “ ‘personal rights' to be 
treated with equal dignity and respect.”  
 
Laws that classify citizens based on race are 
constitutionally suspect and therefore subject 
to strict scrutiny; racially gerrymandered 
districting schemes are no different, even 
when adopted for benign purposes. This does 
not mean that race can never play a role in 
redistricting. Legislatures are almost always 
cognizant of race when drawing district lines, 
and simply being aware of race poses no 
constitutional violation. Only when race is 
the “dominant and controlling” consideration 
in drawing district lines does strict scrutiny 
apply.  
 
This case challenges the constitutionality of 
two North Carolina congressional districts as 
racial gerrymanders in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Specifically, this case concerns 
North Carolina's Congressional District 1 
(“CD 1”) and Congressional District 12 (“CD 
12”) as they stood after the 2011 redistricting. 
The plaintiffs contend that the congressional 
map adopted by the North Carolina General 
Assembly in 2011 violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment: race was the predominant 
consideration with respect to both districts, 
and the General Assembly did not narrowly 
tailor the districts to serve a compelling 
interest. The Court agrees. 
 
After careful consideration of all evidence 
presented during a three-day bench trial, the 
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parties' findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, the parties' arguments, and the 
applicable law, the Court finds that the 
plaintiffs have shown that race predominated 
in both CD 1 and CD 12 and that the 
defendants have failed to establish that its 
race-based redistricting satisfies strict 
scrutiny. Accordingly, the Court holds that 
the general assembly's 2011 Congressional 
Redistricting Plan is unconstitutional as 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Having found that the 2011 Congressional 
Redistricting Plan violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Court will require that 
new congressional districts be drawn 
forthwith to remedy the unconstitutional 
districts.  
 
Before turning to a description of the history 
of the litigation and an analysis of the issues 
it presents, the Court notes that it makes no 
finding as to whether individual legislators 
acted in good faith in the redistricting 
process, as no such finding is required. 
Nevertheless, the resulting legislative 
enactment has affected North Carolina 
citizens' fundamental right to vote, in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
The North Carolina Constitution requires 
decennial redistricting of the North Carolina 
Senate and North Carolina House of 
Representatives, subject to several specific 
requirements. The general assembly is 
directed to revise the districts and apportion 
representatives and senators among those 
districts. Similarly, consistent with the 
requirements of the Constitution of the 
United States, the general assembly 
establishes North Carolina's districts for the 
U.S. House of Representatives after every 
decennial census.  
 
Redistricting legislation must comply with 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”). 
“The Voting Rights Act was designed by 
Congress to banish the blight of racial 
discrimination in voting ....” Enacted 
pursuant to Congress's enforcement powers 
under the Fifteenth Amendment, the VRA 
prohibits states from adopting plans that 
would result in vote dilution under section 2, 
52 U.S.C. § 10301, or in covered 
jurisdictions, retrogression under section 5, 
52 U.S.C. § 10304. 
Section 2(a) of the VRA prohibits the 
imposition of any electoral practice or 
procedure that “results in a denial or 
abridgement of the right of any citizen ... to 
vote on account of race or color.” A section 2 
violation occurs when, based on the totality 
of circumstances, the political process results 
in minority “members hav[ing] less 
opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their 
choice.”  
 
Section 5 of the VRA prohibits a state or 
political subdivision subject to section 4 of 
the VRA from enforcing “any voting 
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure with respect 
to voting different from that in force or effect 
on November 1, 1964,” unless it has obtained 
a declaratory judgment from the District 
Court for the District of Columbia that such 
change “does not have the purpose and will 
not have the effect of denying or abridging 
the right to vote on account of race or color” 
or has submitted the proposed change to the 
U.S. attorney general and the attorney 
general has not objected to it. By requiring 
that proposed changes be approved in 
advance, Congress sought “ ‘to shift the 
advantage of time and inertia from the 
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perpetrators of the evil to its victim,’ by 
‘freezing election procedures in the covered 
areas unless the changes can be shown to be 
nondiscriminatory.’ ” The purpose of this 
approach was to ensure that “no voting-
procedure changes would be made that would 
lead to a retrogression in the position of racial 
minorities with respect to their effective 
exercise of the electoral franchise.” Section 
5, therefore, prohibits a covered jurisdiction 
from adopting any change that “has the 
purpose of or will have the effect of 
diminishing the ability of [the minority 
group] ... to elect their preferred candidates of 
choice.” 
In November 1964, several counties in North 
Carolina met the criteria to be classified as a 
“covered jurisdiction” under section 5. As 
such, North Carolina was required to submit 
any changes to its election or voting laws to 
the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for 
federal preapproval, a process called 
“preclearance.” To obtain preclearance, 
North Carolina had to demonstrate that a 
proposed change had neither the purpose nor 
effect “of denying or abridging the right to 
vote on account of race or color.” 
 
The legal landscape changed dramatically in 
2012, when the Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional the coverage formula used to 
determine which states are subject to the 
section 5 preclearance requirement. As a 
result of the invalidation of the coverage 
formula under section 4, North Carolina is no 
longer obligated to comply with the 
preclearance requirements of section 5. 
 
B. 
 
For decades, African-Americans enjoyed 
tremendous success in electing their 
preferred candidates in former versions of 
CD 1 and CD 12 regardless of whether those 
districts contained a majority black voting 
age population (“BVAP”)—that is the 
percentage of persons of voting age who 
identify as African–American. 
 
The general assembly first drew CD 1 in an 
iteration of its present form in 1992. Between 
1997 and 2011, the BVAP fell below 50 
percent. The BVAP stood at 46.54 percent, 
for example, for the plan in place from 1997 
to 2001. After the 2000 census, the general 
assembly enacted the 2001 Congressional 
Redistricting Plan (now referred to as the 
“benchmark” or “benchmark plan”) that 
redrew CD 1, modestly increasing the BVAP 
to 47.76 percent. 
The BVAP of former CD 12 mirrored that of 
former CD 1. Initially in 1991, to comply 
with the DOJ's then-existing “maximization” 
policy—requiring majority-minority districts 
wherever possible—CD 12 was drawn with a 
BVAP greater than 50 percent. After years of 
litigation and the U.S. Supreme Court's 
repudiation of the maximization policy, the 
general assembly redrew the district in 1997 
with a BVAP of 32.56 percent. The general 
assembly thus determined that the VRA did 
not require drawing CD 12 as a majority 
African-American district. The 2001 
benchmark version of CD 12 reflected a 
BVAP of 42.31 percent. 
 
Despite the fact that African-Americans did 
not make up a majority of the voting-age 
population in these earlier versions of CD 1 
or CD 12, African-American preferred 
candidates easily and repeatedly won 
reelection under those plans. Representative 
Eva Clayton prevailed in CD 1 in 1998 and 
2000, for instance, winning 62 percent and 66 
percent of the vote, respectively. Indeed, 
African-American preferred candidates 
prevailed with remarkable consistency, 
winning at least 59 percent of the vote in each 
of the five general elections under the version 
of CD 1 created in 2001. Representative G.K. 
Butterfield has represented that district since 
2004. Meanwhile, in CD 12, Congressman 
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Mel Watt won every general election in CD 
12 between 1992 and 2012. He never 
received less than 55.95 percent of the vote, 
gathering at least 64 percent in each election 
under the version of CD 12 in effect during 
the 2000s. 
 
No lawsuit was ever filed to challenge the 
benchmark 2001 version of CD 1 or CD 12 
on VRA grounds.  
 
C. 
Following the census conducted April 1, 
2010, leaders of the North Carolina House of 
Representatives and Senate independently 
appointed redistricting committees. Each 
committee was responsible for 
recommending a plan applicable to its own 
chamber, while the two committees jointly 
were charged with preparing a redistricting 
plan for the U.S. House of Representatives 
North Carolina districts. Senator Rucho and 
Representative Lewis were appointed chairs 
of the Senate and House Redistricting 
Committees, respectively, on January 27 and 
February 15, 2011. 
 
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis 
were responsible for developing a proposed 
congressional map. In Representative 
Lewis's words, he and Senator Rucho were 
“intimately involved” in the crafting of these 
maps. 
 
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis 
engaged private redistricting counsel and a 
political consultant. Specifically, Senator 
Rucho and Representative Lewis engaged the 
law firm of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak 
& Stewart, P.C. (“Ogletree”) as their private 
redistricting counsel. In December 2010, 
Ogletree engaged Dr. Thomas Hofeller, who 
served as redistricting coordinator for the 
Republican National Committee for the 
1990, 2000, and 2010 redistricting cycles, to 
design and draw the 2011 Congressional 
Redistricting Plan under the direction of 
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis. Dr. 
Hofeller was the “principal architect” of the 
2011 Congressional Redistricting Plan (as 
well as the state senate and house plans).  
 
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis 
were the sole sources of instruction for Dr. 
Hofeller regarding the design and 
construction of congressional maps. All such 
instructions were provided to Dr. Hofeller 
orally – there is no written record of the 
precise instructions Senator Rucho and 
Representative Lewis gave to Dr. Hofeller. 
Dr. Hofeller never received instructions from 
any legislator other than Senator Rucho and 
Representative Lewis, never conferred with 
Congressmen Butterfield or Watt, and never 
conferred with the Legislative Black Caucus 
(or any of its individual members) with 
respect to the preparation of the 
congressional maps. Representative Lewis 
did not make Dr. Hofeller available to answer 
questions for the members of the North 
Carolina Senate and House Redistricting 
Committees. 
 
Throughout June and July 2011, Senator 
Rucho and Representative Lewis released a 
series of public statements describing, among 
other things, the criteria that they had 
instructed Dr. Hofeller to follow in drawing 
the proposed congressional map. As Senator 
Rucho explained at the July 21, 2011, joint 
meeting of the Senate and House 
Redistricting Committees, those statements 
“clearly delineated” the “entire criteria” that 
were established and “what areas we were 
looking at that were going to be in 
compliance with what the Justice Department 
expected us to do as part of our submission.” 
 
In their June 17, 2011, public statement, 
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis 
highlighted one criterion in their redistricting 
plan: 
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In creating new majority African 
American districts, we are obligated 
to follow ... the decisions by the North 
Carolina Supreme Court and the 
United States Supreme Court in 
Strickland v. Bartlett. Under the 
Strickland decisions, districts created 
to comply with section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act, must be created 
with a “Black Voting Age 
Population” (“BVAP”), as reported 
by the Census, at the level of at least 
50% plus one. Thus, in constructing 
VRA majority black districts, the 
Chairs recommend that, where 
possible, these districts be drawn at a 
level equal to at least 50% plus one 
“BVAP.” 
 
On July 1, 2011, Senator Rucho and 
Representative Lewis made public their first 
proposed congressional plan, entitled 
“Rucho-Lewis Congress,” and issued a 
public statement. The plan was drawn by Dr. 
Hofeller and contained two majority-BVAP 
districts, namely CD 1 and CD 12. With 
regard to proposed CD 1, Senator Rucho and 
Representative Lewis stated that they had 
included a piece of Wake County (an urban 
county in which the state capital, Raleigh, is 
located) because the benchmark CD 1 was 
underpopulated by 97,500 people. Senator 
Rucho and Representative then added: 
 
Because African Americans represent 
a high percentage of the population 
added to the First District from Wake 
County, we have also been able to re-
establish Congressmen Butterfield's 
district as a true majority black 
district under the Strickland case. 
 
With regard to CD 12, Senator Rucho and 
Representative Lewis noted that although the 
2001 benchmark district was “not a Section 2 
majority black district,” there “is one county 
in the Twelfth District that is covered by 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
(Guilford).” Therefore, “[b]ecause of the 
presence of Guilford County in the Twelfth 
District, we have drawn our proposed 
Twelfth District at a black voting age level 
that is above the percentage of black voting 
age population found in the current Twelfth 
District.”  
 
On July 28, 2011, the general assembly 
enacted the congressional and legislative 
plans, which Dr. Hofeller had drawn at the 
direction of Senator Rucho and 
Representative Lewis. The number of 
majority-BVAP districts in the 2011 
Congressional Redistricting Plan increased 
from zero to two when compared to the 
benchmark 2001 Congressional Redistricting 
Plan. The BVAP in CD 1 increased from 
47.76 percent to 52.65 percent, and in CD 12 
the BVAP increased from 43.77 percent to 
50.66 percent. 
 
Following the passage of the 2011 
Congressional Redistricting Plan, the general 
assembly, on September 2, 2011, submitted 
the plan to the DOJ for preclearance under 
section 5 of the VRA. On November 1, 2011, 
the DOJ precleared the 2011 Congressional 
Redistricting Plan. 
 
D. 
 
1. 
 
Two sets of plaintiffs challenged the 2011 
Congressional Redistricting Plan in state 
court for illegal racial gerrymandering. A 
three-judge panel consolidated the two cases. 
The state court held a two-day bench trial on 
June 5 and 6, 2013. On July 8, 2013, the court 
issued a decision denying the Plaintiffs' 
pending motion for summary judgment and 
entering judgment for the defendants. Id. The 
court acknowledged that the general 
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assembly used race as the predominant factor 
in drawing CD 1. Nonetheless, applying strict 
scrutiny, the court concluded that North 
Carolina had a compelling interest in 
avoiding liability under the VRA, and that the 
districts had been narrowly tailored to avoid 
that liability. With regard to CD 12, the court 
held that race was not the driving factor in its 
creation, and therefore examined and upheld 
it under rational-basis review. 
The state court plaintiffs appealed, and the 
North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the 
trial court's judgment. The U.S. Supreme 
Court, however, granted certiorari, vacated 
the decision, and remanded the case to the 
North Carolina Supreme Court for further 
consideration in light of Alabama Legislative 
Black Caucus v. Alabama. On December 18, 
2015, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the trial court's judgment. 
 
2. 
 
Plaintiffs David Harris and Christine Bowser 
are U.S. citizens registered to vote in CD 1 or 
CD 12, respectively. Neither was a plaintiff 
in the state-court litigation. 
 
Plaintiffs brought this action on October 24, 
2013, alleging, among other things, that 
North Carolina used the VRA's section 5 
preclearance requirements as a pretext to 
pack African–American voters into North 
Carolina's Congressional Districts 1 and 12 
and reduce those voters' influence in other 
districts. 
 
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that 
North Carolina's Congressional Districts 1 
and 12, as drawn in the 2011 Congressional 
Redistricting Plan, was a racial gerrymander 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs also 
sought to permanently enjoin the defendants 
from giving effect to the boundaries of the 
First and Twelfth Congressional Districts, 
including barring the defendants from 
conducting elections for the U.S. House of 
Representatives based on the 2011-enacted 
First and Twelfth Congressional Districts.  
 
Because the Plaintiffs' action “challeng[ed] 
the constitutionality of the apportionment of 
congressional districts” in North Carolina, 
the chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit granted the Plaintiffs' 
request for a hearing by a three-judge court 
on October 18, 2013.  
 
A three-day bench trial began on October 13, 
2015. After the bench trial, this Court ordered 
the parties to file posttrial briefs. The case is 
now ripe for consideration. 
 
II. 
 
“[A] State may not, absent extraordinary 
justification, ... separate its citizens into 
different voting districts on the basis of race.” 
A voting district is an unconstitutional racial 
gerrymander when a redistricting plan 
“cannot be understood as anything other than 
an effort to separate voters into different 
districts on the basis of race, and that the 
separation lacks sufficient justification.”  
 
In a racial gerrymander case, the “plaintiff's 
burden is to show, either through 
circumstantial evidence of a district's shape 
and demographics or more direct evidence 
going to legislative purpose, that race was the 
predominant factor motivating the 
legislature's decision to place a significant 
number of voters within or without a 
particular district.” “To make this showing, a 
plaintiff must prove that the legislature 
subordinated traditional race-neutral 
districting principles, including but not 
limited to compactness, contiguity, and 
respect for political subdivisions or 
communities defined by actual shared 
interests, to racial considerations.” Public 
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statements, submissions, and sworn 
testimony by the individuals involved in the 
redistricting process are not only relevant but 
often highly probative.  
 
Once plaintiffs establish race as the 
predominant factor, the Court applies strict 
scrutiny, and “the State must demonstrate 
that its districting legislation is narrowly 
tailored to achieve a compelling interest.” If 
race did not predominate, then only rational-
basis review applies. 
 
For the reasons that follow, the Court finds 
that the plaintiffs have presented dispositive 
direct and circumstantial evidence that the 
legislature assigned race a priority over all 
other districting factors in both CD 1 and CD 
12. There is strong evidence that race was the 
only nonnegotiable criterion and that 
traditional redistricting principles were 
subordinated to race. In fact, the 
overwhelming evidence in this case shows 
that a BVAP-percentage floor, or a racial 
quota, was established in both CD 1 and CD 
12. And, that floor could not be 
compromised. A congressional district 
necessarily is crafted because of race when a 
racial quota is the single filter through which 
all line-drawing decisions are made, and 
traditional redistricting principles are 
considered, if at all, solely insofar as they did 
not interfere with this quota. Accordingly, the 
Court holds that “race was the predominant 
factor motivating the legislature's decision to 
place a significant number of voters within or 
without a particular district.”  
 
Because race predominated, the state must 
demonstrate that its districting decision is 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
interest. Even if the Court assumes that 
compliance with the VRA is a compelling 
state interest, attempts at such compliance 
“cannot justify race-based districting where 
the challenged district was not reasonably 
necessary under a constitutional reading and 
application” of federal law. Thus, narrow 
tailoring requires that the legislature have a 
“strong basis in evidence” for its race-based 
decision, that is, “good reasons to believe” 
that the chosen racial classification was 
required to comply with the VRA. Evidence 
of narrow tailoring in this case is practically 
nonexistent; the state does not even proffer 
any evidence with respect to CD 12. Based 
on this record, as explained below, the Court 
concludes that North Carolina's 2011 
Congressional Redistricting Plan was not 
narrowly tailored to achieve compliance with 
the VRA, and therefore fails strict scrutiny. 
 
A. 
 
As with any law that distinguishes among 
individuals on the basis of race, “equal 
protection principles govern a State's 
drawing of congressional districts.” “Racial 
classifications with respect to voting carry 
particular dangers. Racial gerrymandering, 
even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us 
into competing racial factions; it threatens to 
carry us further from the goal of a political 
system in which race no longer matters ....” 
As such, “race-based districting by our state 
legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny.”  
 
To trigger strict scrutiny, the plaintiffs first 
bear the burden of proving that race was not 
only one of several factors that the legislature 
considered in drawing CD 1 and CD 12, but 
that race “predominated.” Under this 
predominance test, a plaintiff must show that 
“the legislature subordinated traditional race-
neutral districting principles ... to racial 
considerations.” When a legislature has 
“relied on race in substantial disregard of 
customary and traditional districting 
principles,” such traditional principles have 
been subordinated to race. 
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When analyzing the legislative intent 
underlying a redistricting decision, there is a 
“presumption of good faith that must be 
accorded legislative enactments.” This 
presumption “requires courts to exercise 
extraordinary caution in adjudicating claims 
that a State has drawn district lines on the 
basis of race.” Such restraint is particularly 
warranted given the “complex interplay of 
forces that enter a legislature's redistricting 
calculus,” making redistricting possibly “the 
most difficult task a legislative body ever 
undertakes.” This presumption must yield, 
however, when the evidence shows that 
citizens have been assigned to legislative 
districts primarily based on their race. 
 
1. 
 
CD 1 presents a textbook example of racial 
predominance. There is an extraordinary 
amount of direct evidence – legislative 
records, public statements, instructions to Dr. 
Hofeller, the “principal architect” of the 2011 
Congressional Redistricting Plan, and 
testimony – that shows a racial quota, or 
floor, of 50-percent-plus-one-person was 
established for CD 1. Because traditional 
districting criteria were considered, if at all, 
solely insofar as they did not interfere with 
this 50-percent-plus-one-person minimum 
floor, the quota operated as a filter through 
which all line-drawing decisions had to pass. 
As Dr. Hofeller stated, “[S]ometimes it 
wasn't possible to adhere to some of the 
traditional redistricting criteria in the creation 
of [CD 1]” because “the more important thing 
was to ... follow the instructions that I ha[d] 
been given by the two chairmen [to draw the 
district as majority-BVAP].” Indeed. The 
Court therefore finds that race necessarily 
predominates when, as here, “the legislature 
has subordinated traditional districting 
criteria to racial goals, such as when race is 
the single immutable criterion and other 
factors are considered only when consistent 
with the racial objective.”  
 
a. 
 
The legislative record is replete with 
statements indicating that race was the 
legislature's paramount concern in drawing 
CD 1. During legislative sessions, Senator 
Rucho and Representative Lewis made clear 
that CD 1 “[w]as required by Section 2” of 
the VRA to have a BVAP of at least 50 
percent plus one person.  
 
b. 
 
The public statements released by Senator 
Rucho and Representative Lewis also reflect 
their legislative goal, stating that, to comply 
with section 2 of the VRA, CD 1 must be 
established with a BVAP of 50 percent plus 
one person. Further, in its preclearance 
submission to the DOJ, North Carolina 
makes clear that it purposefully set out to add 
“a sufficient number of African-American 
voters in order to” draw CD 1 “at a majority 
African-American level.”  
 
c. 
 
In light of this singular legislative goal, 
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis, 
unsurprisingly, instructed Dr. Hofeller to 
treat CD 1 as a “voting rights district,” 
meaning that he was to draw CD 1 to exceed 
50-percent BVAP.  
 
The Court is sensitive to the fact that CD 1 
was underpopulated; it is not in dispute that 
CD 1 was underpopulated by 97,500 people 
and that there were efforts to create districts 
with approximately equal population. While 
equal population objectives “may often prove 
‘predominant’ in the ordinary sense of that 
word,” the question of whether race 
predominated over traditional raced-neutral 
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redistricting principles is a “special” inquiry: 
“It is not about whether a legislature believes 
that the need for equal population takes 
ultimate priority,” but rather whether the 
legislature placed race above nonracial 
considerations in determining which voters to 
allocate to certain districts in order to achieve 
an equal population goal.  
 
To accomplish equal population, Dr. Hofeller 
intentionally included high concentrations of 
African-American voters in CD 1 and 
excluded less heavily African-American 
areas from the district. During cross-
examination, Dr. Hofeller, in response to why 
he moved into CD 1 a part of Durham County 
that was “the heavily African-American part” 
of the county, stated, “Well, it had to be.” Dr. 
Hofeller, after all, had to “make sure that in 
the end it all adds up correctly”—that is, that 
the “net result” was a majority-BVAP 
district.  
 
Dr. Hofeller certainly “ma[de] sure that in the 
end it add[ed] up correctly.” The BVAP 
substantially increased from 47.76 percent, 
the BVAP in CD 1 when the benchmark plan 
was enacted, to 52.65 percent, the BVAP 
under the 2011 Congressional Plan—an 
increase of nearly five percentage points. Pls.' 
Ex. 69 at 111. And, while Dr. Hofeller had 
discretion, conceivably, to increase the 
BVAP to as high as he wanted, he had no 
discretion to go below 50-percent-plus-one-
person BVAP. This is the very definition of a 
racial quota. 
 
d. 
 
The Supreme Court's skepticism of racial 
quotas is longstanding. The Court, however, 
has yet to decide whether use of a racial quota 
in a legislative redistricting plan or, in 
particular, use of such a quota exceeding 50 
percent, establishes predominance as a matter 
of law under Miller. The Court recently has 
cautioned against “prioritizing mechanical 
racial targets above all other districting 
criteria” in redistricting. Although the Court 
in Alabama did not decide whether the use of 
a racial quota exceeding 50 percent, standing 
alone, can establish predominance as a matter 
of law, the Court made clear that such 
“mechanical racial targets” are highly 
suspicious. 
 
There is “strong, perhaps overwhelming” 
direct evidence in this case that the general 
assembly “prioritize[ed] [a] mechanical 
racial target[ ] above all other districting 
criteria” in redistricting. In order to achieve 
the goal of drawing CD 1 as a majority-
BVAP district, Dr. Hofeller not only 
subordinated traditional race-neutral 
principles but disregarded certain principles 
such as respect for political subdivisions and 
compactness.  
 
Dr. Hofeller testified that he would split 
counties and precincts when necessary to 
achieve a 50-percent-plus-one-person BVAP 
in CD 1. Dr. Hofeller further testified that he 
did not use mathematical measures of 
compactness in drawing CD 1. Had he done 
so, Dr. Hofeller would have seen that the 
2011 Congressional Redistricting Plan 
reduced the compactness of CD 1 
significantly. 
 
Apparently seeing the writing on the wall, the 
defendants make the passing argument that 
the legislature configured CD 1 to protect the 
incumbent and for partisan advantage. The 
defendants, however, proffer no evidence to 
support such a contention. There is nothing in 
the record that remotely suggests CD 1 was a 
political gerrymander, or that CD 1 was 
drawn based on political data. It cannot 
seriously be disputed that the predominant 
focus of virtually every statement made, 
instruction given, and action taken in 
connection with the redistricting effort was to 
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draw CD 1 with a BVAP of 50 percent plus 
one person to comply with the VRA.  
 
e. 
 
Even if the Court assumes, arguendo, that this 
is a “mixed-motive suit”—in which a state's 
conceded goal of “produc[ing] majority-
minority districts” is accompanied by “other 
goals, particularly incumbency protection”—
race can be the predominant factor in the 
drawing of a district without the districting 
revisions being “purely race-based.” Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has observed that 
“partisan politicking” may often play a role 
in a state's redistricting process, but the fact 
“[t]hat the legislature addressed these 
interests [need] not in any way refute the fact 
that race was the legislature's predominant 
consideration.”  
 
As the Supreme Court has explained, 
traditional factors have been subordinated to 
race when “[r]ace was the criterion that, in 
the State's view, could not be compromised,” 
and when traditional, race-neutral criteria 
were considered “only after the race-based 
decision had been made.” When a legislature 
has “relied on race in substantial disregard of 
customary and traditional districting 
practices,” such traditional principles have 
been subordinated to race. Here, the record is 
unequivocally clear: the general assembly 
relied on race – the only criterion that could 
not be compromised – in substantial 
disregard of traditional districting principles. 
 
Moreover, because traditional districting 
criteria were considered, if at all, solely 
insofar as they did not interfere with this 50-
percent-plus-one-person minimum floor, the 
quota operated as a filter through which all 
line-drawing decisions had to pass. Such a 
racial filter had a discriminatory effect on the 
configuration of CD 1 because it rendered all 
traditional criteria that otherwise would have 
been “race-neutral” tainted by and 
subordinated to race. For these reasons, the 
Court holds that the plaintiffs have 
established that race predominated in the 
legislative drawing of CD 1, and the Court 
will apply strict scrutiny in examining the 
constitutionality of CD 1. 
 
2. 
CD 12 presents a slightly more complex 
analysis than CD 1 as to whether race 
predominated in redistricting. Defendants 
contend that CD 12 is a purely political 
district and that race was not a factor even 
considered in redistricting. Nevertheless, 
direct evidence indicating racial 
predominance combined with the traditional 
redistricting factors' complete inability to 
explain the composition of the new district 
rebut this contention and leads the Court to 
conclude that race did indeed predominate in 
CD 12. 
 
a. 
 
While not as robust as in CD 1, there is 
nevertheless direct evidence supporting the 
conclusion that race was the predominant 
factor in drawing CD 12. Public statements 
released by Senator Rucho and 
Representative Lewis reflect this legislative 
goal. In their June 17, 2011, statement, for 
example, Senator Rucho and Representative 
Lewis provide, 
 
In creating new majority African 
American districts, we are obligated 
to follow ... the decisions by the North 
Carolina Supreme Court and the 
United States Supreme Court .... 
Under the[se] decisions, districts 
created to comply with section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act, must be 
created with a “Black Voting Age 
Population” (“BVAP”), as reported 
by the Census, at the level of at least 
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50% plus one. Thus, in constructing 
VRA majority black districts, the 
Chairs recommend that, where 
possible, these districts be drawn at a 
level equal to at least 50% plus one 
“BVAP.” 
 
This statement describes not only the new CD 
1, as explained above, but clearly refers to 
multiple districts that are now majority 
minority. This is consistent with the changes 
to the congressional map following 
redistricting: the number of majority-BVAP 
districts in the 2011 plan, compared to the 
benchmark 2001 plan, increased from zero to 
two, namely CD 1 and CD 12. The Court 
cannot conclude that this statement was the 
result of happenstance, a mere slip of the pen. 
Instead, this statement supports the 
contention that race predominated. 
 
The public statement issued July 1, 2011, 
further supports this objective. There, 
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis 
stated, “Because of the presence of Guilford 
County in the Twelfth District [which is 
covered by section 5 of the VRA], we have 
drawn our proposed Twelfth District at a 
black voting age level that is above the 
percentage of black voting age population 
found in the current Twelfth District.” As 
explained, section 5 was intended to prevent 
retrogression; to ensure that such result was 
achieved, any change was to be precleared so 
that it did “not have the purpose and [would] 
not have the effect of denying or abridging 
the right to vote on account of race or color.” 
Despite the fact that nothing in section 5 
required the creation of a majority-minority 
district in CD 12,5 this statement indicates 
that it was the intention in redistricting to 
create such a district—it was drawn at a 
higher BVAP than the previous version. This 
statement does not simply “show[ ] that the 
legislature considered race, along with other 
partisan and geographic considerations,”; 
instead, reading the text in its ordinary 
meaning, the statement evinces a level of 
intentionality in the decisions regarding race. 
The Court will again decline to conclude that 
it was purely coincidental that the district was 
now majority BVAP after it was drawn. 
 
Following the ratification of the revised 
redistricting plan, the North Carolina General 
Assembly and attorney general submitted the 
plan to the DOJ for preclearance under 
section 5. The submission explains, 
 
One of the concerns of the 
Redistricting Chairs was that in 1992, 
the Justice Department had objected 
to the 1991 Congressional Plan 
because of a failure by the state to 
create a second majority minority 
district combining the African-
American community in 
Mecklenburg County with African-
American and Native American 
voters residing in south central and 
southeastern North Carolina. 
 
The submission further explains that 
Congressman Watt did not believe that 
African-American voters in Mecklenburg 
County were politically cohesive with Native 
American voters in southeastern North 
Carolina. The redistricting committee 
accordingly drew the new CD 12 based on 
these considerations, including DOJ's 1992 
concern that a new majority-minority district 
be created—a concern that the U.S. Supreme 
Court handily rejected in Miller, when it 
repudiated the maximization policy. The 
discussion of CD 12 in the DOJ submission 
concludes, “Thus, the 2011 version 
maintains, and in fact increases, the African-
American community's ability to elect their 
candidate of choice in District 12.” Given the 
express concerns of the redistricting 
committee, the Court will not ascribe the 
result to mere coincidence and instead finds 
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that the submission supports race 
predominance in the creation of CD 12. 
 
b. 
 
In addition to the public statements issued, 
Congressman Watt testified at trial that 
Senator Rucho himself told Congressman 
Watt that the goal was to increase the BVAP 
in CD 12 to over 50 percent. Congressman 
Watt testified that Senator Rucho said “his 
leadership had told him that he had to ramp 
up the minority percentage in [the Twelfth] 
Congressional District up to over 50 percent 
to comply with the Voting Rights Law.” 
Congressman Watt sensed that Senator 
Rucho seemed uncomfortable discussing the 
subject “because his leadership had told him 
that he was going to have to go out and justify 
that [redistricting goal] to the African-
American community.”  
 
Defendants argue that Senator Rucho never 
made such statements to Congressman Watt, 
citing Senator Rucho and Congresswoman 
Ruth Samuelson's testimony in the Dickson 
trial. Nevertheless, after submitting 
Congressman Watt to thorough and probing 
cross-examination about the specifics of the 
content and location of this conversation, the 
defendants declined to call Senator Rucho or 
Congresswoman Samuelson to testify, 
despite both being listed as defense witnesses 
and being present throughout the trial. The 
Court is thus somewhat crippled in its ability 
to assess either Senator Rucho or 
Congresswoman's Samuelson's credibility as 
to their claim that Senator Rucho never made 
such statements. Based on its ability to 
observe firsthand Congressman Watt and his 
consistent recollection of the conversation 
between him and Senator Rucho, the Court 
credits his testimony and finds that Senator 
Rucho did indeed explain to Congressman 
Watt that the legislature's goal was to “ramp 
up” CD 12's BVAP. 
And, make no mistake, the BVAP in CD 12 
was ramped up: the BVAP increased from 
43.77 percent to 50.66 percent. This 
correlates closely to the increase in CD 1. 
Such a consistent and whopping increase 
makes it clear that the general assembly's 
predominant intent regarding district 12 was 
also race. 
c. 
 
The shape of a district is also relevant to the 
inquiry, as it “may be persuasive 
circumstantial evidence that race for its own 
sake, and not other districting principles, was 
the legislature's dominant and controlling 
rationale in drawing its district lines.” CD 12 
is a “serpentine district [that] has been 
dubbed the least geographically compact 
district in the Nation.”  
 
Under the benchmark 2001 plan, CD 12 had 
a Reock score6 of .116, the lowest in the state 
by far. Under the new plan, the Reock score 
of CD 12 decreased to .071, remaining the 
lowest in the state by a good margin. A score 
of .071 is low by any measure. At trial, Dr. 
Ansolabehere testified that a score of .2 “is 
one of the thresholds that [is] commonly 
use[d] ... one of the rules of thumb” to say 
that a district is noncompact.  
 
Defendants do not disagree. At trial, Dr. 
Hofeller testified that in redrawing CD 12, he 
made the district even less compact. And 
importantly, Dr. Hofeller did not “apply the 
mathematical measures of compactness to 
see how the districts were holding up” as he 
was drawing them. Nevertheless, Dr. 
Hofeller opined that “District 12's 
compactness was in line with former versions 
of District 12 and in line with compactness as 
one would understand it in the context of 
North Carolina redistricting ....” While he did 
not recall any specific instructions as to 
compactness, he was generally “to make 
plans as compact as possible with the goals 
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and policies of the entire plan,”—that is, as 
the defendants claim, to make the state more 
favorable to Republican interests, a 
contention to which the Court now turns. 
 
d. 
 
Defendants claim that politics, not race, was 
the driving factor behind the redistricting in 
CD 12. The goal, as the defendants portray it, 
was to make CD 12 an even more heavily 
Democratic district and make the 
surrounding counties better for Republican 
interests. This goal would not only enable 
Republican control but also insulate the plan 
from challenges such as the instant one.  
 
Dr. Hofeller testified to this singular aim time 
and again at trial: “My instructions from the 
two chairman [Senator Rucho and 
Congressman Lewis] were to treat District 12 
as a political district and to draw it using 
political data and to draw it in such a manner 
that it favorably adjusted all of the 
surrounding districts.”  
 
Dr. Hofeller testified that he complied with 
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis's 
instructions and did not look at race at all 
when creating the new districts. Using 
Maptitude, Dr. Hofeller provided, “On the 
screen when I was drawing the map was the 
Obama/McCain race shaded in accordance 
with the two-party vote, which excluded the 
minor party candidates, and that was the sole 
thematic display or numeric display on the 
screen except for one other thing, and that 
was the population of the precinct because of 
one person, one vote,” Hofeller testified that 
it was only after the fact that he considered 
race and what impact it may or may not have 
had.  
 
Despite the defendants' protestations, the 
Court is not persuaded that the redistricting 
was purely a politically driven affair. Parts of 
Dr. Hofeller's own testimony belie his 
assertions that he did not consider race until 
everything was said and done. At trial, he 
testified that he was “aware of the fact that 
Guilford County was a Section 5 county” and 
that he “was instructed [not] to use race in 
any form except perhaps with regard to 
Guilford County.” Dr. Hofeller also testified 
in his deposition that race was a more active 
consideration: “[I]n order to be cautious and 
draw a plan that would pass muster under the 
Voting Rights Act, it was decided to reunite 
the black community in Guilford County into 
the Twelfth.”  
 
Moreover, Senator Rucho and Representative 
Lewis themselves attempted to downplay the 
“claim[ ] that [they] have engaged in extreme 
political gerrymandering.” In their joint 
statement published July 19, 2011, they 
assert that these claims are “overblown and 
inconsistent with the facts.” The press release 
continues to explain how Democrats 
maintain a majority advantage in three 
districts and a plurality advantage in the ten 
remaining districts. This publication serves to 
discredit their assertions that their sole focus 
was to create a stronger field for Republicans 
statewide. 
 
That politics not race was more of a post-hoc 
rationalization than an initial aim is also 
supported by a series of emails presented at 
trial. Written by counsel for Senator Rucho 
and Representative Lewis during the 
redistricting, the first email, dated June 30, 
2011, was sent to Senator Rucho, 
Representative Lewis, Dr. Hofeller, and 
others involved in the redistricting effort, 
providing counsel's thoughts on a draft public 
statement “by Rucho and Lewis in support of 
proposed 2011 Congressional Plan.” “Here is 
my best efforts to reflect what I have been 
told about legislative intent for the 
congressional plans. Please send me your 
suggestions and I will circulate a revised 
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version for final approval by [Senator Rucho] 
and [Representative Lewis] as soon as 
possible tomorrow morning,” counsel wrote. 
In response, Brent Woodcox, redistricting 
counsel for the general assembly, wrote, “I do 
think the registration advantage is the best 
aspect to focus on to emphasize 
competitiveness. It provides the best 
evidence of pure partisan comparison and 
serves in my estimation as a strong legal 
argument and easily comprehensible political 
talking point.” Id. Unlike the email at issue in 
Cromartie II, which did not discuss “the point 
of the reference” to race, this language 
intimates that the politics rationale on which 
the defendants so heavily rely was more of an 
afterthought than a clear objective. 
 
This conclusion is further supported 
circumstantially by the findings of the 
Plaintiffs' experts, Drs. Peterson and 
Ansolabehere. At trial, Dr. Peterson opined 
that race “better accord[ed] with” the 
boundary of CD 12 than did politics, based 
on his “segment analysis.” This analysis 
looked at three different measures of African-
American racial representation inside and 
outside of the boundary of CD 12, and four 
different measures of representations of 
Democrats for a total of twelve segment 
analyses. Four of the twelve studies 
supported the political hypothesis; two 
support both hypotheses equally; while six 
support the race hypothesis—“and in each of 
these six, the imbalance is more pronounced 
than in any of the four studies favoring the 
Political Hypothesis.”  
 
Using different methods of analysis, Dr. 
Ansolabehere similarly concluded that the 
new districts had the effect of sorting along 
racial lines and that the changes to CD 12 
from the benchmark plan to the Rucho-Lewis 
plan “can be only explained by race and not 
party.” 
Defendants argue that these findings are 
based on a theory the Supreme Court has 
rejected—that is, Dr. Ansolabehere used only 
party registration in his analysis, and the 
Supreme Court has found that election results 
are better predictors of future voting 
behavior. But Dr. Ansolabehere stated that he 
understood the Supreme Court's finding and 
explained why in this situation he believed 
that using registration data was nonetheless 
preferable: registration data was a good 
indicator of voting data and it “allowed [him] 
to get down to [a deeper] level of analysis.” 
Moreover, Defendants themselves appear to 
have considered registration data at some 
point in the redistricting process: in their July 
19, 2011, statement, Senator Rucho and 
Representative Lewis consider the numbers 
of registered Democrats, Republicans, and 
unaffiliated voters across all districts.  
 
While both studies produce only 
circumstantial support for the conclusion that 
race predominated, the plaintiffs were not 
limited to direct evidence and were entitled to 
use “direct or circumstantial evidence, or a 
combination of both.” The defendants' 
argument that Dr. Peterson's analysis is “of 
little to no use” to the Court, as he “did not 
and could not conclude” that race 
predominated, is unavailing in this regard. 
 
The defendants contend that, to show that 
race predominated, the plaintiffs must show 
“alternative ways” in which “the legislature 
could have achieved its legitimate political 
objectives” that were more consistent with 
traditional districting principles and that 
resulted in a greater racial balance. The 
Supreme Court, however, limited this 
requirement to “a case such as [the one at 
issue in Cromartie II],”—that is, a case in 
which “[t]he evidence taken together ... [did] 
not show that racial considerations 
predominated,” id. Here, the evidence makes 
abundantly clear that race, although generally 
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highly correlative with politics, did indeed 
predominate in the redistricting process: “the 
legislature drew District 12's boundaries 
because of race rather than because of 
political behavior.” Redistricting is 
inherently a political process; there will 
always be tangential references to politics in 
any redistricting—that is, after all, the nature 
of the beast. Where, like here, at the outset 
district lines were admittedly drawn to reach 
a racial quota, even as political concerns may 
have been noted at the end of the process, no 
“alternative” plans are required. 
 
e. 
 
In light of all of the evidence, both direct and 
circumstantial, the Court finds that race 
predominated in the redistricting of CD 12. 
Traditional redistricting principles such as 
compactness and contiguity were 
subordinated to this goal. Moreover, the 
Court does not find credible the defendants' 
purported rationale that politics was the 
ultimate goal. To find that otherwise would 
create a “magic words” test that would put an 
end to these types of challenges. To accept 
the defendants' explanation would “create[ ] 
an incentive for legislators to stay “on script” 
and avoid mentioning race on the record.” 
The Court's conclusion finds support in light 
of the defendants' stated goal with respect to 
CD 1 to increase the BVAP of the district to 
50 percent plus one person, the result of 
which is consistent with the changes to CD 
12. 
 
B. 
 
The fact that race predominated when the 
legislature devised CD 1 an CD 12, however, 
does not automatically render the districts 
constitutionally infirm. Rather, if race 
predominates, strict scrutiny applies, but the 
districting plan can still pass constitutional 
muster if narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest. While 
such scrutiny is not necessarily “strict in 
theory, but fatal in fact,” the state must 
establish the “most exact connection between 
justification and classification.”  
 
The Court's strict-scrutiny analysis for CD 12 
is straightforward. The defendants 
completely fail to provide this Court with a 
compelling state interest for the general 
assembly's use of race in drawing CD 12. 
Accordingly, because the defendants bear the 
burden of proof to show that CD 12 was 
narrowly tailored to further a compelling 
interest, and the defendants failed to carry 
that burden, the Court concludes that CD 12 
is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
The defendants do, however, point to two 
compelling interests for CD 1: the interest in 
avoiding liability under the “results” test of 
VRA section 2(b) and the “nonretrogression” 
principle of VRA section 5. Although the 
Supreme Court has yet to decide whether 
VRA compliance is a compelling state 
interest, it has assumed as much for the 
purposes of subsequent analyses. The Court, 
therefore, will assume, arguendo, that 
compliance with the VRA is a compelling 
state interest. Even with the benefit of that 
assumption, the 2011 Congressional 
Redistricting Plan does not survive strict 
scrutiny because the defendants did not have 
a “strong basis in evidence” for concluding 
that creation of a majority-minority district—
CD 1—was reasonably necessary to comply 
with the VRA. Accordingly, the Court holds 
that CD 1 was not narrowly tailored to 
achieve compliance with the VRA, and 
therefore fails strict scrutiny. 
 
1. 
 
a. 
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“The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain 
electoral law, practice, or structure interacts 
with social and historical conditions to cause 
an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by 
black and white voters to elect their preferred 
representatives.” Section 2 of the VRA 
forbids state and local voting procedures that 
“result[ ] in a denial or abridgement of the 
right of any citizen of the United States to 
vote on account of race[.]” “Vote dilution 
claims involve challenges to methods of 
electing representatives—like redistricting or 
at-large districts—as having the effect of 
diminishing minorities' voting strength.”  
 
The question of voting discrimination vel 
non, including vote dilution, is determined by 
the totality of the circumstances. Under 
Gingles, however, the Court does not reach 
the totality-of-the-circumstances test unless 
the challenging party is able to establish three 
preconditions.  
 
Unlike cases such as Gingles, in which 
minority groups use section 2 as a sword to 
challenge districting legislation, here the 
Court is considering the general assembly's 
use of section 2 as a shield. The general 
assembly, therefore, must have a “strong 
basis in evidence” for finding that the 
threshold conditions for section 2 liability are 
present: “first, ‘that [the minority group] is 
sufficiently large and geographically 
compact to constitute a majority in a single 
member district’; second, ‘that [the minority 
group] is politically cohesive’; and third, 
‘that the white majority votes sufficiently as 
a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the 
minority's preferred candidate.’ ” A failure to 
establish any one of the Gingles factors is 
fatal to the defendants' claim. For the reasons 
stated below, the Court finds that the 
defendants fail to show the third Gingles 
factor, that the legislature had a “strong basis 
in evidence” of racially polarized voting in 
CD 1 significant enough that the white 
majority routinely votes as a bloc to defeat 
the minority candidate of choice. 
 
b. 
“[R]acial bloc voting ... never can be 
assumed, but specifically must be proved.” 
Generalized assumptions about the 
“prevalence of racial bloc voting” do not 
qualify as a “strong basis in evidence.” 
Moreover, the analysis must be specific to 
CD 1. Thus, evidence that racially polarized 
voting occurs in pockets of other 
congressional districts in North Carolina does 
not suffice. The rationale behind this 
principle is clear: simply because “a 
legislature has strong basis in evidence for 
concluding that a § 2 violation exists 
[somewhere] in the State” does not permit it 
to “draw a majority-minority district 
anywhere [in the state].”  
 
Strikingly, there is no evidence that the 
general assembly conducted or considered 
any sort of a particularized polarized-voting 
analysis during the 2011 redistricting process 
for CD 1. Dr. Hofeller testified that he did not 
do a polarized voting analysis for CD 1 at the 
time he prepared the map. Further, there is no 
evidence “ ‘that the white majority votes 
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to 
defeat the minority's preferred candidate.’ ” 
In fact, based on the defendants' own 
admission, “African American voters have 
been able to elect their candidates of choice 
in the First District since the district was 
established in 1992.” This admission, in the 
Court's view, ends the inquiry. In the interest 
of completeness, the Court will comment on 
an argument the defendants' counsel made at 
trial and in their posttrial brief. 
 
The defendants contend that there is some 
evidence that the general assembly 
considered “two expert reports” that “found 
the existence of racially polarized voting in” 
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North Carolina. These generalized reports, 
standing alone, do not constitute a “strong 
basis in evidence” that the white majority 
votes as a bloc to defeat the minority's 
preferred candidate of choice in CD 1. 
Moreover, it is not enough for the general 
assembly to simply nod to the desired 
conclusion by claiming racially polarized 
voting showed that African-Americans 
needed the ability to elect candidates of their 
choice without asserting the existence of a 
necessary premise: that the white majority 
was actually voting as a bloc to defeat the 
minority's preferred candidates. “Unless 
[this] point[ ] [is] established, there neither 
has been a wrong nor can be a remedy.” 
 
Contrary to the defendants' unfounded 
contentions, the composition and election 
results under earlier versions of CD 1 vividly 
demonstrate that, though not previously a 
majority-BVAP district, the white majority 
did not vote as a bloc to defeat African-
Americans' candidate of choice. In fact, 
precisely the opposite occurred in these two 
districts: significant crossover voting by 
white voters supported the African-American 
candidate. The suggestion that the VRA 
would somehow require racial balkanization 
where, as here, citizens have not voted as 
racial blocs, where crossover voting has 
naturally occurred, and where a majority-
minority district is created in blatant 
disregard for fundamental redistricting 
principles is absurd and stands the VRA on 
its head. As the defendants fail to meet the 
third Gingles factor, the Court concludes that 
section 2 did not require the defendants to 
create a majority-minority district in CD 1. 
 
2. 
 
Turning to consider the defendants' section 5 
defense, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
struck down redistricting plans that were not 
narrowly tailored to the goal of avoiding “ ‘a 
retrogression in the position of racial 
minorities with respect to their effective 
exercise of the electoral franchise.’ ” Indeed, 
“the [VRA] and our case law make clear that 
a reapportionment plan that satisfies § 5 still 
may be enjoined as unconstitutional,” as 
section 5 does not “give covered jurisdictions 
carte blanche to engage in racial 
gerrymandering in the name of 
nonretrogression.” “A reapportionment plan 
would not be narrowly tailored to the goal of 
avoiding retrogression if the State went 
beyond what was reasonably necessary to 
avoid retrogression.” Id. Applying that 
principle below, it is clear that CD 1 is not 
narrowly tailored to the avoidance of section 
5 liability. 
 
a. 
 
In Alabama, the Supreme Court made clear 
that section 5 “does not require a covered 
jurisdiction to maintain a particular 
numerical minority percentage.” Rather, 
section 5 requires legislatures to ask the 
following question: “To what extent must we 
preserve existing minority percentages in 
order to maintain the minority's present 
ability to elect its candidate of choice?” There 
is no evidence that the general assembly 
asked this question. Instead, the general 
assembly directed Dr. Hofeller to create CD 
1 as a majority-BVAP district; there was no 
consideration of why the general assembly 
should create such a district. 
 
While the Court “do[es] not insist that a 
legislature guess precisely what percentage 
reduction a court or the Justice Department 
might eventually find to be retrogressive,” 
the legislature must have a “strong basis in 
evidence” for its use of racial classifications. 
Specifically, the Supreme Court noted that it 
would be inappropriate for a legislature to 
“rel[y] heavily upon a mechanically 
numerical view as to what counts as 
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forbidden retrogression.” That is precisely 
what occurred here: the general assembly 
established a mechanical BVAP target for 
CD 1 of 50 percent plus one person, as 
opposed to conducting a more sophisticated 
analysis of racial voting patterns in CD 1 to 
determine to what extent it must preserve 
existing minority percentages to maintain the 
minority's present ability to elect its 
candidate of choice. 
 
b. 
 
Although CD 1 has been an extraordinarily 
safe district for African-American preferred 
candidates of choice for over twenty years, 
the 2011 Congressional Redistricting Plan 
increased CD 1's BVAP from 47.76 percent 
to 52.65 percent. Despite the fact that 
African-Americans did not make up a 
majority of the voting-age population in CD 
1, African-American preferred candidates 
easily and repeatedly won reelection under 
earlier congressional plans, including the 
2001 benchmark plan. Representative Eva 
Clayton prevailed in CD 1 in 1998 and 2000, 
for instance, winning 62 percent and 66 
percent of the vote, respectively. Indeed, 
African-American preferred candidates 
prevailed with remarkable consistency, 
winning at least 59 percent of the vote under 
each of the five general elections under the 
benchmark version of CD 1. In 2010, 
Congressman Butterfield won 59 percent of 
the vote, while in 2012 – under the 
redistricting plan at issue here – he won by an 
even larger margin, receiving 75 percent of 
the vote. 
 
In this respect, the legislature's decision to 
increase the BVAP of CD 1 is similar to the 
redistricting plan invalidated by the Supreme 
Court in Bush. In Bush, a plurality of the 
Supreme Court held that increasing the 
BVAP from 35.1 percent to 50.9 percent was 
not narrowly tailored because the state's 
interest in avoiding retrogression in a district 
where African–American voters had 
successfully elected their representatives of 
choice for two decades did not justify 
“substantial augmentation” of the BVAP. 
Such an augmentation could not be narrowly 
tailored to the goal of complying with section 
5 because there was “no basis for concluding 
that the increase to a 50.9% African–
American population ... was necessary to 
ensure nonretrogression.” “Nonretrogression 
is not a license for the State to do whatever it 
deems necessary to ensure continued 
electoral success; it merely mandates that the 
minority's opportunity to elect 
representatives of its choice not be 
diminished, directly or indirectly, by the 
State's actions.” While the BVAP increase 
here is smaller than that in Bush, the principle 
is the same. Defendants show no basis for 
concluding that an augmentation of CD 1's 
BVAP to 52.65 percent was narrowly tailored 
when the district had been a safe district for 
African-American preferred candidates of 
choice for over two decades. 
 
In sum, the legislators had no basis—let 
alone a strong basis—to believe that an 
inflexible racial floor of 50 percent plus one 
person was necessary in CD 1. This quota 
was used to assign voters to CD 1 based on 
the color of their skin. “Racial classifications 
of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our 
society. They reinforce the belief, held by too 
many for too much of our history, that 
individuals should be judged by the color of 
their skin.”  
 
For these reasons, the Court finds that CD 1 
cannot survive strict scrutiny. Accordingly, 
the Court is compelled to hold that CD 1 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
III. 
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Having found that the 2011 Congressional 
Redistricting Plan violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Court now addresses 
the appropriate remedy. Plaintiffs have 
requested that we “determine and order a 
valid plan for new congressional districts.” 
Nevertheless, the Court is conscious of the 
powerful concerns for comity involved in 
interfering with the state's legislative 
responsibilities. As the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly recognized, “redistricting and 
reapportioning legislative bodies is a 
legislative task which the federal courts 
should make every effort not to pre-empt.” 
As such, it is “appropriate, whenever 
practicable, to afford a reasonable 
opportunity for the legislature to meet 
constitutional requirements by adopting a 
substitute measure rather than for the federal 
court to devise ... its own plan.” Under North 
Carolina law, courts must give legislatures at 
least two weeks to remedy defects identified 
in a redistricting plan.  
 
The Court also recognizes that individuals in 
CD 1 and CD 12 whose constitutional rights 
have been injured by improper racial 
gerrymandering have suffered significant 
harm. “Those citizens ‘are entitled to vote as 
soon as possible for their representatives 
under a constitutional apportionment plan.’ ” 
Therefore, the Court will require that new 
districts be drawn within two weeks of the 
entry of this opinion to remedy the 
unconstitutional districts. In accordance with 
well-established precedent that a state should 
have the first opportunity to create a 
constitutional redistricting plan, the Court 
allows the legislature until February 19, 
2016, to enact a remedial districting plan. 
 
IV. 
 
Because the plaintiffs have shown that race 
predominated in CD 1 and CD 12 of North 
Carolina's 2011 Congressional Redistricting 
Plan, and because the defendants have failed 
to establish that this race-based redistricting 
satisfies strict scrutiny, the Court finds that 
the 2011 Congressional Redistricting Plan is 
unconstitutional, and will require the North 
Carolina General Assembly to draw a new 
congressional district plan. A final judgment 
accompanies this opinion. 
 
SO ORDERED. 
 
… 
 
COGBURN, District Judge, concurring: 
 
I fully concur with Judge Gregory's majority 
opinion. Since the issue before the court was 
created by gerrymandering, and based on the 
evidence received at trial, I write only to 
express my concerns about how unfettered 
gerrymandering is negatively impacting our 
republican form of government. 
 
Voters should choose their representatives. 
This is the “core principle of republican 
government.” To that end, the operative 
clause of Article I, § 4 of the United States 
Constitution, the Elections Clause, gives to 
the states the power of determining how 
congressional representatives are chosen: 
 
The Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in 
each State by the Legislature thereof; but 
the Congress may at any time by Law 
make or alter such Regulations, except as 
to the places of chusing Senators. 
 
As redistricting through political 
gerrymander rather than reliance on natural 
boundaries and communities has become the 
tool of choice for state legislatures in drawing 
congressional boundaries, the fundamental 
principle of the voters choosing their 
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representative has nearly vanished. Instead, 
representatives choose their voters. 
 
Indeed, we heard compelling testimony from 
Congressman G. K. Butterfield (CD 1) and 
former Congressman Mel Watt (CD 12) that 
the configuration of CD 1 and CD 12 made it 
nearly impossible for them to travel to all the 
communities comprising their districts. Not 
only has political gerrymandering interfered 
with voters selecting their representatives, it 
has interfered with the representatives 
meeting with those voters. In at least one 
state, Arizona, legislative overuse of political 
gerrymandering in redistricting has caused 
the people to take congressional redistricting 
away from the legislature and place such 
power in an independent congressional 
redistricting commission, an action that 
recently passed constitutional muster.  
 
Redistricting through political 
gerrymandering is nothing new. Starting in 
the year the Constitution was ratified, 1788, 
state legislatures have used the authority 
under the Elections Clause to redraw 
congressional boundaries in a manner that 
favored the majority party. For example, in 
1788, Patrick Henry persuaded the Virginia 
legislature to remake its Fifth Congressional 
District to force Henry's political foe James 
Madison to run against James Monroe. 
Madison won in spite of this, but the game 
playing had begun. In 1812, Governor 
Elbridge Gerry signed a bill redistricting 
Massachusetts to benefit his party with one 
district so contorted that it was said to 
resemble a salamander, forever giving such 
type of redistricting the name gerrymander. 
Thus, for more than 200 years, 
gerrymandering has been the default in 
congressional redistricting. 
 
Elections should be decided through a contest 
of issues, not skillful mapmaking. Today, 
modern computer mapping allows for 
gerrymandering on steroids as political 
mapmakers can easily identify individual 
registrations on a house-by-house basis, 
mapping their way to victory. As was seen in 
Arizona State Legislature, supra, however, 
gerrymandering may well have an expiration 
date as the Supreme Court has found that the 
term “legislature” in the Elections Clause is 
broad enough to include independent 
congressional redistricting commissions.  
 
To be certain, gerrymandering is not 
employed by just one of the major political 
parties. Historically, the North Carolina 
Legislature has been dominated by 
Democrats who wielded the gerrymander 
exceptionally well. Indeed, CD 12 runs its 
circuitous route from Charlotte to 
Greensboro and beyond—thanks in great part 
to a state legislature then controlled by 
Democrats. It is a district so contorted and 
contrived that the United States Courthouse 
in Charlotte, where this concurrence was 
written, is five blocks within its boundary, 
and the United States Courthouse in 
Greensboro, where the trial was held, is five 
blocks outside the same district, despite being 
more than 90 miles apart and located in 
separate federal judicial districts. How a 
voter can know who their representative is or 
how a representative can meet with those 
pocketed voters is beyond comprehension. 
 
While redistricting to protect the party that 
controls the state legislature is 
constitutionally permitted and lawful, it is in 
disharmony with fundamental values upon 
which this country was founded. “[T]he true 
principle of a republic is, that the people 
should choose whom they please to govern 
them.” Beyond taking offense at the affront 
to democracy caused by gerrymandering, 
courts will not, however, interfere with 
gerrymandering that is philosophically rather 
than legally wrong. As has been seen in 
Arizona, it is left to the people of the state to 
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decide whether they wish to select their 
representatives or have their representatives 
select them. 
 
… 
 
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part: 
 
I concur with the majority in finding that 
Plaintiffs have met their burden of proving 
that race predominated in the drawing of 
North Carolina's First Congressional District 
(“CD 1”) and that Defendants have failed to 
show that the legislature's use of race in the 
drawing of that district was narrowly tailored 
to serve a compelling governmental interest. 
I also concur with the majority with respect 
to North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional 
District (“CD 12”) in that, if race was a 
predominant factor, Defendants did not meet 
their burden to prove that CD 12 was 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest. However, I respectfully dissent from 
the majority in that I find that Plaintiffs have 
not met their burden of proving that race 
predominated in the drawing of CD 12. As a 
result, I conclude that the district is subject to 
and passes the rational basis test and is 
constitutional. I differ with the well-reasoned 
opinion of my colleagues only as to the 
degree to which race was a factor in the 
drawing of CD 12. 
 
I. CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT I 
 
With respect to my concurring opinion, I only 
add that I do not find, as Plaintiffs have 
contended, that this legislative effort 
constitutes a “flagrant” violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The majority 
opinion makes clear that bad faith is not 
necessary in order to find a violation. 
Although Plaintiffs argued that the actions of 
the legislature stand in “flagrant” violation of 
Fourteenth Amendment principles, Plaintiffs 
also conceded at trial they did not seek to 
prove any ill-intent. Nevertheless, I wish to 
emphasize that the evidence does not suggest 
a flagrant violation. Instead, the legislature's 
redistricting efforts reflect the difficult 
exercise in judgment necessary to comply 
with section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
(“VRA”) in 2010, prior to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Shelby County v. Holder. 
Shelby struck down as unconstitutional the 
formula created under section 4 of the VRA 
and, resultingly, removed those covered 
jurisdictions from section 5. 
 
In Shelby, the Supreme Court recognized the 
success of the VRA. However, the Court also 
described its concern with an outdated 
section 4 formula and the restrictions of 
section 5: 
 
Yet the Act has not eased the 
restrictions in § 5 or narrowed the 
scope of the coverage formula in § 
4(b) along the way. Those 
extraordinary and unprecedented 
features were reauthorized—as if 
nothing had changed. In fact, the 
Act's unusual remedies have grown 
even stronger. When Congress 
reauthorized the Act in 2006, it did so 
for another 25 years on top of the 
previous 40—a far cry from the initial 
five-year period. Congress also 
expanded the prohibitions in § 5. We 
had previously interpreted § 5 to 
prohibit only those redistricting plans 
that would have the purpose or effect 
of worsening the position of minority 
groups. In 2006, Congress amended § 
5 to prohibit laws that could have 
favored such groups but did not do so 
because of a discriminatory purpose, 
even though we had stated that such 
broadening of § 5 coverage would 
“exacerbate the substantial federalism 
costs that the preclearance procedure 
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already exacts, perhaps to the extent 
of raising concerns about § 5's 
constitutionality.” In addition, 
Congress expanded § 5 to prohibit 
any voting law “that has the purpose 
of or will have the effect of 
diminishing the ability of any citizens 
of the United States,” on account of 
race, color, or language minority 
status, “to elect their preferred 
candidates of choice.” In light of 
those two amendments, the bar that 
covered jurisdictions must clear has 
been raised even as the conditions 
justifying that requirement have 
dramatically improved. 
 
Although no court has held that compliance 
with section 5 is a compelling state interest, 
the Supreme Court has generally assumed 
without deciding that is the case. Compliance 
with section 5 was, in my opinion, at least a 
substantial concern to the North Carolina 
legislature in 2011, a concern made difficult 
by the fact that, at least by 2013 and likely by 
2010, coverage was “based on decades-old 
data and eradicated practices” yet had 
expanded prohibitions.  
 
As a result, while I agree with my colleagues 
that CD 1, as drawn, violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment, I do not find that violation to be 
flagrant, as argued by Plaintiffs. Instead, I 
simply find the violation as to CD 1 to be the 
result of an ultimately failed attempt at the 
very difficult task of achieving 
constitutionally compliant redistricting while 
at the same time complying with section 5 
and receiving preclearance from the 
Department of Justice. In drawing legislative 
districts, the Department of Justice and other 
legislatures have historically made similar 
mistakes in their attempts to apply the VRA. 
Further, the difficult exercise of judgment 
involved in the legislature's efforts to draw 
these districts is reflected in the differing 
conclusions reached by this court and the 
North Carolina Supreme Court. Contrary to 
Plaintiffs' suggestion, I find nothing flagrant 
or nefarious as to the legislature's efforts 
here, even though I agree that CD 1 was 
improperly drawn using race as a 
predominant factor without sufficient 
justification. 
 
II. CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 12 
 
Turning to my dissent regarding whether 
Plaintiffs have carried their burden of 
showing that race was the dominant and 
controlling consideration in drawing CD 12, 
a brief history of redistricting efforts in the 
state will provide helpful context to the 
current situation. In 1991, North Carolina 
enacted a Congressional Districting Plan with 
a single majority-black district—the 1991 
version of CD 1. The 1991 version of CD 1 
was a majority single-race-black district in 
both total population and voting age 
population (“VAP”). The State filed for 
preclearance from the Department of Justice 
for the 1991 plan under section 5 of the VRA, 
and there was no objection to the 1991 
version of CD 1 specifically. There was, 
however, a preclearance objection to the 
1991 Congressional Plan overall because of 
the State's failure to create a second majority-
minority district running from the 
southcentral to southeastern region of the 
State.  
 
As a result of this objection, the General 
Assembly drew a new Congressional Plan in 
1992. The 1992 plan included a different 
version of CD 1 that was majority minority 
but did not include any portion of Durham 
County. The General Assembly also created 
a second majority-minority district (CD 12) 
that stretched from Mecklenburg County to 
Forsyth and Guilford Counties and then all 
the way into Durham County. The Attorney 
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General did not interpose an objection to the 
1992 Congressional Plan. 
 
Under the 1992 Congressional Plan, CD 12 
was drawn with a single-race total black 
population of 56.63% and a single-race black 
VAP (“BVAP”) of 53.34%. Under a 
mathematical test for measuring the 
compactness of districts called the “Reock” 
test (also known as the dispersion test), the 
1992 CD 12 had a compactness score of 0.05.  
 
The 1992 districts were subsequently 
challenged under the VRA, and in Shaw I, the 
Supreme Court found that the 1992 versions 
of CD 1 and 12 were racial gerrymanders in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
case was remanded for further proceedings. 
On appeal again after remand, in Shaw II, the 
Supreme Court again found that the 1992 
version of CD 12 constituted a racial 
gerrymander.  
 
Following the decision in Shaw II, in 1997 
the North Carolina General Assembly 
enacted new versions of CD 1 and CD 12. 
The 1997 version of CD 12 was drawn with a 
black total population of 46.67% and a black 
VAP of 43.36%.  
 
The plan was yet again challenged in court, 
and in Cromartie v. Hunt, a three-judge panel 
held on summary judgment that the 1997 
version of CD 12 also constituted a racial 
gerrymander in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, although the decision was 
reversed by the Supreme Court on appeal. 
 
On remand, the district court again found the 
1997 version of CD 12 to be an 
unconstitutional racial gerrymander in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Cromartie v. Hunt, a ruling that the State 
again appealed. The Supreme Court reversed 
the district court, finding that politics, not 
race, was the predominant motive for the 
district.  
 
In 2001, the North Carolina General 
Assembly enacted the Congress Zero 
Deviation Plan for redistricting based upon 
the 2000 Census. 
 
Under the 2000 Census, the 2001 version of 
CD 12 was drawn with a single-race black 
total population of 45.02% and an any-part 
black total population of 45.75%. Single-race 
black VAP was 42.31% and any-part black 
VAP was 42.81%.  
 
In every election held in CD 12 between 1992 
and 2010, without exception, the African-
American candidate of choice, Congressman 
Mel Watt, prevailed with no less than 55.95% 
of the vote, regardless of whether the black 
VAP in CD 12 exceeded 50%, and regardless 
of any other characteristic of any specific 
election, demonstrating clearly that African-
Americans did not require a majority of the 
VAP to elect their chosen candidate.  
 
A. The 2011 Redistricting Process 
 
Following the 2010 Census, Senator Robert 
Rucho and Representative David Lewis were 
appointed chairs of the Senate and House 
Redistricting Committees, respectively, on 
January 27, 2011, and February 15, 2011.  
 
Jointly, Senator Rucho and Representative 
Lewis were responsible for developing a 
proposed congressional map based upon the 
2010 Census. Under the 2010 Census, the 
2001 version of CD 12 was overpopulated by 
2,847 people, or 0.39%.  
 
They hired Dr. Thomas Hofeller to be the 
architect of the 2011 plan, and he began 
working under the direction of Senator 
Rucho and Representative Lewis in 
December 2010.2 Senator Rucho and 
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Representative Lewis were the sole source of 
instructions for Dr. Hofeller regarding the 
criteria for the design and construction of the 
2011 congressional maps. 
 
Throughout June and July of 2011, Senator 
Rucho and Representative Lewis released a 
series of public statements describing, among 
other things, the criteria that they had used to 
draw the proposed congressional plan. As 
Senator Rucho explained at the July 21, 2011 
joint meeting of the Senate and House 
Redistricting Committees, those public 
statements “clearly delineated” the “entire 
criteria” that were established and “what 
areas [they] were looking at that were going 
to be in compliance with what the Justice 
Department expected [them] to do as part of 
[their] submission.”  
 
B. The Factors Used to Draw CD 123 
 
On July 1, 2011, Senator Rucho and 
Representative Lewis made public the first 
version of their proposed congressional plan, 
Rucho-Lewis Congress 1, along with a 
statement explaining the rationale for the 
map. Specifically with regard to CD 12, 
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis 
noted that although the 2001 benchmark 
version of CD 12 was “not a Section 2 
majority black district,” there “is one county 
in the Twelfth District that is covered by 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
(Guilford).” Therefore, “[b]ecause of the 
presence of Guilford County in CD 12, we 
have drawn our proposed Twelfth District at 
a black voting age level that is above the 
percentage of black voting age population 
found in the current Twelfth District.” 
Although the proposed map went through 
several iterations, CD 12 remained largely 
unchanged from Rucho-Lewis 1 throughout 
the redistricting process.  
 
It is clear from both this statement and the 
record that race was, at the very least, one 
consideration in how CD 12 was drawn. 
These instructions apparently came, at least 
in part, from concerns about obtaining 
preclearance from the DOJ. Testimony was 
elicited at trial that Dr. Hofeller was in fact 
told to consider placing the African-
American population of Guilford County into 
CD 12 because Guilford County was a 
covered jurisdiction under section 5 of the 
VRA.  
 
That race was at least present as a concern in 
the General Assembly's mind is further 
confirmed when looking to the General 
Assembly's 2011 preclearance submission to 
the Department of Justice. There it explained 
that it drew “District 12 as an African-
American and very strong Democratic 
district that has continually elected a 
Democratic African American since 1992,” 
and also noted that CD 12 had been drawn to 
protect “African-American voters in Guilford 
and Forsyth.”  
 
The DOJ preclearance submission also 
explained that the General Assembly had 
drawn CD 12 in such a way to mitigate 
concerns over the fact that “in 1992 the 
Justice Department had objected to the 1991 
Congressional Plan because of a failure by 
the State to create a second majority-minority 
district combining the African-American 
community in Mecklenburg County with 
African American and Native American 
voters residing in south central and 
southeastern North Carolina.” The 
preclearance submission further stated that 
“the 2011 version [of CD 12] maintains and 
in fact increases the African American 
community's ability to elect their candidate of 
choice.” I note that I interpret this statement 
slightly differently from the majority. I 
conclude that this statement describes one 
result of how the new district was drawn, 
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rather than the weight a particular factor was 
given in how to draw the district in the first 
place. Essentially, I would find this statement 
is an explanation by legislature that because 
they chose to add Guilford County back into 
CD 12, the district ended up with an 
increased ability to elect African-American 
candidates, rather than the legislature 
explaining that they chose to add Guilford 
County back into CD 12 because of the 
results that addition created. 
 
However, while it is clear that race was a 
concern, it is also clear that race was not the 
only concern with CD 12. In their July 19, 
2011 Joint Statement, Senator Rucho and 
Representative Lewis stated that the version 
of CD 12 in Rucho-Lewis Congress 2, the 
second map that they put forward, was based 
upon the 1997 and 2001 versions of that 
district and that the 2011 version was again 
drawn by the legislative leaders based upon 
political considerations. According to them, 
CD 12 was drawn to maintain that district as 
a “very strong Democratic district ... based 
upon whole precincts that voted heavily for 
President Obama in the 2008 General 
Election.” The co-chairs stated that by 
making CD 12 a very strong Democratic 
district, adjoining districts would be more 
competitive for Republicans.  
 
Further, Dr. Hofeller testified that he 
constructed the 2011 version of CD 12 based 
upon whole Voting Tabulation Districts 
(“VTDs”) in which President Obama 
received the highest vote totals during the 
2008 Presidential Election, indicating that 
political lean was a primary factor. The only 
information on the computer screen used by 
Dr. Hofeller in selecting VTDs for inclusion 
in the CD 12 was the percentage by which 
President Obama won or lost a particular 
VTD. Dr. Hofeller has also stated that there 
was no racial data on the screen when he 
constructed the district, providing some 
support for the conclusion that racial 
concerns did not predominate over politics. 
 
Although Plaintiffs argue that the primary 
difference between the 2001 and 2011 
versions of CD 12 is the increase in black 
VAP, allegedly due to the predominance of 
race as a factor, Defendants contend that by 
increasing the number of Democratic voters 
in the 2011 version of CD 12 located in 
Mecklenburg and Guilford Counties, the 
2011 Congressional Plan created districts that 
were more competitive for Republican 
candidates as compared to the 2001 versions 
of these districts, including Congressional 
Districts 6, 8, 9, and 13, a stated goal of the 
redistricting chairs. Defendants argue that the 
principal differences between the 2001 and 
2011 versions of CD 12 are that the 2011 
version: (1) adds more strong Democratic 
voters located in Mecklenburg and Guilford 
Counties; (2) adds more Democratic voters to 
the 2011 version of CD 5 because it was able 
to accept additional Democrats while 
remaining a strong Republican district; (3) 
removes Democratic voters from the 2011 
CD 6 in Guilford County and places them in 
the 2001 CD 12; and (4) removes Republican 
voters who had formerly been assigned to the 
2001 CD 12 from the corridor counties of 
Cabarrus, Rowan, Davidson and other 
locations.  
 
Defendants also contend, or at least intimate, 
that the final black VAP of the 2011 version 
of CD 12 resulted in part from the high 
percentage of African-Americans who vote 
strongly Democrat. They note that, both in 
previous versions of CD 12 and in alternative 
proposals that were before the General 
Assembly in 2010, African-Americans 
constituted a super-majority of registered 
Democrats in the district, citing the 2001 
Twelfth Congressional Plan (71.44%); the 
Southern Coalition for Social Justice Twelfth 
Congressional Plan (71.53%); and the “Fair 
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and Legal” Twelfth Congressional Plan 
(69.14%). Defendants are apparently making 
the same argument the State has made several 
times previously: the percentage of African-
Americans added to the district is 
coincidental and the result of moving 
Democrats who happen to be African-
American into the district. 
 
C. Racial Concerns did not Predominate 
 
Equal protection principles deriving from the 
Fourteenth Amendment govern a state's 
drawing of electoral districts. The use of race 
in drawing a district is a concern because 
“[r]acial gerrymandering, even for remedial 
purposes, may balkanize us into competing 
racial factions; it threatens to carry us further 
from the goal of a political system in which 
race no longer matters.” To prove a claim of 
racial gerrymandering, Plaintiffs first have 
the burden to prove that race was the 
predominant factor in the drawing of the 
allegedly gerrymandered districts. 
Predominance can be shown by proving that 
a district “is so extremely irregular on its face 
that it rationally can be viewed only as an 
effort to segregate the races for purposes of 
voting, without regard for traditional 
districting principles,” (i.e., proving 
predominance circumstantially), or by 
proving that “race for its own sake, and not 
other districting principles, was the 
legislature's dominant and controlling 
rationale in drawing its district lines. ... [and] 
that the legislature subordinated traditional 
race-neutral districting principles ... to racial 
considerations.” 
 
Plaintiffs can meet this burden through direct 
evidence of legislative purpose, showing that 
race was the predominant factor in the 
decision on how to draw a district. Such 
evidence can include statements by 
legislative officials involved in drawing the 
redistricting plan and preclearance 
submissions submitted by the state to the 
Department of Justice. Plaintiffs can also 
meet this burden through circumstantial 
evidence such as the district's shape, 
compactness, or demographic statistics. 
Circumstantial evidence can show that 
traditional redistricting criteria were 
subordinated and that a challenged district is 
unexplainable on grounds other than race. 
Plaintiffs do not need to show that race was 
the only factor that the legislature considered, 
just that it predominated over other factors.  
 
If race is established as the predominant 
motive for CD 12, then the district will be 
subject to strict scrutiny, necessitating an 
inquiry into whether the use of race to draw 
the district was narrowly tailored to meet a 
compelling state interest. The Supreme Court 
has assumed without deciding that 
compliance with sections 2 and 5 of the VRA 
is a compelling state interest. Defendants in 
this case contend that, if the court finds that 
either district was drawn predominantly 
based on race, their maps are narrowly 
tailored to avoid liability under these sections 
in satisfaction of strict scrutiny. 
 
Just as with CD 1, the first hurdle Plaintiffs 
must overcome is to show that racial 
concerns predominated over traditional 
criteria in the drawing of CD 12. As stated 
above, it is in this finding that I dissent from 
the majority. 
 
Most importantly, as compared to CD 1, I 
find that Plaintiffs have put forth less, and 
weaker, direct evidence showing that race 
was the primary motivating factor in the 
creation of CD 12, and none that shows that 
it predominated over other factors. Plaintiffs 
first point to several public statements that 
they argue demonstrate the State's intent to 
draw CD 12 at a majority black level and 
argue that this stated goal demonstrates that 
race predominated. However, I find that the 
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statements issued by the redistricting chairs 
show only a “consciousness” of race, rather 
than a predominance, and by themselves do 
not show an improperly predominant racial 
motive.  
First, Plaintiffs cite to the July 1, 2011 press 
release where the redistricting chairs 
explained that: 
 
Because of the presence of Guilford 
County [a section 5 jurisdiction under 
the VRA] in the Twelfth District, we 
have drawn our proposed Twelfth 
District at a black voting age level 
that is above the percentage of black 
voting age population found in the 
current Twelfth District. We believe 
this measure will ensure preclearance 
of the plan. 
 
This statement seems similar to, and perhaps 
slightly more persuasive than, the statements 
that the Supreme Court found unpersuasive 
in Cromartie II. In Cromartie II, the Supreme 
Court considered a statement by the 
mapmaker that he had “moved [the] 
Greensboro Black Community into the 12th, 
and now need to take about 60,000 out of the 
12th.” The Court in that case noted that while 
the statement did reference race, it did not 
discuss the political consequences or 
motivation for placing the population of 
Guilford County in the 12th district. Here, 
while the statement by the co-chairs does 
reference political consequences (ensuring 
preclearance), it still does not rise to the level 
of evidence that the Supreme Court has found 
significant in other redistricting cases. While 
this statement, like the statement in 
Cromartie II, provides some support for 
Plaintiffs' contention, it does not rise to the 
level of showing predominance. It does not 
indicate that other concerns were 
subordinated to this goal, merely, that it was 
a factor. 
 
The co-chairs' later statement that this result 
would help to ensure preclearance under the 
VRA similarly falls short of explaining that 
such actions were taken in order to ensure 
preclearance, or that a majority BVAP (or 
even an increase in BVAP) was a non-
negotiable requirement. In fact, the co-chairs 
explicitly state in the same release that CD 12 
was created with “the intention of making it 
a very strong Democratic district” and that 
that it was not a majority black district that 
was required by section two (insinuating that 
it became so as a result of the addition of 
Guilford County, rather than Guilford being 
added in order to achieve that goal), belying 
that there was any mechanical racial 
threshold of the sort that would lend itself to 
a finding of predominance.  
 
Further, regarding the placement of Guilford 
County into CD 12, Dr. Hofeller testified as 
follows: 
 
My instructions in drawing the 12th 
District were to draw it as it were a 
political district, as a whole. We were 
aware of the fact that Guilford County 
was a Section 5 county. We were also 
aware of the fact that the black 
community in Greensboro had been 
fractured by the Democrats in the 
2001 map to add Democratic 
strengths to two Democratic districts. 
During the process, it was my 
understanding that we had had a 
comment made that we might have a 
liability for fracturing the African-
American community in Guilford 
County between a Democratic district 
and a Republican district. When the 
plan was drawn, I knew where the old 
97th, 12th District had been drawn, 
and I used that as a guide because one 
of the things we needed to do 
politically was to reconstruct 
generally the 97th district; and when 
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we checked it, we found out that we 
did not have an issue in Guilford 
County with fracturing the black 
community. 
 
Dr. Hofeller's testimony shows that, while the 
map drawers were aware that Guilford 
County was a VRA county and that there 
were possibly some VRA concerns 
surrounding it, the choice to place Guilford 
County in CD 12 was at least in part also 
based on a desire to reconstruct the 1997 
version of CD 12 for political reasons and 
doing so also happened to eliminate any 
possible fracturing complaint. This is 
furthered by Dr. Hofeller's deposition 
testimony, in which he explained that while 
the redistricting chairs were certainly 
concerned about a fracturing complaint over 
Guilford County, “[his] instruction was not to 
increase [the black] population. [His] 
instruction was to try and take care of [the 
VRA] problem, but the primary instructions 
and overriding instruction in District 12 was 
to accomplish the political goal.”  
 
Compare these statements with those made 
about CD 1, where Dr. Hofeller repeatedly 
testified that he was told “to draw that 1st 
District with a black voting-age population in 
excess of 50 percent because of the 
Strickland case.” He also testified that this 
goal for CD 1 could not be compromised, 
explaining that while he had some leeway in 
how high he could take the BVAP of the 
district, he could not go lower than 50% plus 
1. These are the sorts of statements that show 
predominance, rather than consciousness, of 
race and are clearly distinguishable from 
those made about CD 12, where there is only 
evidence that race was one among several 
factors. 
 
Based upon this direct evidence, I conclude 
that race was a factor in how CD 12 was 
drawn, although not a predominant one. A 
comparison of the legislative statements as to 
CD 12 with those made with respect to CD 1 
is illustrative, given that the legislature 
clearly stated its intention to create a 
majority-minority district within CD 1. 
Compared with such open expressions of 
intent, the statements made with respect to 
CD 12 seem to be more a description of the 
resulting characteristics of CD 12 rather than 
evidence about the weight that the legislature 
gave various factors used to draw CD 12. For 
example, as the majority points out, in the 
public statement issued July 1, 2011, Senator 
Rucho and Representative Lewis stated, 
“[b]ecause of the presence of Guilford 
County in the Twelfth District [which is 
covered by section 5 of the VRA], we have 
drawn our proposed Twelfth District at a 
black voting age level that is above the 
percentage of black voting age population 
found in the current Twelfth District.” While 
the majority reaches an imminently 
reasonable conclusion that this is evidence of 
an intention to create a majority-minority 
district, I, on the other hand, conclude that the 
statement reflects a recognition of the fact the 
black VAP voting age was higher in the new 
district because of the inclusion of a section 5 
county, not necessarily that race was the 
predominant factor or that Guilford County 
was included in order to bring about that 
result. It seems clear to me that some 
recognition of the character of the completed 
CD 12 to the Department of Justice 
addressing the preclearance issue was 
necessary. However, that recognition does 
not necessarily reflect predominant, as 
opposed to merely significant, factors in 
drawing the district. 
 
Plaintiffs also point to circumstantial 
evidence, including the shape of the district, 
the low compactness scores, and testimony 
from two experts who contend that race, and 
not politics, better explains the choices made 
in drawing CD 12. 
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As regards the district's shape and 
compactness, as Defendants point out, the 
redistricting co-chairs were not working from 
a blank slate when they drew the 2011 
version of CD 12. CD 12 has been subject to 
litigation almost every single time it has been 
redrawn since 1991, and, although Plaintiffs 
are correct that it has a bizarre shape and low 
compactness scores, it has always had a 
bizarre shape and low compactness scores. 
As such, pointing out that these traditional 
criteria were not observed by the co-chairs in 
drawing CD 12 is less persuasive evidence of 
racial predominance than it might otherwise 
be, given that to create a district with a more 
natural shape and compactness score, the 
surrounding districts (and likely the entire 
map) would have to be redrawn. It is hard to 
conclude that a district that is as non-compact 
as CD 12 was in 2010 was revised with some 
specific motivation when it retains a similar 
shape as before and becomes slightly less 
compact than the geographic oddity it already 
was. 
 
As for Plaintiffs' expert testimony, I first note 
that Dr. David Peterson's testimony neither 
establishes that race was the predominant 
motive for the drawing of CD 12 nor does it 
even purport to. As Dr. Peterson himself 
stated, his opinion was simply that race 
“better accounts for” the boundaries of CD 12 
than does politics, but he did not have an 
opinion on the legislature's actual motivation, 
on whether political concerns predominated 
over other criteria, or if the planners had 
nonnegotiable racial goals.  
 
Further, when controlling for the results of 
the 2008 presidential election, the only data 
used by the map's architect in drawing CD 12, 
Dr. Peterson's analysis actually finds that 
politics is a better explanation for CD 12 than 
race. As such, even crediting his analysis, Dr. 
Peterson's report and testimony are of little 
use in examining the intent behind CD 12 in 
that they, much like Plaintiffs' direct 
evidence, show at most that race may have 
been one among several concerns and that 
politics was an equal, if not more significant, 
factor. 
 
As for Dr. Ansolabehere, his testimony may 
provide some insight into the demographics 
that resulted from how CD 12 was drawn. 
However, even assuming that his testimony 
is to be credited in its entirety, I do not find 
that it establishes that race predominated as a 
factor in how CD 12 was drawn. 
 
First, as Defendants point out, Dr. 
Ansolabehere relied on voter registration 
data, rather than actual election results, in his 
analysis. Even without assuming the 
Supreme Court's admonishment about the 
use of registration data as less correlative of 
voting behavior than actual election results 
remains accurate, Dr. Ansolabehere's 
analysis suffers from a separate flaw. Dr. 
Ansolabehere's analysis says that race better 
explains the way CD 12 was drawn than does 
political party registration. However, this is a 
criterion that the state did not actually use 
when drawing the map. Dr. Hofeller testified 
that when drawing the districts, he examined 
only the 2008 presidential election results 
when deciding which precincts to move in 
and out of a district. This fact is critical to the 
usefulness of Dr. Ansolabehere's analysis 
because, absent some further analysis stating 
that race better explains the boundaries of CD 
12 than the election results from the 2008 
presidential election, his testimony simply 
does not address the criteria that Dr. Hofeller 
actually used. Plaintiffs contend that the 
legislature's explanation of political 
motivation is not persuasive because, if it 
were the actual motivation, Dr. 
Ansolabehere's analysis would show that the 
boundaries were better explained by voter 
registration than by race. However, because 
Defendants have explained that they based 
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their political goals on the results of the 2008 
presidential election, rather than voter 
registration, Dr. Ansolabehere's analysis is 
simply not enough to prove a predominant 
racial motive. 
 
This is particularly true when the other 
evidence that might confirm Dr. 
Ansolabehere's analysis is less than clear, and 
in fact provides some hesitation as to the 
analysis, rather than corroborating it. 
Specifically, Dr. Ansolabehere applied his 
envelope analysis to CD 12, a district that 
was originally drawn in order to create a 
majority-minority district, has retained a 
substantial minority population in the twenty 
years since its creation, and was extremely 
non-compact when originally drawn. 
Therefore, absent some consideration of 
other factors—the competitiveness of 
surrounding, contiguous districts and the 
compactness of those districts—it is difficult 
to place great weight on Dr. Ansolabehere's 
analysis. In other words, if a district starts out 
as an extremely gerrymandered district, 
drawn with race as a predominant factor, I do 
not find compelling a subsequent study 
concluding that race, and not politics, may be 
a better predictor of the likelihood of voter 
inclusion in a modification of the original 
district.  
 
As the Supreme Court has explained, 
Plaintiffs' burden of proving that racial 
considerations were “dominant and 
controlling” is a demanding one. In my 
opinion, Plaintiffs have not met that burden 
here as to CD 12. Plaintiffs' direct evidence 
shows only that race was a factor in how CD 
12 was drawn, not the “dominant and 
controlling” factor. As for their 
circumstantial evidence, Plaintiffs must show 
that the district is unexplainable on grounds 
other than race. Here, Defendants explain CD 
12 based on the use of political data that 
Plaintiffs' experts do not even specifically 
address. As the Court in Cromartie II 
explained, in cases where racial identification 
correlates highly with political affiliation, 
Plaintiffs attacking a district must show “at 
the least that the legislature could have 
achieved its legitimate political objectives in 
alternative ways that are comparably 
consistent with traditional districting 
principles [and] that those districting 
alternatives would have brought about 
significantly greater racial balance.” 
Plaintiffs have not done so here. In 
essentially alleging that political goals were 
pretext, they have put forth no alternative 
plan that would have made CD 12 a strong 
Democratic district while simultaneously 
strengthening the surrounding Republican 
districts and not increasing the black VAP. 
As such, they have not proven that politics 
was mere pretext in this case. 
 
Finally, mindful of the fact that the burden is 
on Plaintiffs to prove “that the legislature 
subordinated traditional race-neutral 
districting principles ... to racial 
considerations” (i.e., proving predominance 
directly), it is not clear whether compliance 
with section 5, although it necessarily 
involved consideration of race, should be 
considered a “neutral” redistricting principle 
or a purely racial consideration. Although I 
reach the same decision regardless, I 
conclude that actions taken in compliance 
with section 5 and preclearance should not be 
a factor that elevates race to a “predominant 
factor” when other traditional districting 
principles exist, as here, supporting a finding 
otherwise. As a result, the fact that certain 
voters in Guilford County were included in 
CD 12 in an effort to comply with section 5, 
avoid retrogression, and receive preclearance 
does not persuade me that race was a 
predominant factor in light of the other facts 
of this case. 
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As Plaintiffs have failed to show that race 
was the predominant factor in the drawing of 
CD 12, it is subject to a rational basis test 
rather than strict scrutiny. Because I find that 
CD 12 passes the rational basis test, I would 
uphold that district as constitutional. 
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“Supreme Court to review whether North Carolina relied too heavily on 
race in redistricting” 
 
PBS Newshour 
Jonathan Drew 
June 27, 2016 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to 
decide whether Republican lawmakers relied 
too heavily on race when they redrew North 
Carolina’s congressional districts to give the 
GOP a powerful advantage in the swing state. 
The justices added the case to their fall 
calendar — almost certainly too late to affect 
2016’s remaining races. But in the years 
ahead, it could impact partisan efforts to 
create electoral districts aimed at swaying the 
balance of power in Congress and in state 
legislatures. 
It could be heard in conjunction with a 
separate case challenging voting districts in 
Virginia, an election law expert said. 
North Carolina’s GOP leaders deny factoring 
in race to an illegal extent, saying their 2011 
map was designed primarily to give 
Republicans an edge and to comply with the 
federal Voting Rights Act. 
Opponents argue that they unfairly stacked 
minorities into fewer districts after the 2010 
Census in ways that diluted their influence.  
A federal court ruled in February that race 
was the predominant factor in drawing two 
congressional districts, and ordered the state 
to quickly produce a new map for North 
Carolina’s 13 members of Congress. That 
map was used in an unusual, separate, June 7 
congressional primary. 
The Supreme Court denied the state GOP’s 
emergency request to intervene ahead of that 
primary, but key issues remain unresolved. 
A ruling by the high court also should 
influence the outcome of a separate federal 
case challenging the districts used to elect 
North Carolina’s state legislators. 
North Carolina’s status as a swing state belies 
the uneven split favoring Republicans in the 
state’s legislature and congressional 
delegation. Narrowly contested presidential 
races in 2008 and 2012 show that voter 
preferences are split fairly evenly statewide. 
But the GOP used redistricting in 2011 to 
create veto-proof majorities of more than 
two-thirds of the seats in the state legislature, 
and the state’s congressional delegation now 
has 3 Democrats to 10 Republicans. 
The case is McCrory v. Harris, 15-1262. 
Several weeks ago, the Supreme Court 
agreed to hear a similar case, in which 
challengers argue that a 2011 districting plan 
for Virginia’s House of Delegates packed 
black voters into a dozen legislative districts, 
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strengthening Republican control of 
neighboring territories. 
The justices didn’t immediately set a date for 
hearing the two cases, which will likely be 
heard together or consolidated by the high 
court, according to Rick Hasen, a professor 
who studies election law at University of 
California at Irvine. 
Hasen wrote on his blog that five of the eight 
justices appear sympathetic to such claims 
brought by minority voters against 
Republicans, based on a 2015 ruling in an 
Alabama case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the most closely watched of North 
Carolina’s June congressional primaries, 
Republican U.S. Rep. George Holding 
defeated fellow incumbent Renee Ellmers 
after outside groups poured in money for ads 
questioning her conservative credentials. 
Holding is expected to have a wide advantage 
over his Democratic challenger in November. 
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“North Carolina redistricting delay denied” 
 
SCOTUSblog 
Lyle Denniston 
February 20, 2016 
 
Without an explanation, the Supreme Court 
on Friday night left intact a lower court 
decision that had forced the North Carolina 
legislature to draw up a new election district 
map for congressional seats, to cure “racial 
gerrymandering” in two of its districts.  There 
were no noted dissents from the order. 
The Court acted within hours after it had been 
told that the legislature in a special session in 
Raleigh had approved a new plan for the two 
districts — 1 and 12 — that a three-judge 
district court had ruled unconstitutional as a 
result of “packing” more minority voters into 
those areas. 
The Justices’ order was one of the first 
significant actions the Court had taken since 
the death of Justice Antonin Scalia.  An eight-
member Court can deal effectively with such 
matters, at least when the Justices are not split 
four to four. 
The new North Carolina districting plan 
enacted Friday specified that it would not go 
into effect if the Supreme Court had granted 
the request of the governor and state board of 
elections to postpone the district court’s order 
mandating a new map.  With the Justices’ 
denial of the state’s challenge, the new map 
will be in effect for the primary election in the 
state — now set for June 7 under a separate 
law, also passed by the legislature Friday, 
setting aside an earlier plan for the primary 
on March 15. 
The approaching date of the March primary 
was one factor that had led state officials to 
ask the Supreme Court to delay the district 
court ruling.  The panel had given the 
lawmakers just two weeks — that is, until 
Friday — to come up with a remedy for the 
constitutional violation in the two districts. 
For years, those two districts have been 
electing African-American candidates.  
District 1 is represented in the current 
Congress by Rep. George K. Butterfield, Jr., 
and District 12 by Rep. Alma S. Adams, both 
African-American Democrats. 
At a time when District 1 had a population of 
voting-age African Americans of 47.76%, 
Rep. Butterfield won election in  2010 under 
a prior map with somewhat more than fifty-
nine percent of the vote.  Under the 2011 
plan, however, with more minorities in his 
district (now at 52.65%), he won with more 
than seventy percent in both 2012 and 2014. 
In District 12, another African-American, 
Mel Watt, who preceded Adams, won the 
2010 election under a prior plan with 63.9% 
of the vote when African-Americans of 
voting age totaled 43.77%.  Under the 2011 
plan, with more minorities in the district 
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(then, 50.66), he won reelection with 79.6% 
in 2012. In the 2014 election, Rep. Adams 
won election in that district with more than 
seventy-five percent of the vote. 
Even though the results under the prior plan 
had indicated to the supporters of those 
candidates that their districts were already 
drawn in a way that assured that African-
American voters could choose candidates of 
their preference, the 2011 plan that the 
district court struck down significantly 
increased the numbers of African-American 
voters in the two districts. 
Legislative sponsors of the plan sought to 
justify the increased population of minorities 
in those areas by arguing that they needed to 
push up representation of minorities in those 
districts above fifty percent, to satisfy the 
federal Voting Rights Act.  The district court, 
however, ruled earlier this month that this 
would not justify lines for those two districts 
when race was the predominant factor in 
dictating the boundaries of the new, oddly 
shaped districts. 
Although prior Supreme Court precedents 
allow some use of racial factors in 
redistricting election boundaries, the Court 
has barred the use of race as the predominant 
factor, outranking any other political or 
practical considerations. 
A voter from each of the North Carolina 
districts had challenged the increases in 
minority voters in a lawsuit filed in 2013, but 
the case did not move rapidly, and the 2011 
plan was used in both the 2012 and 2014 
elections. 
With a trial set to begin in October of last year 
on the challenge, the legislature a month 
before had moved up the primary date from 
May 2016 to March 15.  Opponents of that 
plan argued that the governor and legislature 
were seeking to lock in the 2011 plan for this 
year’s congressional elections. 
The district court, after a trial, struck down 
the boundary lines of Districts 1 and 12 on 
February 5, leading state officials to ask the 
Supreme Court to postpone that decision, 
arguing that the process for holding the 
primary in March had already begun, and the 
state faced a chaotic situation if the 2011 plan 
were not allowed to remain in effect. 
The Court got a reply from the challengers to 
the 2011 plan on three days ago, opposing 
delay of the lower court mandate for a new 
map.  Then, earlier Friday, each side notified 
the Justices of the legislature’s new actions, 
leading to the release of the denial of the stay 
in late evening. 
The Supreme Court’s action did not judge the 
constitutionality of the 2011 plan, or of the 
new replacement for it, focusing only on 
whether the Justices thought the state 
officials might win if they went forward with 
a formal appeal of the lower court decision.
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“North Carolina's Congressional Primaries Are A Mess Because Of 
These Maps” 
 
NPR 
Tom Bullock 
March 10, 2016 
 
North Carolina voters are likely to be 
confused when they arrive at their polling 
places on March 15. In addition to 
presidential candidates, voters will see 
congressional primary candidates on the 
ballot. 
But thanks to a federal court decision, the 
districts those candidates represent no longer 
exist and any votes in those races won't count. 
Thanks to three judges, two animal shapes 
and one hastily redrawn map of U.S. House 
seats, North Carolina politics have been 
thrown into chaos. 
It started to go off the rails Feb. 5 when a 
panel of three federal judges determined that 
the boundaries of the state's 1st and 12th 
congressional districts were drawn in such a 
way as to concentrate African-American 
voters and dilute their overall influence. 
Coming just five weeks ahead of voting, 
there was no choice but to "stop the current 
election, go back, redraw the lines," said Josh 
Lawson, general counsel for the North 
Carolina State Board of Elections. 
Redrawing The Animal Shapes 
If you're not familiar with North Carolina's 
congressional map, here's where the animal 
shapes come into play. 
 
 
Credit: Alyson Hurt/NPR 
The 1st District looks kind of like an octopus 
whose body hugs the Virginia border and 
whose tentacles stretch east and west and 
halfway down the state. 
The 12th congressional district is more 
snakelike — sometimes no wider than an 
interstate — and extends more than 80 miles 
from Charlotte to Winston-Salem. 
The federal court decision surprised many in 
the state, especially because the U.S. 
Department of Justice approved the maps 
five years ago. 
Faced with the court order, the state's 
Republican Legislature opted for a drastic 
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redrawing of North Carolina's entire 
congressional map, finishing the job in just 
two weeks. 
"Eleven out of the 13 districts saw major 
changes," said Michael Bitzer, a political 
scientist at Catawba College. "Some sitting 
members of Congress woke up the next 
morning after these maps had been released 
and went, 'Oh, boy, I don't even live in the 
district now.' " 
In fact, the home of Democratic U.S. Rep. 
Alma Adams in the old, snaking 12th District 
is two hours away from the borders of the 
newly redrawn, short and squat 12th District. 
Most of the other districts were also stretched 
or shifted, which means that "lots of folks 
now have different representation than they 
did before," said Lawson. 
Primary Chaos 
The process has created a host of logistical 
hurdles for elections officials in North 
Carolina, starting with a process known as 
geocoding to determine who represents every 
voter in the state. Next, officials need to 
reprint more than 4,500 different types of 
ballots. And then there's the question of who's 
on the ballot. 
"Under the current map, 46 people are 
currently running for Congress, but that 
number would be expected to grow 
substantially," said Lawson, because the state 
has reopened the filing period to allow more 
candidates to run in the newly drawn 
districts. 
All of this takes time. So, state lawmakers 
moved the primaries for U.S. House races 
from March 15 to June 7. 
However, the March 15 ballots have already 
been printed and they include congressional 
candidates. So election officials have urged 
North Carolina voters to fill out the entire 
ballot — even though votes for U.S. House 
candidates won't be counted. 
It's an effort to avoid confusion, although 
telling voters to cast votes in a race that isn't 
happening yet is a situation that Lawson 
admits he did not foresee. 
The federal judges who threw out the original 
congressional map still have to approve the 
one drawn by the state lawmakers. If the 
judges reject it, they can tell the Legislature 
to redraw the map, or the judges will 
redistrict the state themselves. 
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Looking Ahead: Voter Identification 
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“Supreme Court Blocks North Carolina from Restoring Strict Voting 
Law” 
 
New York Times 
Adam Liptak 
August 31, 2016 
A deadlocked Supreme Court on Wednesday 
refused to revive parts of a restrictive North 
Carolina voting law that a federal appeals 
court had struck down as an unconstitutional 
effort to “target African Americans with 
almost surgical precision.” 
The court was divided 4 to 4, with the court’s 
more conservative members voting to revive 
parts of the law. The court’s brief order 
included no reasoning. 
North Carolina’s law, which imposed an 
array of voting restrictions, including new 
voter identification requirements, was 
enacted by the state’s Republican-controlled 
legislature in 2013. It was part of a wave of 
voting restrictions enacted after a 5-to-4 
Supreme Court decision that effectively 
struck down a central part of the federal 
Voting Rights Act, weakening federal 
oversight of voting rights. 
Challenges to the laws have met with 
considerable success in recent months, and 
Wednesday’s development suggested that the 
current eight-member Supreme Court is not 
likely to undo those victories. 
Gov. Pat McCrory, a Republican who is 
seeking re-election this fall, asserted that 
North Carolina had “been denied basic voting 
rights already granted to more than 30 
states.” He noted that four justices had 
supported the state’s position and that “four 
liberal justices blocked North Carolina 
protections afforded by our sensible voter 
laws.” 
The law’s critics welcomed the order. 
“This decision opens the door for fair and full 
access to the democratic process for all 
voters,” said Allison Riggs, a lawyer for the 
Southern Coalition for Social Justice. 
“Hundreds of thousands of North Carolinians 
will now be able to vote without barriers. The 
voting booth is the one place where everyone 
is equal and where we all have the same say.” 
Civil rights groups joined with the Obama 
administration in filing suit against the law, 
arguing that, several parts of the law violated 
the Constitution and what remained of the 
Voting Rights Act. A trial judge rejected 
those claims in April, but in July a three-
judge panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Richmond, 
Va., disagreed. 
The appeals court ruling struck down five 
parts of the law: its voter ID requirements, a 
rollback of early voting to 10 days from 17, 
an elimination of same-day registration and 
of preregistration of some teenagers, and its 
ban on counting votes cast in the wrong 
precinct. 
The court found that all five restrictions 
“disproportionately affected African 
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Americans.” The law’s voter identification 
provision, for instance, “retained only those 
types of photo ID disproportionately held by 
whites and excluded those disproportionately 
held by African Americans.” 
This was so, the court said, even though the 
state had “failed to identify even a single 
individual who has ever been charged with 
committing in-person voter fraud in North 
Carolina.” But it did find that there is 
evidence of fraud in absentee voting by mail, 
a method used disproportionately by white 
voters. But the Legislature exempted 
absentee voting from the photo ID 
requirement. 
The court also found that the early voting 
restrictions had a much larger effect on black 
voters, who “disproportionately used the first 
seven days of early voting.” 
The law, the court said, eliminated one of two 
“souls-to-the-polls” Sundays when black 
churches provided rides to polling places. 
In an emergency application filed 17 days 
after the appeals court ruling, state officials 
asked the Supreme Court to step in. 
Represented by Paul D. Clement, a former 
United States solicitor general in the George 
W. Bush administration, the officials 
challenged only the parts of the appeals 
court’s ruling that they said would create 
confusion in the coming election. 
The state officials asked the justices to 
temporarily restore three parts of the law: its 
voter-ID requirements, the reduction of early 
voting days and preregistration of some 
teenagers. 
In response, the Obama administration and 
civil rights groups said the state had moved 
too slowly to challenge the appeals court’s 
ruling and that undoing it would lead to 
mistakes and confusion. 
They added that the state’s lawyers had 
earlier told the appeals court that the state 
could comply with a ruling so long as it was 
issued by late July. The appeals court ruled 
on July 29. 
Changing course now, the administration 
said, “would inflict irreparable injury on 
minority voters.” 
The state asked the justices to act because it 
said the appeals court’s approach would 
“threaten voter ID laws throughout the 
nation.” 
The Obama administration responded that the 
appeal’s court’s ruling rested on “a careful 
appraisal of overwhelming evidence specific 
to North Carolina.” 
“The only voter ID laws that the decision 
endangers are those proven through 
overwhelming evidence to have been adopted 
with racially discriminatory intent,” the brief 
said. 
“This is a case about the use of race to 
achieve partisan ends.” 
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. 
Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan 
voted to reject the state’s arguments. Justice 
Clarence Thomas would have revived all of 
the contested provisions, while Chief Justice 
John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices Anthony M. 
Kennedy and Samuel A. Alito Jr. would have 
reinstated the voter ID and early voting 
provisions. 
“This ruling means that thousands of voters 
who would have been disenfranchised will 
now be able to participate in the presidential 
election,” said Dale Ho, director of the 
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American Civil Liberties Union’s Voting 
Rights Project, which represented several 
plaintiffs in the case. 
Republican supporters of the tightened 
standards, who had suggested that the appeals 
court’s judges might have been intending “to 
reopen the door for voter fraud,” took a 
measured tone on Wednesday. 
“We respect the court, but are disappointed 
North Carolina will not be among the more 
than 30 other states with commonsense voter 
ID in place for the upcoming election,” 
House Speaker Tim Moore and Phil Berger, 
the president pro tempore of the North 
Carolina Senate, said in a joint statement.
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“Election Litigation 2016: Where Things Stand” 
 
Election Law Blog 
Rick Hasen 
August 22, 2016 
With 77 days to go until Election Day, and 
early voting starting much sooner in some 
places, here is the major litigation affecting 
election procedures and voting that I’m 
watching the most closely: 
Wisconsin: One trial judge required 
Wisconsin officials to accept an affidavit 
instead of one of the strict voter ids for 
voting. A 7th Circuit panel reversed that 
holding, and we are awaiting the entire 7th 
Circuit en banc to rule on this question.  A 
second trial judge struck a number of election 
rollbacks in Wisconsin, including those 
limited to early voting. The state has 
petitioned the 7th Circuit to stay that judge’s 
order pending appeal. I expect we will hear 
something on this case this week. 
North Carolina: The 4th Circuit struck a 
number of challenged election rollbacks 
based upon a finding that North Carolina 
passed the law with racially discriminatory 
intent. The state will file a cert. petition in the 
Supreme Court, and in the meantime it has 
asked the Supreme Court to reinstate some of 
the laws that the 4th Circuit blocked. Chief 
Justice Roberts has asked the plaintiffs to file 
a reply by this Thursday, the 25th. Expect a 
ruling the following week (and given the 
slow pace set by the Chief, I do not expect the 
stay to be granted so close to the election). 
Texas: We thought things were done in 
Texas for the time being, after the 5th Circuit 
found that Texas’s strict voter id law violated 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and 
ordered a softening by the trial judge (as well 
as a remand after the election to consider 
whether Texas acted with racially 
discriminatory intent). Texas and the 
plaintiffs agreed in the trial court on an 
affidavit requirement for softening to apply 
in this election only, which seemed to settle 
things for November. But last week the Texas 
AG left open the possibility of seeking 
emergency relief with the Supreme Court to 
get the full voter id requirement reinstated for 
November. Nothing’s been filed yet, and 
given the lengthy delay and timing such a 
request would almost certainly be denied. 
Ohio: We are waiting on a couple of cases 
out of the 6th Circuit over whether the Ohio 
legislature’s rollback of early voting was 
permissible. Two lower courts said it was not. 
Frankly, I’m quite surprised these rulings are 
not out yet as time is tight—and the theories 
of the plaintiffs here seem the shakiest in 
terms of proving a violation. [Update: Only 
one of these two pending cases is about the 
early voting aspect of this law. The other 
deals with other aspects.]  We are also 
awaiting a 6th Circuit ruling on a so-far-
unsuccessful challenge to its voter purge 
procedures, for removing people from the 
ballot who have not been active voters. 
Arizona: Democrats are looking for a court 
order to make sure that the long lines that 
materialized in the primary will not reappear 
on election day. Awaiting a district court 
ruling. 
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Kansas/EAC: The D.C. Circuit is 
considering an appeal over the issue of 
whether an EAC bureaucrat exceeded his 
authority when he allowed Kansas and 
Arizona to require documentary proof of 
citizenship for voters who register to vote in 
federal elections using the federal form. 
There is also litigation over the “dual” voting 
system that SOS Kobach has put in place over 
the objections of voting rights activists. 
[Update: There’s another one of these Kansas 
cases pending before the 10th Circuit.] 
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“As November Approaches, Courts Deal Series of Blows to Voter ID 
Laws” 
 
National Public Radio 
Camila Domonoske 
August 2, 2016 
 
All summer long, the clock has been ticking 
on voting rights cases. Judges don't like to 
change voting rules too near an election, and 
November iscreeping ever closer. 
And the past two weeks, in particular, have 
been eventful: Five courts in five states ruled 
against voter ID and proof-of-citizenship 
laws. 
There's still time for appeals and stays. But 
for now, advocates for voting access are 
celebrating. 
"It's been like Christmas Day," one activist 
told CNN on Monday. 
Supporters of voter ID laws have argued they 
are necessary to prevent voter fraud. But in 
their responses, judges consistently 
highlighted the rarity of voter fraud — 
particularly through in-person voting. 
A federal judge in North Dakota went further: 
"The undisputed evidence before the Court 
reveals that voter fraud in North Dakota has 
been virtually non-existent," he wrote, as he 
rejected a voter ID law justified by fears of 
such fraud. 
Here's a look at the recent rulings: 
Texas 
On July 20, a federal appeals court ruled that 
Texas' voter ID law had a discriminatory 
impact on voters, and ordered a lower court 
to come up with a fix before elections in 
November. 
It's "probably the strictest voter identification 
law in the country," as NPR's Pam Fessler 
puts it, and activists say it disproportionately 
impacts black and Hispanic voters. 
The court agreed, although it stopped short of 
concluding that Texas purposefully set out to 
disenfranchise minority voters, as the Two-
Way reported at the time: 
"A district court had found not only 
that the law discriminated, but that it 
was intentionally designed to do so. 
The 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
saw some flaws in that conclusion 
and instructed the lower court to 
reconsider that element of the case 
and rule again — preferably after 
Election Day." 
So this case — which has been ricocheting 
through the court system for years now — is 
far from over. 
North Carolina 
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On July 29, a three-judge panel of the 4th 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals overturned 
North Carolina's sweeping voter ID law 
(which included a host of other voting 
restrictions, including shortening the early 
voting period and banning same-day 
registration). 
And — unlike in Texas — the appeals court 
ruled that North Carolina legislators had 
actually passed the law with discriminatory 
intent. 
As the Two-Way reported then, "The appeals 
court noted that the North Carolina 
Legislature 'requested data on the use, by 
race, of a number of voting practices' — then, 
data in hand, 'enacted legislation that 
restricted voting and registration in five 
different ways, all of which 
disproportionately affected African 
Americans.' " 
The court wrote that the changes to the voting 
process "target African Americans with 
almost surgical precision," and "impose cures 
for problems that did not exist." 
Wisconsin 
"Wisconsin's ID law has been the subject of 
litigation ever since it was passed by the 
state's Republican-controlled Legislature in 
2011. Proponents said the law was needed to 
prevent voter fraud, although there has been 
little evidence of voter impersonation at the 
polls," NPR's Pam Fessler reported in 2015. 
The Supreme Court declined to get involved, 
and voters had to show ID in this year's 
primaries. 
But on Friday, a U.S. district judge struck 
down several parts of the state's strict voter 
ID law — as well as other election laws 
passed by Republican state lawmakers, the 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reports. 
Among the provisions he overturned: limits 
on early voting, a requirement that people 
must live in a ward for 28 days before voting, 
a prohibition on expired student IDs and a 
ban on emailing absentee ballots to voters. 
The judge also required that anyone with 
difficulty getting an ID must be granted a 
voting ID within 30 days, the Journal 
Sentinel reports. 
In his decision, U.S. District Judge James 
Peterson wrote: 
"The evidence in this case casts doubt on the 
notion that voter ID laws foster integrity and 
confidence. The Wisconsin experience 
demonstrates that a preoccupation with 
mostly phantom election fraud leads to real 
incidents of disenfranchisement, which 
undermine rather than enhance confidence in 
elections, particularly in minority 
communities. To put it bluntly, Wisconsin's 
strict version of voter ID law is a cure worse 
than the disease." 
Kansas 
On Friday, a judge ruled that Kansas citizens 
must be allowed to vote in state and local 
elections, even if they didn't show proof of 
citizenship when they registered. 
This one's complicated. We'll let Pam 
explain: 
"Since 2013, Kansas has required 
residents to show proof-of-
citizenship when they register to vote. 
But a number of courts have blocked 
that requirement when it comes to 
federal elections — for president or 
members of Congress. In response, 
the state set up a two-tiered system 
492 
 
where those who don't show proof-of-
citizenship can vote in federal 
elections, but not state or local ones. 
But that arrangement was struck 
down earlier this year by a state 
judge, for those who used a national 
voter registration form. Still 
following? There's more. In May, a 
federal judge ordered the state to start 
registering approximately 18,000 
voters whose registrations had been 
held in suspension because they didn't 
show proof of citizenship. Kansas 
Secretary of State Kris Kobach has 
appealed. He argues that the law is 
needed to stop immigrants in the 
country illegally from voting ... 
Kobach has ordered that the 
suspended voters be registered, but 
only for federal races." 
On Friday, just days before the primaries in 
Kansas' state elections, a county judge 
overturned Kobach's order. In his oral ruling, 
he said votes from people who didn't show 
proof-of-citizenship must be counted — even 
in local and state elections. 
If the same policy holds in November's 
elections, 50,000 people could be affected, 
the Wichita Eagle reports. 
North Dakota 
On Monday, a federal judge blocked a law 
requiring photo ID to vote in North Dakota, 
ruling that the law unfairly burdens Native 
Americans in the state. 
As The Associated Press reports, North 
Dakota doesn't require voters to register, but 
starting in 2004 it has required identity cards. 
There was an exception allowing people 
without an ID to vote, as long as a poll worker 
could sign an affidavit vouching for them — 
but in 2013, the exception was overturned. 
"The public interest in protecting the most 
cherished right to vote for thousands of 
Native Americans who currently lack a 
qualifying ID and cannot obtain one, 
outweighs the purported interest and 
arguments of the State," U.S. District Judge 
Daniel Hovland wrote. "No eligible voter, 
regardless of their station in life, should be 
denied the opportunity to vote." 
Almost a quarter of Native Americans in the 
state, otherwise eligible to vote, don't have 
proper ID; that's only true for 12 percent of 
non-Indians, the AP reports. 
A question of timing 
Voter ID laws aren't the only voting-rights 
cases that have landed in the courts this 
summer. Earlier in July, the Virginia 
Supreme Court ruled that Gov. Terry 
McAuliffe didn't have the authority to restore 
voting rights to hundreds of thousands of 
felons at once; McAuliffe has pledged to 
restore those rights individually. 
In Ohio, judges ruled earlier this summer that 
the state couldn't eliminate a week of early 
voting or change laws governing how 
absentee and provisional ballots are counted. 
Those cases are currently being appealed. 
The spate of high-profile voting-rights cases 
isn't just a coincidence. For several of these 
cases, the current legal battles can be traced 
back to one Supreme Court decision. 
In 2013, the Supreme Court struck down a 
key provision of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. 
The act said the federal government had to 
approve any changes to the voting process in 
certain states — ones with a history of 
discrimination. 
In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme 
Court said the formula used to determine 
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which states qualify was outdated, and the 
requirement couldn't be enforced until 
Congress comes up with a new standard. 
Since then, a "blizzard" of changes have been 
carried out by state and local authorities, as 
the New York Times reported over the 
weekend. 
And more conspicuously, states that would 
have needed pre-approval — including Texas 
and North Carolina — passed voter ID laws 
after that decision, as Frontline has reported. 
One result: More voting-rights lawsuits than 
usual. 
"We have to go out and sue rather than 
blocking bad laws before they go into effect," 
the head of the voting rights unit of the 
Justice Department told NPR's Carrie 
Johnson this spring. "And that's been a big 
change for us."
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“Appeals Court Strikes Down Texas Voter ID Law” 
 
USA Today 
Richard WolfJuly 20, 2016 
 
A federal appeals court struck down Texas' 
tough voter identification law as 
discriminatory Wednesday, giving civil 
rights advocates a crucial victory in advance 
of the 2016 election. 
The 9-6 ruling from the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 5th Circuit, a generally 
conservative court, represents the third 
consecutive decision against the Texas law 
and sets up a potential Supreme Court 
showdown over the contentious issue of state 
photo ID rules. 
The law could have left up to 600,000 voters 
without the proper identification in this fall's 
elections, opponents claimed. Because of 
that, the Supreme Court had invited voting 
rights advocates to seek a delay in the photo 
ID requirement if the appeals court had not 
ruled by Wednesday. 
The appeals court majority said the law was 
not intended to discriminate but had that 
effect on minority voters. 
"The district court must ensure that any 
remedy enacted ameliorates (the law's) 
discriminatory effect, while respecting the 
legislature's stated objective to safeguard the 
integrity of elections by requiring more 
secure forms of voter identification," the 
court said. 
Dissenting judges said the law was 
reasonable in both purpose and effect. 
"Requiring a voter to verify her identity with 
a photo ID at the polling place is a reasonable 
requirement widely supported by Texans of 
all races and members of the public 
belonging to both political parties," they said. 
The majority ruling "fans the flames of 
perniciously irresponsible racial name-
calling." 
The law was enacted in 2011, blocked by a 
federal district judge in 2012 and then put 
into effect in 2013, when the Supreme Court 
struck down a key part of the Voting Rights 
Act that had required Texas and some other 
states to get federal approval for voting 
changes. Challengers have won every court 
case since, but the law had remained in effect. 
Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton 
criticized the court ruling. "Preventing voter 
fraud is essential to accurately reflecting the 
will of Texas voters during elections," he 
said, "and it is unfortunate that this common-
sense law, providing protections against 
fraud, was not upheld in its entirety.” 
Gerry Hebert, executive director of the 
Campaign Legal Center — which 
represented some Texas challengers 
— said "this law will no longer prevent 
eligible voters from casting a ballot this 
November.” 
Other civil rights groups applauded the ruling 
bur wished for more -- a ruling that Texas 
lawmakers passed the law with a purpose to 
discriminate. 
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“We believe that the evidence is clear that 
(the law) was passed by a legislature that 
intended to discriminate and that the law 
must be invalidated in its entirety," said 
Sherrilyn Ifill, president of the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Education Fund. 
The Texas case and another challenge to 
North Carolina's array of voting 
restrictions are the leading contenders among 
many voting rights cases to get to the 
Supreme Court as early as next year, when 
the justices could define what types of voting 
changes are allowed and prohibited under 
the Voting Rights Act. 
"There is not a lot of guidance from the 
Supreme Court on these vote dilution cases," 
Thomas Farr, a lawyer representing North 
Carolina before the 4th Circuit appeals court, 
said last month. That court's decision is 
expected soon. 
The Supreme Court has itself to thank for 
some of the laws enacted after the justices 
struck down a key part of the Voting Rights 
Act in 2013. Those laws impose new rules for 
registering and voting that could limit access 
to the polls for minorities and young people 
in particular — the coalition that 
propelled Barack Obama to the White House 
in 2008 and 2012. 
Seventeen states have new voting procedures 
in place for the November election, more than 
half of which are being challenged in 
court. Many require voters to show photo 
identification, such as the Texas law. Others 
target rules for registering, early voting and 
provisional voting, such as the wide-ranging 
North Carolina law that caused confusion and 
long lines in March's primary. 
Those wide-ranging restrictions came under 
attack as racially discriminatory before a 
three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 4th Circuit in June. One judge 
said the legislature's rush to impose 
limits after getting a green light from the 
Supreme Court in 2013 "looks pretty bad to 
me." 
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“Appeals Court Upholds Wisconsin Voter ID Rulings” 
 
Associated Press 
August 29, 2016 
A federal appeals court has refused to 
reconsider a pair of rulings affecting 
Wisconsin's voter ID law, meaning no more 
changes to the requirement are likely before 
the November election. 
The 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals on 
Friday unanimously declined to have a full 
panel of judges hear appeals of two recent 
rulings affecting the voter ID requirement 
and a host of other election-related laws. 
The U.S. Supreme Court would have to 
intervene for any changes to happen before 
the Nov. 8 election. 
The appeals court's upholding the earlier 
rulings means that Wisconsin voters will 
have to show an acceptable ID to vote, but 
those having trouble getting it can get a 
temporary ID from the Division of Motor 
Vehicles.
  
497 
 
“Appeals Court Strikes Down North Carolina’s Voter-ID Law” 
 
The Washington Post 
Robert Barnes and Ann E. Marimow 
July 29, 2016 
Voting rights activists scored legal victories 
in key presidential election states Friday, the 
most important being a federal appeals court 
ruling that North Carolina’s epublican-led 
legislature enacted new voting restrictions in 
2013 to intentionally blunt the growing clout 
of African American voters. 
The unanimous decision by a three-judge 
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th 
Circuit was an overwhelming victory for the 
Justice Department and civil rights groups. 
Election law experts consider North 
Carolina’s voter law one of the nation’s most 
far-reaching.  
In Wisconsin, where one federal judge 
already had eased restrictions on voter-ID 
requirements, a second judge found that 
additional elements of the law passed by the 
legislature and signed by Gov. Scott Walker 
(R-Wis.) were unconstitutional.  
U.S. District Judge James D. Peterson 
suggested he would strike the entire law if he 
were not bound by the Supreme Court’s 
decision that states may use properly written 
voter-ID laws to guard against voter fraud. 
“The evidence in this case casts doubt on the 
notion that voter ID laws foster integrity and 
confidence,” Peterson wrote. “The 
Wisconsin experience demonstrates that a 
preoccupation with mostly phantom election 
fraud leads to real incidents of 
disenfranchisement, which undermine rather 
than enhance confidence in elections, 
particularly in minority communities. To put 
it bluntly, Wisconsin’s strict version of voter 
ID law is a cure worse than the disease.” The 
state will appeal both rulings. 
In the North Carolina case, the 4th Circuit 
panel agreed with allegations that North 
Carolina’s omnibus bill selectively chose 
voter-ID requirements, reduced the number 
of early-voting days and changed registration 
procedures in ways meant to harm blacks, 
who overwhelmingly vote for the Democratic 
Party. 
“The new provisions target African 
Americans with almost surgical precision” 
and “impose cures for problems that did not 
exist,” Judge Diana Gribbon Motz wrote for 
the panel. “Thus the asserted justifications 
cannot and do not conceal the State’s true 
motivation.” 
The rulings — along with that of a state court 
that halted an attempt in Kansas to require 
proof of citizenship to register — marked 
important wins for opponents of restrictive 
voting laws that are being challenged 
throughout the country ahead of November’s 
presidential election. Put together, the 
decisions suggest a growing judicial 
suspicion of the wave of voting-restriction 
legislation passed in recent years by -
Republican-led legislatures that said it was 
necessary to combat voter fraud. 
The decisions are likely to prompt the states 
to ask the Supreme Court for emergency 
498 
 
action. But it is far from clear whether the 
eight justices, evenly divided between 
conservative and liberal, would get involved. 
The proximity of an election is often reason 
for justices to let an appeals court ruling 
stand. 
Federal courts have been examining what are 
popular and, to some, seemingly common-
sense laws — requiring photo ID, for 
instance — to see whether they favor one 
group over another. 
In North Carolina, for instance, the judges at 
oral arguments noted that government-issued 
driver’s licenses are an acceptable form of 
identification but that government-issued 
public assistance cards — used 
disproportionately by minorities in the state 
— are not. 
Republican leaders in North Carolina vowed 
an appeal to the high court. They issued a 
fiery statement denouncing the ruling “by 
three partisan Democrats” and suggested it 
was intended to help the Democratic 
candidates for president and governor. 
North Carolina is considered a key swing 
state, and African American voters have 
played an increasing role in making it 
competitive. 
“We can only wonder if the intent is to reopen 
the door for voter fraud, potentially allowing 
fellow Democrat politicians like Hillary 
Clinton and Roy Cooper to steal the 
election,” said Senate Leader Phil Berger and 
House Speaker Tim Moore. 
Motz, 73, was nominated by President Bill 
Clinton. The other judges on the panel were 
Henry Floyd, nominated to the federal bench 
by President George W. Bush and elevated to 
the 4th Circuit by President Obama, and 
James A. Wynn Jr., a former North Carolina 
Supreme Court justice nominated to the 
federal circuit by Obama. 
Election law experts are skeptical there is 
evidence of widespread cheating at the polls 
in this country. In particular, they find that 
voting fraud is most often associated with 
absentee balloting, rather than the kind of 
impersonation voting that ID laws are meant 
to combat. 
Speaking to reporters in Baton Rouge on 
Friday, U.S. Attorney General Loretta E. 
Lynch praised the court’s ruling and said the 
Justice Department will continue to challenge 
restrictive voting laws. “The ability of 
Americans to have a voice in the direction of 
their country — to have a fair and free 
opportunity to help write the story of this 
nation — is fundamental to who we are and 
who we aspire to be,” Lynch said. 
Democrats and civil rights groups have also 
filed suits in Ohio and Arizona. 
The North Carolina decision by the 
Richmond-based court on Friday reverses a 
485-page ruling by District Judge Thomas D. 
Schroeder that upheld the voting measures 
passed in 2013. 
North Carolina lawmakers overhauled the 
state’s election law soon after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 
which freed certain states with a history of 
discrimination from a Voting Rights Act 
requirement that they receive federal 
approval before changing voting rules. North 
Carolina was one of the states. 
Legislators quickly eliminated same-day 
voter registration, rolled back of a week of 
early voting and put an end to out-of-precinct 
voting. The appeals court’s ruling reinstates 
those provisions that civil rights groups, led 
by the state NAACP, said were used 
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disproportionately by African American 
voters. 
Motz wrote that Schroeder’s comprehensive 
examination of the legislature’s action 
“seems to have missed the forest in carefully 
surveying the many trees. This failure of 
perspective led the court to ignore critical 
facts bearing on legislative intent, including 
the inextricable link between race and 
politics in North Carolina.” 
The panel seemed to say it found the 
equivalent of a smoking gun. “Before 
enacting that law, the legislature requested 
data on the use, by race, of a number of voting 
practices,” Motz wrote. “Upon receipt of the 
race data, the General Assembly enacted 
legislation that restricted voting and 
registration in five different ways, all of 
which disproportionately affected African 
Americans.” 
The panel found the law was passed with 
racially discriminatory intent, violating the 
Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. It 
said that “intentionally targeting a particular 
race’s access to the franchise because its 
members vote for a particular party, in a 
predictable manner, constitutes 
discriminatory purpose.” 
Motz added: “Our conclusion does not mean, 
and we do not suggest, that any member of 
the General Assembly harbored racial hatred 
or animosity toward any minority group.” 
But she said the “totality of the circumstances 
— North Carolina’s history of voting 
discrimination; the surge in African 
American voting; the legislature’s 
knowledge that African Americans voting 
translated into support for one party; and the 
swift elimination of the tools African 
Americans had used to vote and imposition 
of a new barrier at the first opportunity to do 
so — cumulatively and unmistakably reveal 
that the General Assembly used [the law] to 
entrench itself.” 
“Even if done for partisan ends, that 
constituted racial discrimination,” Motz 
wrote. 
Such a finding could have meant that the 
judges could order North Carolina back 
under federal supervision. But the panel 
declined to take that step, saying it was 
enough to block the parts of the law it found 
offensive. 
North Carolina Gov. Pat McCrory (R) issue a 
short statement that, like that of the 
legislative leaders, said the decision would be 
appealed, and he repeated claims about the 
partisan cast of the panel. “Three Democratic 
judges are undermining the integrity of our 
elections while also maligning our state,” 
said McCrory, who is in a tight reelection 
battle with Cooper, the state’s Democratic 
attorney general. 
Voting rights advocates applauded the ruling 
and said it sent a strong message to 
legislatures throughout the country. 
North Carolina was one of 17 states set to 
have more-restrictive voting laws in place for 
this presidential election than in 2012. Laws 
in several states, including Wisconsin, Texas 
and Virginia, also are being challenged in 
court. 
In Wisconsin, a federal judge previously 
ruled that voters who lack the specific kind of 
identification the state requires be allowed to 
vote in November by signing an affidavit as 
to their identity. In a separate lawsuit, groups 
asked Peterson to rule on other aspects of the 
law.  
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He struck part of the law restricting hours for 
in-person voting before the election, saying it 
intentionally discriminates. “The 
legislature’s immediate goal was to achieve a 
partisan objective, but the means of achieving 
that objective was to suppress the reliably 
Democratic vote of Milwaukee’s African 
Americans,” Peterson concluded. 
In Texas, the entire U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the 5th Circuit ruled that Texas’s strict voter-
ID law discriminates against minority voters, 
and it ordered a lower court to come up with 
a fix for the law in time for the November 
elections. 
The appeals court, one of the most 
conservative in the country, declined to strike 
down the law completely but said provisions 
must be made to allow those who lack the 
specific ID the law requires to be able to cast 
a vote. The state has decided not to appeal 
that ruling to the Supreme Court, and a 
district judge is to rule soon on what 
accommodations must be made. 
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“Texas to Appeal Voter ID Ruling to Supreme Court” 
 
The Hill 
Reid Wilson 
August 16, 2016 
 
Texas will ask the U.S. Supreme Court to 
keep the state’s controversial voter 
identification law in place, three weeks after 
an appeals court found that the law violated 
the Voting Rights Act.  
Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton’s office 
said on Tuesday that it would appeal the July 
20 ruling by the 5th Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  
“To protect the integrity of voting in the state 
of Texas, our office will appeal the Voter ID 
ruling of the Fifth Circuit to the United States 
Supreme Court,” Paxton’s communications 
director, Marc Rylander, said in a statement.  
The appeals court ruling that put Texas’s 
voter identification law on ice directed the 
state and voting-rights advocates who 
challenged the law to come up with a 
compromise. A U.S. District Court judge 
approved an agreement last week that would 
allow voters without identifications to cast 
ballots if they signed a declaration of 
citizenship and provided proof that they lived 
in Texas.  
The negotiations between the state and 
voting-rights groups seemed to hint that 
Texas would live with the deal and not appeal 
to the highest court. Voting-rights groups 
criticized Texas for reversing course on 
Tuesday. 
“[Gov.] Greg Abbott, Ken Paxton and other 
Texas Republicans are terrified by the 
prospect that every Texan who can vote 
might vote, so it’s no surprise that they will 
spend more Texans’ tax dollars to defend a 
discriminatory law,” said Matt Angle, who 
runs the Democrat-backing Lone Star 
Project.  
The Texas appeal comes just hours after 
North Carolina Gov. Pat McCrory (R) said he 
would appeal a 4th Circuit Court decision 
overturning major parts of his state’s 
landmark 2013 election reform law. 
McCrory’s office said Monday that he would 
ask the Supreme Court for a temporary stay 
and allow the law to remain in place as North 
Carolina mounts its appeal. 
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“North Carolina Asks Supreme Court to Reinstate Voter ID Law” 
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North Carolina officials are asking the U.S. 
Supreme Court to reinstate key parts of the 
state's voter ID law blocked last month after 
a federal appeals court found that the measure 
intentionally targeted African-Americans. 
Lawyers for the state filed an emergency 
application with Chief Justice John Roberts 
on Monday in an attempt to allow officials to 
conduct this November's election using the 
law's the photo ID requirement and reduce 
the number of early voting days from 17 to 
10. 
The motion, prepared by former George W. 
Bush administration Solicitor General Paul 
Clement, paints the 4th Circuit ruling as a 
deliberate and insubordinate assault on the 
Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Shelby 
County v. Holder, freeing North Carolina and 
areas in 14 other states from having to 
"preclear" changes to voting rules under the 
Voting Rights Act. 
"The ... fundamental problem with the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision is its complete 
misapprehension of the legal principles that 
govern an intentional discrimination 
inquiry,” the state's application says. “Left 
standing, its decision not only will threaten 
voter-ID laws throughout the country despite 
this Court’s decision in Crawford, but also 
will gut this Court’s decision in Shelby 
County.” 
The motion filed by the state and Republican 
Gov. Pat McCrory also says: “If a voter-ID 
law can still be invalidated as intentionally 
discriminatory even when, as here, a State 
has done everything possible to avoid 
discriminatory impact, then no voter-ID law 
is safe. Under the Fourth Circuit’s 
unprecedented analysis, by contrast, the mere 
potential for retrogressive impact suffices to 
give rise to an inference of discriminatory 
intent—even if, as the District Court found 
here, retrogressive impact will not actually 
result.” 
Roberts is likely to refer the application to the 
full court, which is operating shorthanded 
with just eight justices. The votes of five 
justices will be needed to put the 4th Circuit 
ruling on hold. That seems to be an uphill 
fight, since granting the application will 
require the vote of at least one of the four 
Democratic-appointed justices, all of whom 
dissented in Shelby County. 
While the state is seeking to restore the photo 
ID rules, early voting days reduction and a 
ban on pre-registration of 16-year-olds, the 
application does not attempt to reinstate a ban 
on same-day registration and out-of-precinct 
voting. 
North Carolina’s Democratic Attorney 
General Roy Cooper, whose office 
participated in the defense of the law at the 
4th Circuit, is not listed as counsel on the 
application filed Monday. A spokeswoman 
said his office is no longer involved in the 
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cases, which were brought by civil rights 
groups and the Obama administration. 
They're expected to oppose the application. 
The request for an emergency stay came 17 
days after the 4th Circuit ruling — a longer 
delay than many observers expected and 
McCrory indicated after the loss at the 4th 
Circuit. The delay could make it less likely 
that the Supreme Court will step in by putting 
any action even closer to this fall's election. 
 
 
